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ABSTRACT
Transplantation of laws from a foreign country is an explicit
regulatory choice. It is a choice made by governments and influenced by
local and international interest groups. This Article analyzes a complex
junction where international legal transplantation encounters destructive
transactional and behavioral patterns in countries-recipients. The
governments must respond to such inefficiencies and attempt to reduce
resulting transaction costs by introducing corrections to a foreign model,
i.e., a “domestic gradient.” This research focuses on a very peculiar
“gradient”: combining public ownership of financial utilities with close
regulatory oversight as a way to mitigate destructive socioeconomic,
behavioral and transactional patterns in developing markets.
The Article focuses on a relatively unchartered territory transplanting of clearing and settlement (C&S) institutions. First, the
research analyzes the purposes and development of centralized C&S in the
U.S. and Europe. Second, the Article contrasts westernized C&S
transplants with their application in the tumultuous economies of
Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan.
Third, to assess the transplants, the research builds a theoretical
“trust model.”
The model suggests that making the national
governments active players in a financial industry like C&S, whose sole
purpose is minimizing transaction costs and improving capital exchange,
does not address the underlying behavioral and regulatory problems that
*
Assistant Professor, Rutgers School of Law, Newark—
yguseva@kinoy.rutgers.edu. I am deeply grateful to Victor Goldberg, Paul
Stephan, Martin Gelter, Vera Bergelson, Chrystin Ondersma, Michael Livingston,
Jacek Kubas, Andrey Yakovlev, Gary Francione, and the participants of the
31st Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics, the
National Business Law Scholars Conference 2014, Annual Conference of the
Italian Society of Law and Economics 2013, Arizona State University Legal
Scholars Conference 2014, and Rutgers Junior Faculty Colloquia for their
comments, suggestions, and criticisms of this article and its major policy
proposals.

525

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

GUSEVA (DO NOT DELETE)

526

4/20/2015 12:13 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 36:2

the “gradient” is supposed to remedy. These problems, the Article
emphasizes, are a multifaceted lack of trust among private parties, weak
reputational constraints, the low observability of conversion from
trustworthy to untrustworthy market actors, and an equally potent lack
of trust towards government entities in the sample.
The Article concludes by hazarding a few policy proposals on how to
modify the destructive behavioral and regulatory patterns and thus
improve C&S and capital markets. Specifically, instead of transplanting
and adjusting foreign law, the governments should resort to institutional
transplantation and introduce a neutral umpire: a purely foreign
economic party.
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1. INTRODUCTION
International legal transplanting is an explicit public choice. It
is a choice made by governments and influenced by local and
international interest groups. This Article analyzes a complex
junction where international legal transplantation as a method of
capital market development in emerging economies encounters
destructive transactional and behavioral patterns in the countriesrecipients. The governments must respond to such inefficiencies
and attempt to reduce transaction costs by introducing what the
Article refers to as a “domestic gradient,” namely, regulations
adapting the model to local economic conditions. This research
focuses on a very peculiar “gradient”: adding a public ownership
component to purely private transplants and combining such
ownership with close regulatory oversight.
Substantively, the Article examines a very complicated
transplant: centralized clearing and settlement facilities (C&S) of
transactions with securities and derivatives. The underlying
purpose of C&S is improving transactional efficiencies and
reducing the costs of participating parties. The existing models of
such financial infrastructures were designed as “accessories”
added to the already established, mature capital markets to
minimize transaction costs.1
In a nutshell, C&S involve post-trade operations and exchange
of assets and money in performance of trade obligations. The basic
purpose of clearing agencies is to assure a reliable exchange of
assets for payment in every trade and reflect the trades in
respective ownership records. As part of an efficient institutional
infrastructure, C&S institutions not only assure a reliable exchange
but also, in theory, stimulate the development of capital markets.2
See infra Section 4.
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 835-38 (2001) (reviewing studies on
institutional growth precursors); Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path
Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1683–91
(2002) (summarizing a number of studies emphasizing the role of institutions);
Douglas C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (1991) (discussing network
externalities and coordination effects of institutions); Troy A. Paredes, A Systems
Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the
Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1072-77 (2004) (discussing the typical “law
matters” thesis and finding that systemic problems often follow adopting
American corporate law in other countries).
1
2
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In a way, it is an invisible mechanism behind all capital market
transactions.
The value of this instrument for an economy and the global
market is enormous. So are its dangers.3 Efficient C&S institutions
represent regulated Pareto-superior financial conduits promoting
trust, reducing transaction costs between trading parties and, inter
alia, guaranteeing trade execution. 4 Their economic benefits are
significant in terms of the costs of capital and GDP. 5
Unfortunately, C&S facilities have also become systemically
important institutions, albeit they might not be originally designed
to serve as such. 6 Therefore, on the downside, they may
3 In the wake of the recent financial crisis, both aspects of C&S, particularly
C&S of certain derivatives like credit default swaps (CDS), were recognized by
most jurisdictions and international standard setters. See, e.g., Leaders Statement,
The Pittsburgh G20 Summit, pmbl., ¶ 1 (Sept. 24–25, 2009) (“We meet in the midst
of a critical transition from crisis to recovery to turn the page on an era of
irresponsibility . . .”); Building Our Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for the
Benefit of All, G20 Cannes Summit Final Declaration, ¶ 24 (Nov. 4, 2011)
(proposing changes to the international system); COMM. ON PAYMENT AND
SETTLEMENT SYS. & TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS,
PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES (2012) [hereinafter CPSS].
4
At its core, centralized C&S mechanisms do not differ from other
trustworthy middlemen, well-known even in primitive societies. See, e.g., JANET
TAI LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT-EXCHANGE
204–05, 10–15 (Timur Kuran, ed. 1994) (“One way of looking at the evolution of
various exchange institutions is to focus on the incentive of profit-seeking
middlemen to invent or create Pareto-superior institutions for achieving greater
trust among trading partners so as to reduce transaction costs.”).
5 See, e.g., Niels Schulze & Dirk Baur, Economic Impact Study on Clearing and
Settlement,
EUR.
COMM’N
(2006),
at
18,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financialmarkets/docs/clearing/draft/annex_2_en.pdf (finding that lower trading costs
can help to increase the EU’s GDP and reduce capital costs).
6 The systemic risk approach of the legislature is expressed, for instance, in
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, mandating more extensive oversight of systemically
important financial market utilities. Clearing agencies are on the list. The
Financial Stability Oversight Council is in charge of monitoring systemically
important institutions. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5461, 5322 (2010). In addition, as early as
the late 1980s, after the market crash, the SEC, CPSS/IOSCO, and the Federal
Reserve Board concluded, the settlement systems for all financial instruments
could become “a potential source of systemic disturbance to financial markets and
to the economy.” Securities Transactions Settlement, Securities Act Release No.
8,398, Exchange Act Release 49,405, 69 Fed. Reg. 12922, 12926 (Mar. 18, 2004)
[hereinafter SEC Release No. 8,398]. Whether C&S facilities were designed to and
can function as such is an uncertain and troublesome issue. See, e.g., Ben S.
Bernanke, Clearing and Settlement During the Crash, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 133, 143–46
(1990) (explaining the systemic strengths and weaknesses of clearinghouses). See
also infra note 60 and accompanying text.
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deteriorate into a systemic risk centerpiece.
The transplanting novices are thus wading in the perilous
waters where potential disturbances, in the words of Alan
Greenspan in the wake of the 1987 market crash, represent a great
“threat to the liquidity of . . . financial markets” and, at the same
time, serve as a source of systemic risk.7 The key ensuing question,
therefore, is the result of extrapolating a complicated systemically
important conduit developed for relatively mature capital markets
into a developing economy. Even though such an economy may
already have westernized capital markets and law, the aberrations
associated with emerging markets will still likely affect it.
What are those market and transactional aberrations? To set
the stage for the discussion, I would like to start with inviting the
reader to imagine a country where corporate insiders routinely
disregard the law; where contractual breach is commonplace;
where the level of social trust is at a record low; where the Press
Secretary of the President defiantly claims that the sheer volume of
the work done in the run-up to the corruption-riddled 2014
Olympics proves that [luckily] “not all the funds were embezzled;”
where “bankruptcy” is perceived as a code word for corporate
raidership; where businessmen are thrown in jail allegedly on a
whim of parties having ties with the authorities; and where large
chunks of the national financial system disappear overnight due to
a sovereign debt default or sudden anticorruption campaign. In
that hypothetical country, entrepreneurs paradoxically view their
release after a highly questionable imprisonment as a victory
despite the resultant loss of their companies or market share to
competitors.8 To complete this hypothetical picture, let us add to it
a spectacular exchange of Molotov cocktails between the police
and the restless multitudes.
It would not be surprising to discover that, if continued far
enough, such “events” had evolved into entrenched patterns and
7 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks
at the Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, at 7
(Mar. 3, 1995). See also SEC Release No. 8,398, supra note 6, at 12922.
8 See infra notes 117, 140, 151, 154 & 157 and accompanying text. See also D.
Peskov: V Sochi vse gotovo k Olimpiade [Sochi is Ready for the Olympics],
ROSBUS.CONSULTING
[RBK]
(Feb.
5,
2014,
9:23
PM),
http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20140205212327.shtml (interviewing Dmitri
Peskov, Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, who admits
that the construction for the Sochi Olympics has been problematic, but defends
the project by pointing to the volume of infrastructure that has been built in Sochi
as evidence that clearly not all of the construction funds were stolen).
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undermined the interaction between local governments and
regulated markets and among market participants. In other words,
the “events” might slowly accumulate into macro-level, “thick
market” 9 practices and, by implication, customary regulatory
approaches. Incidentally, local parties would be continuously
operating in a market with a low level of trust.
Such phenomena are, generally, less characteristic of the
developed economies where they are often controlled by a variety of
evolutionary developed institutional mechanisms. 10 By contrast,
the emerging markets may be viewed as “developing jurisdictions”
struggling to improve not only law but also the basic trust,
reputation, and germane information sharing and monitoring
mechanisms.
Although many developing economies experience similar
economic and transactional inefficiencies, 11 the above examples
quite obviously paint a portrait of the ex-communist economies of
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. This Article unites these three
jurisdictions into a coherent sample.
The three countries share a number of characteristics including,
not only a similar past, but also relatively comparable strong-arm
political regimes, commodity-based economic policies, interlinked
markets, high corruption rankings and problematic business
environment. These three economies cannot be easily ascribed to
the market-based, Anglo-American or more regulatory, bankbased German and Japanese models. Neither do they boast similar
evolutionary trust-building or market monitoring mechanisms.12
9 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of
Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170,
173–74 (2013) (describing market “thickness” as a function of “the number of
actors who understand themselves to be transacting under similar circumstances .
. .”).
10 See infra Section 4.
11 See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara, Governance and Corruption Constraints in the
Middle East: Overcoming the Business Ethics Glass Ceiling, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 227, 250
(2011) (discussing corruption, cultural issues, and nepotism as challenges to the
profitability and growth of businesses); Corruption in China: Not the Best Way to
Clean Up, ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/9040393
(describing the rampant corruption problem in China and its effects).
12
Trust-building mechanisms generally range from contractual to
institutional and social. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1377, 1410 n.104 (2010) (discussing contractual mechanisms and citing examples of
social mechanisms conducive to trust building). On the monitoring role of banks
and capital markets, see infra Section 2. Business practices become embedded into
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Another similarity is that Russia and Kazakhstan are members
of the new Customs Union. In addition, traditionally, Russia has
been capable of exerting significant political pressure on Ukraine,13
which is mainly due to the interdependence of the two economies.
Hence, it is possible that the three neighbors may preserve a
somewhat close economic alliance, unless, of course, the unrest in
Ukraine will continue to sway the government towards the EU.
Overall, it is only natural to combine the three economies into a
single sample.
There is also an important procedural similarity. Specifically,
after missing out on more than a century of socioeconomic and
technological revolution happening in the capitalist world, which
was mainly due to the inadequacies of the tsarist and Soviet
economies and law, 14 these post-communist jurisdictions were
forced to redefine regulatory and behavioral modes fast and
through non-evolutionary means.
Often, they resorted to westernized statutory imitation. In this
respect, the countries seem to follow the same procedural
timeframe: they have already completed at least two primary or
what I would like to call substantive and procedural stages of legal
transition and are currently in the third stage where the objective
to establish the basic contours of law, including administrative
regulations, corporate and securities law, pertinent public
oversight and judicial system, has been replaced with the search
for efficiency and transaction cost reduction. A part of this new trend
is the brand-new C&S statutes.15
a local culture and often it “is unclear . . . how to shift a country’s social norms
and institutions” to impact legal protections. Choi, supra note 2, at 1695–96.
13 See, e.g., A New Revolution on Maidan Square, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2013, at 53
(describing the “break-up of Ukraine’s [economic] deal with Europe as [Putin’s]
triumph.”).
14 It is nearly de rigueur to cite NIKOLAI A. BERDYAEV, THE ORIGIN OF RUSSIAN
COMMUNISM 94–158 (1937); G.F. SHERSHENEVICH, NAUKA GRAZHDANSKOGO PRAVA V
ROSSII [THE SCIENCE OF CIVIL LAW IN RUSSIA] 235–44 (1893).
15
This distinction is crucial since countries in earlier stages of statutory
development may need to start with transplanting basic concepts and fighting
corruption. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 2, at 1127–28, 1133–43 (discussing the
problems that most developing countries encounter when adopting financial
systems from developed economies, and arguing that developing countries’
regimes should exercise more control to boost investor confidence). By contrast,
the sample countries have already established at least statutory “basics” and now
pursue deeper institutional reforms. On the first two stages, see generally WILLIAM
E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 335–38 (1999); Lane H. Blumenfeld, Russia’s New Civil
Code: the Legal Foundation for Russia’s Emerging Market Economy, 30 INT’L LAW 477
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The first transitional period was the time of unbridled and
uncontrollable liberalization, of presidential decrees and massive
sales of state-owned assets, followed by the enactment of major
codes. It was completed roughly by the late 1990s or early 2000s as
the second period manifested itself through the enactment of more
refined versions of the key substantive and procedural statutes in
the areas of corporate and securities law and judicial procedure.16
(1996); Yuliya Guseva, Russian Mortgage Finance and Legal Reforms in Times of
Financial Crises: Transplanting American Law Models, 3 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 75 (2009).
The “third period” C&S statutes are: Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Kliringe i Kliringovoj
Deiatel’nosti [FZ RF Clearing] [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Clearing
and Clearing Activities], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ
RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF LEGISLATION] 2011, No. 7, Item 904;
Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Tsentral’nom Depozitarii [FZ RF CD] [Federal Law of the
Russian Federation on the Central Depository], SZ RF 2011, No. 50, Item 7356;
Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Vnesenii Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Nekotorye
Zakonodatel'nye Akty Respubliki Kazakhstan po Voprosam Regulirovaniia
Bankovskoi Deiatel'nosti i Finansovykh Organizatsii v Chasti Minimizatsii Riskov
[ZRK RCB] [The Law of the Introduction of Changes and Additions to Several
Acts Concerning the Regulation of Banking and Financial Institutions Connected
with Risk Reduction], art. 77-1 to 82, VEDEMOSTI PARLAMENTA RESPUBLIKI
KAZAKHSTAN [VP RK] [GAZETTE OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE RESPUBLIC OF
KAZAKHSTAN] 2011, No. 24, Item 196; Zakon Ukrainy pro Depozitarnu Sistemu
Ukrainy [ZU DS] [Law of Ukraine on the Depository System], VIDOMOSTI
VERKHOVNOI RADY [GAZETTE OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA] 2013, No. 39, Item 517;
Zakon Ukrainy pro Nacіonal’nu depozitarnu sistemu ta osoblyvostі elektronnogo
obіgu cіnnykh paperіv v Ukrainі [ZU NDS] [Law of Ukraine on the National
Depository System and Special Features of Electronic Circulation of Securities in
Ukraine], GAZETTE OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA 1998, No. 15, Item 67.
16 See, e.g., (1) Russia: GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF]
[CIVIL CODE] pt. 1–2 (Russ.) (Russian civil code); ARBITRAZHNO-PROTSESSUAL’NYI
KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [APK RF] [CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE] (Russ.)
(delineating the procedures for arbitration); Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Rynke
Tsennykh Bumag [FZ RF On Securities] [Federal Law of the Russian Federation
on the Securities Market], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ
RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF LEGISLATION] 1996, No. 17, Item 1918 (the
principal law on the Russian securities market); Federal’nyi zakon RF ob
Aktsionernykh Obshchestvakh [FZ RF ob AO] [Federal Law of the Russian
Federation on Joint-stock Companies], SZ RF 1996, No. 1, Item 1 (outlining the
principal law on joint-stock companies); (2) Ukraine: Zakon Ukrainy pro Tsіnnі
Papery ta Fondovyi rynok [ZU on Securities] [Law of Ukraine on the Securities
and Stock Market], VIDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOI RADY [GAZETTE OF THE VERKHOVNA
RADA] 2006, No. 31, Item 268 (articulating Ukraine’s foundational law on the
securities market); Zakon Ukrainy pro Derzhavne Reguliuvannia Rynku
Tsіnnykh Paperіv v Ukrainі [ZU on Securities Market Regulation] [Law of
Ukraine on State Regulation of the Securities Market], GAZETTE OF THE VERKHOVNA
RADA 1996, No. 51, Item 292 (providing clairification of Ukrainian governmental
regulation of the national securities market); Zakon Ukrainy pro Aktsіonernі
tovarystva [ZU pro AT] [Law of Ukraine on Joint-Stock Companies], GAZETTE OF
THE VERKHOVNA RADA 2008, No. 50-51, Item 384 (specifying the Ukrainian law on
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Simultaneously, the financial infrastructure and exchanges had
matured and even started experimenting with more esoteric
transplants of collateralized products.17
In the current, third period, the sample countries still resort to
incremental transplantation as the principal weapon of choice. The
objectives of the modern “imports” are improving efficiency of the
existing market institutions, including clearing agencies.
Incidentally, all three governments try to adjust the foreign models
to local conditions. Their “domestic gradient” is increasing
domestic control over the transplants. Specifically, most new C&S
facilities and exchanges have some sort of government
participation.18
The central question is whether this approach is efficiency
maximizing given the local conditions or if it represents the
“legacy of the KGB,” i.e., a possibly mistaken belief that in private
transactions, socioeconomic problems may be mitigated by
reinforcing the state. Obviously, to the extent that such reforms do
not address the underlying socioeconomic and trust issues, their
success remains questionable.
More research is needed with respect to the fluent but
fundamental behavioral modes in the transplant-recipients and the
role of the state as both a regulatory actor and a market participant.
joint-stock companies); GOSPODARS’KYI KODEKS UKRAINY [COMMERCIAL CODE]
(Ukr.) (enumerating the Ukrainian commercial code); TSYVIL’NYI KODEKS UKRAINY
[CIVIL CODE] (Ukr.) (the Ukrainian civil code); TSYVIL’NYI PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS
UKRAINY [CIVIL PROCEDURAL CODE] (Ukr.) (expounding the Ukrianian code of civil
procedures); GOSPODARS’KYI PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS UKRAINY [COMMERCIAL
PROCEDURAL CODE] (Ukr.) (setting forth the Ukrainian code of commercial
procedures); Oleg Batyuk, Shareholder Rights, Equitable Treatment and the Role of the
State, OECD 2 (2002) (mentioning all early statutes); (3) Kazakhstan:
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN (OBSHCHAIA CHAST’) [GK RK]
[CIVIL CODE (GENERAL SECTION)] (Kaz.) (delineating the civil code of Kazakhstan);
Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Rynke Tsennykh Bumag [ZRK] [Law of the
Republic of Kazakhstan on Securities Market], VEDEMOSTI PARLAMENTA RESPUBLIKI
KAZAKHSTAN [VP RK] [GAZETTE OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE RESPUBLIC OF
KAZAKHSTAN] 2003, No. 14, Item 119 (expounding the law of Kazakhstan on the
securities market); GRAZHDANSKII PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS RESPUBLIKI
KAZAKHSTAN [GPK RK] [CIVIL PROCEDURAL CODE] (Kaz.) (outlining the law on civil
procedures of Kazakhstan); Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ob Aktsionernykh
Obshchestvakh [ZRK ob AO] [Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Joint-Stock
Companies], VP RK 2003, No. 10, Item 55 (presenting the law of Kazakhstan on
joint-stock companies).
17
See, e.g., Guseva, supra note 15, at 98–100 (examining Russia’s use of
collateralized securities).
18 See infra Section 5.
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In this sense, the C&S facilities present a unique opportunity to
explore a central economic institution evolving under such
unstable conditions within an already established capital market
and legal environment.
To the best of my knowledge, no research has yet offered a
combinatory analysis of the regulatory and behavioral C&S
problems in the jurisdictions like the three sample countries.
Moreover, the existing literature on transplanting and the
importance of law in financial development lacks granularity as
academics often disregard the various stages of statutory
transplantation or cultural specifics and, by necessity, focus on
historical data or accidentally miscode local rules.19 This may cast
doubt on the prescriptive value of such research.20 In addition,
while the general research on trust, cultural foundations and law
abounds, matching specific policies with regulatory, transactional
and societal patterns and already transplanted, ostensibly
westernized, statutory premises remains understudied.21
19
See infra Section 2 (analyzing the Law and Finance and Legal Origin
scholarship). For a critique of coding errors in some Law and Finance articles, see,
for example, Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV.
FIN. STUD. 467 (2010).
20 See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 849 (emphasizing the differences in the
conceptual preoccupations of scholars in developed and developing countries);
Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV.
460, 515 (2006) (warning of the potential repercussions of being “under the sway
of the origins thinking”). An apt example of the “quantitative debates” regarding
the best legal tools is Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J.
FIN. 1, 1–20 (2006); Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement
of Securities Laws: Resource–Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 208–09, 234–37
(2009).
21
See, e.g., Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy, in
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD 77–79 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006)
(questioning “investing” in law reforms as a key method of economic
development); Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between
Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895, 932–35
(2008) (explaining why legal reforms often do not have the desired effect in
societies where informal methods of societal and economic control prevail); Tom
Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia, 34 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 829, 834, 850 (2000) (suggesting that more research is needed on the
interrelation of formal and informal practices).
Overall, the criticism of legal transplanting and institutionalism is legion.
Even major institutionalists place the market structures into a formal-informal
continuum. See, e.g., Douglass C. North, Five Propositions About Institutional
Change
1
(Washington
Univ.,
Working
Paper,
1995),
http://128.118.178.162/eps/eh/papers/9309/9309001.pdf (last visited Oct. 15,
2014) (presenting institutions as behavioral formal and informal constraints,
enforcement policies, and codes of conduct). Multiple scholars emphasize the
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This Article seeks to bridge some of these gaps by zeroing in on
the “trust problem” as part of regulatory, behavioral and, by
extension, transacting and transplanting patterns. The Article
proceeds as follows:
Section 2 explains that off-the-rack
transplanting may seem rational to local policymakers who have
put their faith in the “law-market paradigm,” viz., the empirically
proven interconnection between having efficient legal institutions
and investor protection principles and capital market
development. From this perspective, for a national politician,
transplantation both seems justified and is de facto much easier to
implement procedurally than other alternatives. Yet, as this
Section emphasizes, transplanting is typically prone to produce
efficiency losses, chiefly stemming from the crucial differences
between a foreign economy-origin and the conditions on the
ground.
Section 3 builds a theoretical model explaining why and how
the local low trust environment may undermine the efficiency of a
transactional exchange, particularly an exchange involving a
transplanted centralized intermediary, among other things,
guaranteeing trade execution. Sections 4 and 5 compare the
western C&S models with their replicas in Russia, Ukraine, and
Kazakhstan. Section 6 foregrounds the concept that using the state
to solve behavioral and transactional problems undermining
private exchange is unavailing: the necessary trust linkages are
broken not only among private actors but also between the market
and the state.
The research concludes by hazarding a few policy proposals on
how to efficiently modify the transplanted statutory foundations
and recreate the environment conducive to strengthening trust in
the state and the market. In short, the Article suggests that
although it is probably impossible to change national regulatory
and behavioral patterns overnight, it may be plausible to mend the

importance of non-legal mechanisms and trust for transactional practices. See,
e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY (1995); ROBERT PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 88, 172 (1993) (discussing social trust and the value
of cooperation in discouraging opportunistic behavior); Amir N. Licht et al.,
Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance, 35 J.
COMP. ECON. 659 (2007) (examining cross-cultural psychological values and their
influence on corruption and rule of law). Unfortunately, for the purposes of this
paper, many scholarly conclusions lack the necessary specificity that would
enable policy actors to improve specific reform outcomes.
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broken trust linkages by transplanting not merely foreign law but
an institutional umpire: a purely foreign economic party.
2. TRANSPLANTING: A RATIONAL POLICY CHOICE
OR SPECTACULAR MISTAKE?
2.1. Rationality and Personal Gains
Transplanting is a statutory method with a long history. In
theory, there is nothing inherently irrational about transplanting
the best international practices and adapting them to local market
conditions. That is if, first, such practices are deemed conducive to
jumpstarting a financial model or instrument and, second, the
adaptation actually responds to the local market inefficiencies and
realities.
On the first point, it takes only one logical step to connect
transplanting of foreign templates to better economic outcomes,
which makes transplantation not only a natural solution but also a
methodology supported by solid comparative data. Indeed, there
is a presumptive interconnection between having efficient legal
institutions, investor protection and corporate law principles and
capital market development across a number of markets.22 This
interconnection appears to validate the enduring efforts of multiple
international institutions to galvanize developing economies by
exporting foreign law.23
22 See generally Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing,
88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 463 (2008); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins,
117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002); Rafael La Porta et al. (2006), supra note 20; Rafael La
Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285,
291-98 (2008); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J.
FIN. 1147, 1147–49 (2002); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate
Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 24 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106
J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1113–17 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of
External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and
Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 503–06; Jeffrey
Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 188–90
(2000); Hans B. Christensen et al., Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation:
Hysteresis, Implementation, and Enforcement (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research
(“NBER”),
Working
Paper
No.
16737,
2011),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16737.
23 Such reforms are often far from being a success story. See, e.g., Gianmaria
Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM.
J. COMP. L. 93, 115 (1995) (concluding that “[t]he influence of foreign models, and
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Thus, from a perspective of a domestic policymaker, the
following algorithmic simplification may appear both feasible and
tempting: certain law models, in tandem with enforcement,
translate into (or are statistically associated with) more developed
financial markets.24 This is, in a manner of speaking, the “national
law-market paradigm.” Transplanting is merely an accompanying
procedural mechanism to do that, the mechanism palatable in
terms of its efficiency and, even more so, due to its simplicity.
For a national politician, transplantation is much easier to
implement procedurally than resorting to other alternative
methods. First, it does not require substantial upfront investments,
except a good translating service. Second, the actual payoffs
(whether profits or losses) are realized only in the next political
cycle. Finally, state actors may be less likely to spend resources on
investigating an issue instead of committing to the well-tested best
practices of a handful of jurisdictions-origins.
To continue the agency costs story, to both politicians and
business lobbies a foreign template may appear acceptable.
Drafting parties may either believe that the foreign product is good
“as is” and that the time and costs of drafting new rules would
exceed the value of the ultimate statute or, alternatively, they may
their reception by the legislators of old and new post-socialist states has reached
dimensions never before seen,” but that a “preliminary economic analysis of costs
and benefits” of adopting should be carried out to ensure the new legislation is in
the best interests of the country concerned); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation
Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 294 (2010)
(referring to the transplantation of American templates to facilitate the
privatization of Russia and other developing economies); Richard A. Posner,
Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RES.
OBSERVER 1 (1998) (outlining various examples of countries adopting foreign laws
and noting that “[s]uch grafts do not always take”); Roe, supra note 20, at 464–65;
(noting in particular that, if financial markets require political support, “then
building the legal structures in the midst of a hostile polity would waste resources
and risk disappointment.”); id. at 515–16 (discussing the cost of failed attempts to
establish new legal systems).
24
This simplification seems plausible even though it ignores causational
analysis. See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 835–38 (discussing the limitations of
available data and finding that “[t]he most that can be said” is that this data is
consistent with “correlations between strong investor protection and faster
growth, and between strong capital markets and growth”); Choi, supra note 2, at
1658 (considering how a country develops “good law” and whether that law
should be mandatory); Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and
Financial Development 26 (NBER, Working Paper No. 10126, 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10126 (referring to analyses finding “a strong
connection between investor protection laws and both ownership concentration
and the private benefits of corporate control.”).
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be affected by the typical cognitive biases. Among others, regret
aversion and normality bias may force them to minimize their risks
and mimic the rest of the world’s behavior, particularly at the takeoff stage. The drafting lawyers and lobbyists will be similarly
affected by the aforesaid biases and merely follow the herd “[s]ince
it is difficult to know what is a good innovation in contract [or, in
our case, statutory model] design.”25
Agency costs aside, borrowing a basic foreign template seems
to represent an epitome of the collective wisdom of more
developed markets. 26 Furthermore, uniformity across markets
creates network externalities and increases switching costs, 27
forcing the reformers to adopt a replica with certain minimal
modifications. This uniformity may become particularly useful in
case of cross-border C&S requiring access by domestic members to
foreign C&S entities, which follow international rules.
To conclude, the reasons for replication may vary from the
national “law-market paradigm” or typical agency costs and
cognitive limitations leading to errors in judgment and drafting
cost minimization to the legitimate signals to foreign
counterparties that the national public and private institutions
deserve to be admitted into the elite clubs of international market
facilities and regulators.28 Hence, once a model is identified by
leading foreign markets and irrespective of future regulatory
frictions, which may be substantial in the case of implementing
highly technical models like C&S,29 a foreign transplant is readily

25
MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION 149 (2012). See also Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and
Legal Change, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1153 (1983) (noting that rules may be
adopted due to their perceived “logical elegance” without regard to practical
effect).
26 GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 25, at 74–79 (discussing “learning externalities
and free riders”).
27 Id. at 79–80. In this analysis, Gulati and Scott’s contract drafting theory is
analogized with transactional law drafting.
28
On the benefits of joining regulatory clusters, see, for instance, Chris
Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J.
257, 289–305 (2011) (discussing “impediments” to international financial law
compliance); Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
327, 331–32 (2010) (“[A] multilateral club will likely comprise a powerful lever for
convergence, in part due to the low adjustment costs involved in cooperation and
its relatively high reciprocal benefits for members.”).
29
A key example of the “friction-creators” is the IOSCO Principles.
Regulators even in the “most advanced” jurisdictions with a long history of C&S
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accepted. Such replication within the law-market paradigm
becomes a politically palatable and procedurally easy solution for
the followers.
2.2. A Dearth of Alternatives
The rationality of transplanting is also supported by the simple
fact of life: domestic actors often do not have an efficacious
alternative. Procedurally, there are, obviously, several
developmental strategies, whose efficiency and eventual impact on
national economies differ substantially. The nature and outcomes
of such reforms may be crudely summarized as follows:

supervision are puzzled by how to implement them in practice. See, e.g., Eur. Sec.
& Mkts. Auth., Consultation Paper: Draft Technical Standards for the Regulation
on OTC Derivatives, CCPs and Trade Repositories, ESMA/2012/379, ¶ 117 (June
25, 2012) (observing that “in many cases, . . . global standards are not specific
enough”); see also Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, Derivatives Clearing
Organizations and International Standards, 17 C.F.R. § 39, 140, 190, 78 Fed. Reg.
50259 (Aug. 16, 2013) (outlining procedural standards for the IOSCO).
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TABLE I: The Nature and Outcomes of Legal Reforms
Mechanisms

Actors
Domestic
market
(possibly,
global
companies) &
national
politicians
Domestic
market
through
leading
market actors

Strong
domestic
policy actors

Politicians,
possibly,
business
lobbies and
international
institutions

Domestic

Foreign

Timing

Result

Evolution
coupled with
limited
harmonization
and
transplanting

-

Longterm

Stable,
ex
ante
predictable

-

Transplanting through
Bonding

Longterm

Questionable

Purely
economic
changes
through
economic
“dictatorship”

Possible
ex
post
borrowing

Shortterm

Unpredict
-able,
profound

-

Transplanting through
selected
statutes,
possible
international
convergence

Shortterm

Questionable

The first method is the natural, long-term evolution of a market
or cluster of markets. 30 Scholars may ascribe such evolution to
30 Examples of such evolution abound. See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 792
(“[A]udited financial statements and other disclosure requirements for public
companies . . . can emerge [as a custom] through stock exchange rule or common
practice, as it did in the United States.”); Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The
Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459,
460–82 (2001) (arguing that before the enactment of corporate laws the British
capital market was already well developed); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of
Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and
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“upstream” or “downstream” law production techniques or a
Regardless of the formats, the
combination thereof. 31
improvements, including the western C&S reforms, are never
entirely alien to the markets-origins.32
Since, self-evidently, that is not the story of countries like our
three sample economies, the developing world, by necessity,
should pursue other modi operandi. Those methods are shortcuts
employed by state actors, international institutions or local market
players.
The first subtype of such second-best reforms originates with
the market actors themselves. Specifically, companies may “bond”
themselves to foreign institutions and best practices for the
purposes of signaling their better quality to the global market. By
setting themselves apart from their domestic brethren, they seek to
access foreign markets for goods and capital on cheaper terms.33
How do companies do that? – usually, by way of cross-listing their
securities on reputable foreign exchanges.34
In theory, a certain point of saturation through “bonding”35
may be reached in terms of (a) the number of cross-listing
companies and (b) the typicality of the “bonding” practices. The
Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (2001) (“Much historical evidence suggests that legal
developments have tended to follow, rather than precede, economic change.”)
(citation omitted).
31 On the procedural aspects of both methods, see Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing
International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1584–88 (2011) (discussing “upstream” and
“downstream” production of international law).
32
Coffee (2001), supra note 30, at 24–58 (outlining the historical market
development of U.K. and U.S. securities markets and contrasting these with those
of France and Germany).
33
See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of
Enforcement, 156 U. PA L. REV. 229, 231–47 (2007); Edward M. Iacobucci, Toward a
Signaling Explanation of the Private Choice of Corporate Law, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
319, 334–36 (2004).
34
Coffee (2007), supra note 33, at 284–92 (providing the “bonding
explanation” for cross listing and its impact); Yuliya Guseva, Cross-Listings and the
New World of International Capital: Another Look at the Efficiency and
Extraterritoriality of Securities Law, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 411, 425, 440 (2013) (providing
examples of the effects of listings on home, United States, and other foreign
markets).
35 The term was primarily used by Professor Coffee. See Coffee (2007), supra
note 33, at 284 (explaining the “bonding hypothesis”); John Coffee, Jr., The Future
as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its
Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 674–76 (1999) (discussing “bonding
mechanisms” as an explanation for “abnormal price movement on a U.S. listing”
and providing evidence in support).
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bonding standards thus become substitutes for domestic law and
may turn into a domestic exemplar. This evolution may connote
soft “transplantation through bonding.” If one ignores other
variables, such as the history of regulatory cooperation and close
economic and political ties, one may view Canadian and Israeli
companies, often cross-listing their securities in the U.S., as an
example of transplanting through bonding.
However, in the case of C&S, domestic actors cannot “bond”
easily since domestic C&S facilities are dovetailed with domestic
exchanges and broker-dealers operating within a certain
jurisdiction and licensed as such. In sum, it is not a mobile capital
and cross-listing story. Most importantly, bonding, as an indirect
standard-setting method, seems only somewhat efficient, at least as
concerns our sample jurisdictions, where only a few companies
cross-list their securities abroad. There is no evidence that bonding
has been an influential factor in setting local market rules in the
sample.36
In the second subtype of the second-best reforms, the leading
actors are powerful political groups, who push for purely
economic changes.
Many developing economies, including
Eastern Europe, have routinely resorted to this course of action to
implement market reforms. Among many characteristics of such a
course of action is the absence of a solid statutory ground, which is
built up later, when the market and courts begin to cope with new
economic realities. In the wake of the collapse of the USSR, for
instance, East European countries, just like earlier in their history,
resorted to a species of “benevolent dictatorships,” overturning
existing social foundations first and building up institutional and
statutory underpinnings for their economic progenies later.37
36 Only a handful of companies cross-list. Guseva, supra note 34, at 501
(graphing the number of cross-listed companies between 2007 and 2011); DR
Directory,
BANK
OF
N.Y.
MELLON,
http://www.adrbnymellon.com/dr_directory.jsp (last visited Oct. 19, 2014)
(listing cross-listed companies). Moreover, the stigma associated with the high
riskiness of local peer-firms and unreliable institutions is not entirely washed off
through cross-listings. See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 784, 823 (discussing the
downsides of cross-listing and noting that “[a] company’s reputation is strongly
affected by the reputations of other firms in the same country”). Id. at 784.
37 On the concept of such “dictatorships,” see generally Ronald J. Gilson &
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing
Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2011). Unfortunately, reforms involving
private property cannot be fully explained by the “benevolence” or welfare
concerns of the elites and implicate more sinister considerations and rent-seeking.
See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, Toward a Positive Theory of Privatization: Lessons from
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Although such structural reforms usually produce long-term
market consequences, there are several important caveats that
militate against a liberal exercise of such democratized (vel non)
economic dictatorship. Specifically, the ultimate success of the
reforms and the actual state of a thus modernized economy may be
ex ante unpredictable. This vitiates orderly reform processes. An
efficient implementation of this course of action requires at least
some, if not substantial, knowledge and expertise on the part of
market actors, courts and regulators, who have to adjust to new
circumstances and monitor the transition. All too often, that has
not been the case in the developing economies.38
Thus, a third, more neutral option for an “incipient” democracy
is to introduce market-oriented statutes as fast as possible. As
discussed earlier in this Article, the most expedient way to set forth
the contours of law is by “borrowing” foreign templates and
incorporating them into local legal systems.39 After all, everyone
hopes that having a “stellar” law will lead to a better marketplace,
while local business lobbies, including exchanges and brokerdealers, and politicians may be more inclined to subscribe to some
international framework commitments. This is precisely what
happened in the sample jurisdictions, which looked to foreign
clearing models and adopted them with some modifications.

Soviet-Type Economies,
in
ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 324, 357 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari &
Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997) (“[T]he prevalence of spurious privatization suggests
not only the work of rent seeking groups, but also the inability of such groups to
reach a consensus as to their collective work.”).
38 See generally Stephan, supra note 37, at 357; Daniel Berkowitz et al., The
Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003); Bernard Black et al., Russian
Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731
(2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from
Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1 (1999) (comparing the Polish and Czech
reforms); Edward Glaeser et al., Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 Q.J. ECON. 853, 855–
56 (2001) (comparing the Polish, Czech and Hungarian capital market reforms).
39
Alternatively, jurisdictions may create functional substitutes
amalgamating new foreign and preexisting domestic components. See, e.g., Coffee
(2010), supra note 23, at 346–49; Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance:
Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001). The following
analysis of local “trust” problems is equally applicable to such partial substitutes.
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2.3. The Downsides of Transplanting and the Necessity of a “Gradient”
Unfortunately, the ease and feasibility of a process as such is
not per se predictive of its successful outcome. 40
The
transplantation technique is prone to well-acknowledged efficiency
losses, usually stemming from the crucial differences between a
foreign economy-origin and the conditions on the ground, in a
transplanting jurisdiction. Those may include path dependent
legal or social cultures, inefficient domestic enforcement,
inadequate judicial expertise, and other factors.41 As a result, even
though transplanting, as a procedural option, is more convenient,
expedient and plausible, its ultimate objectives may be thwarted by
a combination of the foregoing factors, preventing engrafting a
replica onto a foreign soil. Thus, it is rational for policymakers in
developing economies not only to borrow but also to adapt certain
provisions of a transplanted prototype to local realities by inserting
a “domestic gradient.”
When local market institutions already exist, the gradient may
simply tweak the old infrastructure to facilitate a more efficient
transactional exchange among a set of such preexisting economic
actors. 42 The changes may also reflect the interests of such
40 See, e.g., Coffee (2010), supra note 23 (citing failures of Russian corporate
law transplanting).
41 See generally John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in
Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219,
280–83 (2011) (suggesting that law is the “least likely . . . pathway for change”);
Berkowitz et al., supra note 38 (focusing on institutional underpinnings as part of
“legality” and its economic consequences); Black, supra note 2, at 846–48
(emphasizing that some institutions are not transplantable and that transplantrecipients must solve “core problems, including the information asymmetry and
self-dealing problems” as a precondition to convergence); Choi, supra note 2, at
1694–95 (emphasizing the importance of pre-existing “country-specific
environment” and path dependence); Coffee (2010), supra note 23, at 294–95, 350
(noting that “scholars have found that transplanted legal rules tend to perform
poorly . . . unless the local culture is receptive”); Glaeser & Shleifer (2002), supra
note 22, at 1196–97 (emphasizing the mismatch between “the transplantation of
rules designed for a system with a relatively benign government” and more
autocratic regimes); Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on
Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 98, 112 (2002) (emphasizing the need
for “complementarities between the new law and preexisting legal institutions”);
Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION
325 (2000) (advocating legal arrangements that encourage outside financing).
42 “Tweaking” can take various forms of course, ranging from functional
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preexisting policy actors.43 For instance, the fully-fledged financial
institutions in the three sample economies might have played a
role in the drafting processes and reinforced their participation in
the C&S facilities.44 Unfortunately, if the resultant gradient solely
protects local vested interests and does not address the underlying
cultural and socioeconomic differences between the jurisdictionorigin and the transplant-recipient, the transplant may perform
poorly.
In the case of C&S, the general notion that transplants fail due
to the differences between original and local conditions or a wrong
gradient does not fully capture all potential problems. The
repercussions of a failure of a C&S institution are exacerbated by
the very nature of these systemically important facilities. Compare
the following scenarios: In one case, a new business association
statute is imported in a jurisdiction-recipient. If the relevant
transplanting statute favors only certain parties, the market as a
whole may ignore the transplant and employ alternative business
association formats. In another case, the transplant itself is a
systemically important institution. It is also a monopoly and local
parties cannot switch to other providers of similar services or
resort to alternative methods of transacting. The latter example is
the case of C&S.
The combination of a market monopoly and systemic
importance implies that the transplanted institution and the local
market participants continuously depend on each other’s
performance and that they all must operate within a certain
cultural and socioeconomic environment. Hence, in order to assess
the validity of the C&S gradient, it is imperative to juxtapose the
socioeconomic conditions in the transplant-recipients that may
bear on the risks and business operations of the clearinghouses
with the structure, objectives and risks of these transplanted
entities.

substitutes to combining multiple features, without reinventing the wheel.
43 See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 41, at 280–83 (observing this trend in
takeover regimes).
44 Even if a true “capture” by an interest group did not occur, domestic share
ownership requirements (discussed below) and heavy reliance on national
regulators might be indicative of some lobbying on the part of the powerful local
actors. See infra Section 5; see also UNICREDIT, MARKET PROFILE JUNE 2014: UKRAINE
6 (2014) (mentioning that some Ukrainian professional associations have amassed
a significant lobbying power).
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3. ASSESSMENT STRATEGY: TRUST IN TRANSACTIONS
3.1. Introduction
This Section begins with the analysis of C&S institutions, a
dangerous and systemically important transplant. The Section
then places these institutions within the socioeconomic conditions
of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The analysis concludes that
due to both the nature of the transplant and the fundamental trust
concerns in the sample jurisdictions, their new C&S facilities pose
serious market risks.
3.2. What are the Clearing and Settlement Transplants?
3.2.1. Parties and Functions
C&S institutions are very complex and systemically important
market entities, which developed in the transplant-origin
jurisdictions, i.e., the U.S. and some European countries, over the
course of more than half a century.
They perform post-trade
45
operations, including two broad categories of services: clearance
and settlement.
In simple terms, clearing involves trade
comparison, matching, confirmation, registration, netting and riskmanagement, including collateralization and margining, while
settlement is merely an exchange of money and securities (or other
assets) in performance of trade obligations.46
The functional perspective on modern “clearing” often
presumes the existence of entities like central counterparties
(“CCPs”). 47 CCPs, for example, send trade confirmations and
45 See generally Craig Pirrong, The Industrial Organization of Execution, Clearing
and Settlement in Financial Markets 6–8 (Ctr. for Fin. Stud., Working Paper No.
2008/43, 2007), available at www.cba.uh.edu/spirrong/Clearing_silos.pdf.
46 Id.; see also Robert R. Bliss & Robert S. Steigerwald, Derivatives Clearing and
Settlement: A Comparison of Central Counterparties and Alternative Structures, 30 J.
ECON. PERSP. 22 (2006) (articulating the importance of clearing and settlement
systems to the stability of the financial system, especially in the global market);
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of
Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 317 (1990)
(trading within the major United States securities exchanges and the OTC markets
are cleared and settled by the combined efforts of the Depository Trust Company
and the National Securities Clearing Corporation).
47
TINA P. HASENPUSCH, CLEARING SERVICES FOR GLOBAL MARKETS: A
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settlement instructions to depositories or other settlement
institutions and help trading parties complete securities trades
promptly and efficiently.
In the case of derivatives, C&S,
obviously, also involves position management.48
The key services of CCPs comprise of: (1) novation (when a
CCP acts as a buyer and seller in each trade, thus substituting itself
for the original parties to the transaction, 49 undertaking the
counterparty default risk and providing a guarantee of execution);
(2) multilateral netting services, 50 which have generally replaced
bilateral clearing of obligations between direct trade
counterparties; 51 and (3) risk management through membership
standards, collateral requirements, capital adequacy requirements,
members’ guarantee funds52 and margining standards, including
an “initial margin,” usually required after trade execution, and a
“variation margin,” assessed according to regular, usually daily,
reevaluation of members’ open positions, if any. 53 CCPs also
facilitate “straight-through processing” (“STP”) of transactions
FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLEARING INDUSTRY 17–40 (2009).
48
See, e.g., John McPartland, Clearing and Settlement Demystified, FED. RES.
BANK OF CHI., No. 210 (Jan. 2005) (explaining how clearing and settlement systems
for various financial assets work).
49 COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS. & TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L
ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 45
(2001), http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss46.pdf?noframes=1.
50
COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS. & EURO-CURRENCY STANDING
COMM. OF THE CENT. BANKS OF THE GRP. OF TEN COUNTRIES, OTC DERIVATIVES:
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES AND COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT 43 (1998)
[hereinafter CPSS (1998)].
51 Larry E. Bergmann, Senior Associate Dir., SEC Div. of Mkt. Reg., Speech at
International Securities Settlement Conference: The US View of the Role of
Regulation in Market Efficiency (Feb. 10, 2004)
(transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch021004leb.htm); see also Kirsi Ripatti,
Central Counterparty Clearing: Constructing a Framework for Evaluation of Risks and
Benefits 5, (Bank of Finland, Discussion Paper No. 1, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=787606 (emphasizing the
importance of a competitive clearing environment).
52
See, e.g., Raymond Knott & Alastair Mills, Modelling Risk in Central
Counterparty Clearing Houses: A Review, FIN. STABILITY REV. 162 (2002), available at
http://www.jscc.co.jp/en/ccp12/ materials/docs/0416/2.pdf (mapping out the
ways in which CPPs “help market participants manage the risk of nonperformance by their counterparties”).
53 See generally Bernanke, supra note 6, at 137 (explaining margining). See also
Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp. v. S.E.C., 590 F.2d 1085, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(discussing generally the creation of a national system for clearance and
settlement of securities transactions); Pirrong, supra note 45 (explaining the
operations of the national system for clearance and settlement).
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based on a series of automated transfers between the original
parties and a number of intermediaries.54
Interfacing with CCPs are central securities depositories
(“CSD”), which generally perform custodial, depository and
settlement services. Depositories, for instance, accept deposits of
certificates from broker-dealers and other financial institutions,
credit and debit accounts of participants, and effect book-entry
transfers of securities.55 Typically, a CSD holds securities “in a
fungible bulk; each participant or pledgee having an interest in
securities of a given issue credited to its account has a pro rata
interest in the physical securities of the issue held in custody by the
securities depository in its nominee name.”56
Although CCPs and CSDs perform different functions, a single
statutory definition and similar principles often apply to both.57
Structurally, all CSDs and CCPs fall into two categories: some are
independent entities, often owned by the actual users of their
services, while others are affiliated with one or several major
exchanges.58
3.2.2. The Risks and Benefits of Centralized C&S
In any interconnected marketplace, a centralized C&S structure
becomes a double-edged sword. 59 For instance, since a CCP
54
See, e.g., CPSS (1998), supra note 50, at 44 (defining “straight-through
processing”).
55
See, e.g., Depository Trust Company, Rules, By-Laws and Organization
Certificate of the Depository Trust Company (June 2013) (outlining rules and common
services of depositories).
56 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 20,221 (Sept. 23, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg.
45167-02 (Oct. 3, 1983).
57 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23) (2012) with 7 U.S.C. § 1a(15) (2014); see also
Thomas L. Hazen & Jerry W. Markham, Broker-Dealer Operations Under Securities
and Commodities Law, SECBDOP § 13:24 (2010) (explaining clearing house
regulation in the futures industry).
58 Both structures have their pros and cons. See, e.g., Pirrong, supra note 45;
Jean-Charles Rochet, “The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in the Securities
Clearing and Settlement Industry,” IDEI, Toulouse University (2004),
www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/1/1627/papers/rochet.pdf (discussing negative
effects of silos); Heiko Schmiedel et al., Economies of Scale and Technological
Development in Securities Depository and Settlement Systems, 30 J. BANKING & FIN.
1783 (2006); Alistair Milne, The Industrial Organization of Post-Trade Clearing and
Settlement, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 2945 (2007).
59 See, e.g., CPSS, supra note 3, at 18 (explaining the general applicability of
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“interposes” itself between buyers and sellers and provides a
guarantee that every trade will be completed according to its
terms, it mitigates the counterparty risk of the transacting parties.
At the same time, the guarantee exposes the CCP, and thereby the
whole clearing system, to the counterparty credit risk.60 Defaults
by large customers theoretically can cause a “contagion” of
failures. In that scenario, clearinghouses would have to perform
under guarantee arrangements and look to their clearing funds,
thus effectively spreading the losses among all CCP members such
as broker-dealers or futures commission merchants. These
structural issues may aggravate the systemic and moral hazard
risks.61
An implication of these risks is that when investors rely on the
clearinghouses’ guarantees and monitoring and become less
dependent on the financial stability and reliability of futures
the Principles and the presumption that CSDs and CCPs are systemically
important).
60 See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673,
676–78 (1987) [hereinafter Ivanhoe Partners] (highlighting the unique position of
the NSCCs as both buyer and seller, creating a grave risk for the market should a
company fail to pay the NSCC, which would prevent the NSCC from paying its
sellers, thereby causing a chain reaction with adverse effects on the entire market);
U.S. GOV’T ACCT. OFF., PAYMENTS, CLEARANCE, AND SETTLEMENT: A GUIDE TO THE
SYSTEMS, RISKS, AND ISSUES 47–90, (1997) (reviewing counterparty risk mitigation
and regulation with respect to all major clearinghouses); RALPH S. JANVEY,
REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES MARKETS 1-45 (1992); David Bates
& Roger Craine, Valuing the Futures Market Clearinghouse’s Default Exposure During
the 1987 Crash, 31 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 248, 264 (1999) (explaining the
limitations of efforts to decrease risk in a centralized system); Sean J. Griffith,
Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market in Derivatives
Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1300–05 (2014) (highlighting that derivative
transactions create significant counterparty credit risk).
61 Id.; see also Bernanke, supra note 6 (emphasizing the potential risks of a
centralized clearinghouse); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET
MECHANISMS 51–55 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter BRADY COMMISSION REPORT]; U.S. GOV’T
ACCT. OFF., CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM: THE STOCK, OPTIONS, AND
FUTURES MARKETS ARE STILL AT RISK (1990) [hereinafter GAO, CLEARANCE AND
SETTLEMENT REFORM] (advocating for one regulatory body with responsibility for
rationalizing intermarket issues to better prevent a breakdown of the entire
financial system). The moral hazard risk may also affect the market monitoring
functions making netting and proper operational safeguards more important. See,
e.g., Craig Pirrong, The Clearinghouse Cure, 31 REG. 44, 45, 48 (2008–2009); Craig
Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting, Asymmetric
Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks Through a Central Counterparty 39–41
(Jan. 8, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1340660. See
also Franklin R. Edwards, The Clearing Association in Futures Markets: Guarantor and
Regulator, 3 J. FUTURES MARKETS 369, 375–92 (1983).
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commission merchants and broker-dealers, they may have fewer
incentives to invest in market monitoring. If, simultaneously,
clearinghouses failed to establish adequate risk assessment
policies, their members-financial intermediaries, having better
information about their own exposure, might be incentivized to
take on additional risks either intentionally or through heedless
transactions.62
Another cohort of problems is triggered by the systemic risk of
centralized C&S. 63
Clearing agencies act as financial
intermediaries, similar to banks and insurance companies.64 They
must make valid and reasonable assumptions about their risk
exposure, which is always problematic, particularly in crises,65 and
set up adequate guarantee funds and pertinent collateral rules
accordingly. The concurrency of liquidity crunches and other
types of financial distress across various asset markets may
effectively deplete not only the capital but also the risk assessment
capability of a clearing agency. 66 It may also impact other
clearinghouses, and their members, within an interconnected
marketplace. This strengthened interconnectedness, therefore,
becomes a downside of a multilateral net settlement system.67
Some serious failures may spring from even a single
considerable default. Should a buyer or seller fail to complete a
sizeable transaction, a clearinghouse would act as a cushion
mitigating the settlement risk only up to a certain point, and the
ultimate “result may well be a massive disruption of the securities
market that could result in harm to innocent third parties.”68
62 See, e.g., Pirrong (2008-2009), supra note 61, at 48 (explaining the moral
hazard problem and information advantages that intermediaries may have). But
see Bernanke, supra note 6, at 138–42 (discussing incentives and structures for
better monitoring in centralized clearing).
63 See Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure
for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153 (2012) (emphasizing the general
dangers of systemic risk and arguing that “a better approach to derivatives
regulation would be to adopt a more supple regulatory super-structure that
encourages a diversity of approaches to achieve the objective of minimizing
system risk”); see generally CPSS, supra note 3.
64 See generally Bernanke, supra note 6.
65 Id. at 143.
66 Id. at 144.
67 CPSS, supra note 3.
68 Ivanhoe Partners, supra note 60, at 677; see also Darrell Duffie et al., Policy
Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure 24 (Milton Friedman Inst. for
Res. in Econ., Working Paper No. 2010-002, 2010), available at
http://bfi.uchicago.edu/RePEc/bfi/wpaper/BFI_2010-002.pdf
(describing
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All these risks, including, in the industry vernacular, credit,
liquidity, replacement cost, operational, legal and other pre-, postand settlement risks, are tackled through a complex combination of
legal and operational improvements.69 Moreover, C&S should rest
on the policies ensuring adequate financial monitoring, effective
margining, risk management, participant eligibility policies,
adequate credit risk assessment standards, and net capital
requirements.70 It is through those mechanisms and operational
services, such as netting, that C&S agencies may generate
efficiency gains, minimize their own exposure, and, by extension,
limit the exposure of market participants.71
“waterfall” structures).
69 See, e.g., CPSS, supra note 3; CPSS (2001), supra note 49, at 17, 39, 48; SEC
(2004), supra note 7; COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS. OF THE CENT. BANKS
OF THE GRP. OF TEN COUNTRIES, CROSS-BORDER SEC. SETTLEMENTS 53–54 (1995). All
these risks are mitigated through either improving operations of clearinghouses or
pertinent law, enforceability provisions, prudential rules, harmonization of the
settlement cycle, etc. See, e.g., COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS. OF THE
CENT. BANKS OF THE GRP. OF TEN COUNTRIES, DELIVERY VERSUS PAYMENT IN
SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 4, 34 (Sept. 1992); COMM. ON PAYMENT AND
SETTLEMENT SYS. OF THE CENT. BANKS OF THE GRP. OF TEN COUNTRIES ET AL.,
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
CENTRAL
COUNTERPARTIES
(Mar.
2004),
www.bis.org/publ/cpss61.pdf; BACHMANN TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE
BACHMANN TASK FORCE ON CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM IN U.S. SECURITIES
MARKETS 31–32 (1992); Egon Guttman, Transfer of Securities: State and Federal
Interaction, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 437 (1990); James S. Rogers, Policy Perspectives on
Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1431, 1439–41, 1461–70 (1996). Some
risks are addressed via a combination of regulatory and operational
improvements. Examples include straight-through processing (STP), matching
services, receive-versus-payment (RVP) and delivery-versus-payment (DVP)
mechanisms, allowing for a contemporaneous exchange of assets for payments
and others. See generally SEC Release No. 8,398, supra note 6; Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 44,188, 66 Fed. Reg. 20494 (Apr. 23, 2001) (discussing an example
of an STP provider).
70
See, e.g., Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed. Reg. 14472 (Mar. 16, 2011)
(detailing the SEC’s proposed rules for the operation and governance of clearing
agencies to address gaps identified from the crash); THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET
BREAK, SEC STAFF REPORT, ch. X (Feb. 1988); GAO, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT
REFORM, supra note 61, at xxiii-xxv, xxix-xxx (identifying the problems
encountered during the crash of 1987 due to the volatility in the market and
presenting recommendations on how to uniformly prevent those issues in the
future); Bernanke, supra note 6 (pointing to the major issues within centralized
clearing and settlement systems); Duffie, supra note 68, at 7 (narrating how to
calculate the daily risks posed to a CPP).
71 Self-evidently, these benefits become less obvious or even questionable in
centralized clearing of certain products like OTC derivatives or in interconnected
markets. See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 6; John P. Jackson & Mark J. Manning,
Comparing the Pre-Settlement Risk Implications of Alternative Clearing Arrangements
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The U.S. and European systems, with various degrees of
success, are built around these cost-efficiency and risk
considerations.72 At the same time, the risks continue to be real
and pervasive. In summary, C&S agencies are a complicated,
highly technical and systemically important conduit structure that
facilitates transactional exchange, interacts with the whole market
and, therefore, must assess the risks and performance prospects of
as many market participants, i.e. clearing members, as possible.
This is the animal that the sample economies have recently
imported.
3.3. Assessment Strategy: Market Actors
This dangerous foreign animal has been introduced into the
hostile forest of the local markets of Russia, Ukraine and
Kazakhstan. The new C&S facilities are now in the middle of a
transactional structure where local parties buy and sell financial
products. This Subsection will demonstrate that the typical
transactional metrics in the sample economies may undermine the
ability of a C&S institution to properly assess its exposure and
monitor its members. The principal reasons are behavioral
(Bank of England, Working Paper No. 321, Apr. 2007), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2007/
WP321.pdf (underscoring that inter-agency consolidation may be needed);
Griffith, supra note 63 (emphasizing structural clearinghouse concerns); Pirrong
(2009), supra note 61 (highlighting the downsides of centralized C&S); Manmohan
Singh, Collateral, Netting and Systemic Risk in the OTC Derivatives Market 5–9 (IMF
Working
Paper
No.
10/99),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1099.pdf (describing in
general the positive effects of centralized C&S through netting, collateralization,
reduction in counterparty risk but also raising individual risk concerns).
72 See, e.g., CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD’S SECURITIES
MARKETS, GRP. OF THIRTY 7 (1989) (concluding organizations that compromise the
global clearing and settlement industry need to decide on a long-term approach);
The Direct Costs of Clearing and Settlement: An EU-US Comparison, NERA ECON.
CONSULTING,
City
Res.
Series,
No.
1
(Jun.
2004),
http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/Corporation/LGNL_Services/Business/
Business_support_and_advice/Economic_information_and_analysis/Research_p
ublications/Archived+reports+2000-2006.htm (investigating and comparing the
direct costs of clearing and settling an equity transaction in Europe and in the
U.S.); The Future of Clearing and Settlement in Europe, BOURSE CONSULT, City Res.
Series, No. 7 (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Future of C&S], http://bourseconsult.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/FutureofClearingSettlementFinal.pdf.
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distortions, the low level of trust, and the opacity of the local
economies, which, cumulatively, may lead to systemic risk
accumulation and exacerbate moral hazard.
The analysis begins with the fundamental proposition that in
any country, “[c]onjoint action is possible just in proportion as
human beings can rely on each other.” 73 This is an almost
axiomatic presumption in economics and transactions:
all
transactions presume a certain level of trust among participating
parties. 74 Importantly, such degree of trust may differ from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction 75 and, as demonstrated further in this
Section, the level of trust in the sample is low.
What is “trust”? For the purposes of the analysis, the Article
relies on the definition by Professors Gilson, Scott and Sabel who
define the concept of trust as follows:
first, to refer to the complementary combination of informal
mechanisms—reputation,
continuing
relations,
and
reciprocity—that evolve through the actions of the parties
in implementing their substantive goals under the
agreement; and second, in the increasing confidence of each
party in the ability of the other to actually perform as the
agreement requires.76
In conjunction with the “ability” of the other party to perform
an agreement, I would like to consider the “willingness” of the
other party to comply with her contractual obligations and the

73 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY VOL. I, 109 (1848),
reprinted in JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF
THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY VOL. II (John M. Robson ed., online ed.
2006) (arguing that there is a clear and distinct link between societal functions and
the economy).
74 Id. For a review of the research on trust, socioeconomic interactions, and
reciprocity, see, e.g., LANDA, supra note 4, at 10–15 (describing political and
sociological theory, relating to socioeconomic interactions).
75
Resorting to Mill again, in some countries “of first-rate industrial
capabilities, . . . the most serious impediment to conducting business concerns on
a large scale, [was] the rarity of persons who [were] supposed fit to be trusted
with the receipt and expenditure of large sums of money.” Mill, supra note 73, at
109–10; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic
Organization, 36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 476–79 (1993) (discussing institutional trust in
various environments).
76 Gilson et al., supra note 12, at 1383 n.11.
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mutual awareness of both parties of a reasonable probability of
both: the willingness and the ability.
Based on the discussed above C&S structure and functions, it is
self-explanatory that the willingness and ability factors must be
assessed with respect to several players. The first group includes
the transacting parties, i.e., the ultimate users of C&S services like
brokers, investors, issuers, and others, evaluating the
“trustworthiness” of each other. The second inter-linkage is the
mutual assessment of one another by the private actors and by the
centralized C&S facilities. The third inter-linkage is the trust of the
market actors in the state as an efficient standard setting and
monitoring agent.77

Private
party

Private
party

C&S
facilities

Private
party

State =
regulator

Private
Party

If systemic breakages occur in all three inter-linkages, a
financial model or facility is likely to perform poorly.
3.4. Private v. Private: Trust Thy Neighbor
3.4.1. The Bases of Transactional Trust
Within the first two linkages, private market participants and
C&S facilities must reasonably trust each other in order to transact
efficiently, i.e., without overcharging the counterparties excessive
77
Section 4 will discuss the role of the state in its dual capacity as the
majority owner of C&S facilities and their regulator.
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risk premiums or resorting to costly contractual mechanisms. This
is a self-explanatory proposition since all market actors prefer to
transact for predictable outcomes and be adequately compensated
for the undertaken risks based on the ex ante risk pricing and ex
post outcome assessment and enforcement strategies.78
We can simplify the concept of the expected value of a contract
through the elements of “trust” as follows: suppose the value of a
contract to a transacting party equals V. Prior to signing the
contract, based on the information available at time 0 (zero), the
party may reasonably assign a probability P(t0) that the transaction
will be completed. The party expects that at time 1, i.e., during
contractual performance, new adverse information may become
available. Therefore, the party assigns a probability P(t1) that the
contract will not be performed exactly as promised. The party also
knows that at this junction, her alternative decision may be to go to
court. The value of the court award equals E and the probability of
enforcement of a judgment is P(a).

P(t1)

P(t0)

1

V

2
P(a)

1-P(t1)
1 - P(t0)

0

3

E

1-P(a)

0

78 Contractual techniques and pricing are often related to trust, or fairness,
enforcement and information asymmetry related to type identification. Elena
D’Agostino & Maurizio Lisciandra, Enforceable vs. Non-enforceable Contracts: A
Theoretical Appraisal with Fair Players 4–5, 22, (Munich Personal RePEc Archive,
Paper
No.
41261,
2012),
http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/41261/1/MPRA_paper_41261.pdf.
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Based on this simplistic analysis, the expected value of the
contact is, obviously, the following:

Expected Value = P(t0) x [P(t1) x V + [1 – P(t1)] x P(a) x E]
In the trust context, P is merely a function of the counterparty’s
performance ability and willingness.

P=f(A;W)
The probability changes between time 0 and time 1 reflect the
underlying changes in the ability and willingness:

ΔP=f(ΔA;ΔW)
To summarize, an individual transacting party, including, in the
context of the transplants, clearinghouses and trading parties, may
see the expected value as a function of (a) the probability expressed
through the “ability” and “willingness” assessed at the point of
contracting and the future changes in both during performance by
the counterparty, 79 and (b) the return on enforcement efforts,
relevant when the original probability of performance by the
counterparty is reduced.
Factors A and W must be assessed and observed by all
transacting parties. So should the expected intra-performance
changes, ΔP. Parties will spend resources on identifying these
variables. There, of course, may be differences in the parties’
investments: one party may be ab initio more trustworthy and
reputable than the other counterparty. For example, a wellmanaged CCP may be more trustworthy compared to a small
transacting party. This means that the latter does not need to
spend the same amount of resources on confirming the obvious
quality of the CCP and vice versa. The identification assessment
79
Here, the Article de facto presumes the existence of some form of
calculative trust, and the discussion is inspired by Williamson’s analysis. See, e.g.,
Williamson, supra note 75, at 463–69, 481–83 (discussing risk, trust, and calculative
versus noncalculative risk). The A and W factors may, of course, affect both
calculative and personal trust paradigms.
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efforts are, thus, asymmetric.
In general, the identification of A, W and P should reduce
information asymmetry and allow a party to charge optimal prices,
which can be in the form of margin payments, guarantee funds or
otherwise, and to select optimal contractual arrangements. The
rules of a typical clearinghouse, incorporated by reference into all
contracts between its members and the clearinghouse, illustrate
this approach.
By way of example, the Rules of the National Securities
Clearing Corporation (NSCC) structure the clearing fund
contributions around the objective sets of factors. Those are the
volatility of net pending positions and liquidity and volatility of
securities, which are established “based on such factors as the
Corporation determines to be appropriate from time to time.” 80
This objective pricing prong, based on easily obtainable public
information, is only one aspect of the contractual arrangement.
Another crucial prong is compliance with the exhaustive initial
membership standards, which is more subjective. Note that NSCC
has significant discretion in member assessment. If, for example,
the applicants’ conduct is not “against the interests” of NSCC or its
members, NSCC may still decide to accept the applicants who fail
to meet the initial membership requirements.81 This requirement
demonstrates an asymmetric A and W assessment scenario where a
well-established institution whose trustworthiness need not be
separately evaluated engages in a unilateral assessment.
After the initial evaluation of the member’s quality, ongoing
reporting and operational testing become crucial, allowing NSCC
to continuously make sure that ΔP of contracting parties is
acceptable. NSCC, again, enjoys significant leeway in determining
the scope and manner of such testing and reporting.82
It is possible that the depth of such ongoing monitoring and,
hence, its costs are premised on the initial assessment of
compliance and aforesaid waivers. From a contractual perspective,
if a party determines that the counterparty’s A and W are
substantial, well-identified fairness has the capacity to breed more

80
NAT’L SEC. CLEARING CORP., RULES & PROCEDURES 266–68 (2014),
http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/rules/nscc_rules.pdf
(delineating Procedure XV).
81 Id. at 21, 30 (Rules 2A & 2B).
82 Id.
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“reciprocal” fairness.83 There is a high probability that the “fair”
type, including high A and W parties, will remain fair regardless of
increasing returns conducive to breach or suboptimal contract
choices.84
While identification of A and W is paramount to all transacting
parties, in the case of C&S institutions, it is truly indispensable. In
order to operate safely, centralized clearing agencies must evaluate
the A and W of as many market participants as possible.
The next issue, therefore, is whether a transacting party in the
sample economies can efficiently identify and monitor the ability
and willingness of the counterparties to perform and the value of a
contract. What general market and socioeconomic factors bear on
the feasibility and cost efficiency of such assessments?
3.4.1.1. Public Information and Market Transparency
Under normal market circumstances, pricing, type
identification and monitoring efforts are facilitated by several
public mechanisms. The first one is securities markets with their
disclosure rules and a network of intermediaries and gatekeepers
such as institutional investors, brokerages, exchanges, market
analysts, and others. Unfortunately, in the sample, the ability of a
party to determine the nature of a transacting candidate through
capital markets is questionable.
First, self-evidently, a smaller market, with thin trading and
low gatekeeper coverage, may be less efficient and the prices
83 See, e.g., Garry Charness & Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences
with Simple Tests, 117 Q.J. ECON. 817 (2002) (demonstrating that people are
concerned with increasing total social welfare and motivated by reciprocity);
Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,
114 Q.J. ECON. 817 (1999) (displaying evidence that suggests selfish or fair people
can dominate free rider situations depending on the economic environment);
Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM.
ECON. REV. 1281 (1993) (arguing that people will maximize payoffs for those who
aid them and minimize payoffs for those who harm them); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M.
Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity (Munich Discussion Paper No. 2001–2,
2000), http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14/1/0102_fehr.pdf (presenting new
research against the self-interest hypothesis and supporting the idea that people
are motivated by fairness and reciprocity).
84 See, e.g., D’Agostino & Lisciandra, supra note 78, at 9, 13 (proving the
theory that once a party’s A and W are substantial, there is a high probability that
despite increasing returns on a unilateral breach, a fair transaction will remain
fair).
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would not reflect the full information and the value of companies.85
This may be precisely the case of the sample economies.86 Low
liquidity is another important issue. For instance, even in Russia,
which has the largest market in the region, 87 trading liquidity
remains inadequate. According to some estimates, there are about
300 public corporations and shares of only about 90 of them are
relatively liquid.88
At the international level, the “gatekeepers” such as
international investment market analysts, institutional investors
and other global market actors typically follow more “visible”
companies. 89 Such international visibility is often achieved
85 For an analysis of the implications of the capital market efficiency or lack
thereof, see, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64
STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1186–97, 1247–50 (2012) (describing relative informational
inefficiency of certain markets, like OTC trading, and juxtaposing it with the
“Fraud-on-the-Market” theory); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities
Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335,
1369–416 (1999) (discussing disclosure policies and market efficiency).
86 See, e.g., 2013 Investment Climate Statement—Kazakhstan 8-9, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (2013) (mentioning thin trading in this jurisdiction); Robert B. Ahdieh,
Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the Creation of Strong Securities
Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 279–349 (2003) (highlighting inefficiencies that
weaken security markets in transitional states).
The Russian exchange statistics also show that only 711 issuers trade shares of
stock and various bonds on the Moscow Exchange, the largest exchange in the
country. This number includes not only corporations but also municipal and
other public authorities. See, e.g., Obshchee Kolichestvo Torguemyh Tsennyh Bumag v
ZAO “FB MMVB” [Total Quantity of Securities on the “Moscow Interbank Currency
Exchange”], MOSCKOVSKAIA BIRZHA [MOSCOW EXCHANGE], http://moex.com/s18
(last visited June 9, 2014) (displaying the number of companies that list their stock
on the market); Spisok Tsennyh Bumag, Dopushchennyh k Torgam v ZAO “FB
MMVB” [List of Securities Authorized to Trade on the “Moscow Interbank Currency
Exchange”], MOSCOW EXCHANGE, http://moex.com/ru/listing/securities-list.aspx
(last visited June 9, 2014) (recording those securities authorized to list on the
market).
87 Public Relations Department, Moscow Exchange’s Turnover Was RUB 36.4
Trln in May 2014, MOSCOW EXCHANGE (June 2, 2014, 4:54 PM),
http://moex.com/n5585.
88
Oleg Shvyrkov, Infrastruktura Korporativnogo Upravleniia v Rossii [The
Infrastructure of Corporate Management in Russia], in INVESTITSII V STRANAH BRIC
[INVESTMENTS IN THE BRIC COUNTRIES] 41–42 (Svetlana Borodina & Oleg Shvyrkov
eds., 2010).
89 See, e.g., Reena Aggarwal et al., Portfolio Preferences of Foreign Institutional
Investors, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 2919 (2005) (finding that US funds are more likely to
invest in institutions with greater transparency and institutions better covered by
market analysts); Guseva, supra note 34 (explaining that due to their ability to
increase exposure through cross-listing, investors preferred ADRs to foreign
shares when investing overseas); Mark H. Lang et al., ADRs, Analysts, and
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through global CDS markets or cross-listings on major exchanges.
Both of these signaling and information-revealing mechanisms are
rare in the sample economies.90 Moreover, major financial advisers
and brokers, preserving their status as solid reputational
intermediaries, sometimes distance themselves from even large
and profitable corruption-tainted clients.91
The mirror image of this problem is the less observable
character and nature of businesses within the domestic markets.
This may be due to several reasons, including not only the general
shortage of reliable reputational intermediaries, local investment
banks or independent press,92 but also the persistent inadequacy of
disclosure and large numbers of administrative offenses in this
area.93
Accuracy: Does Cross Listing in the United States Improve a Firm’s Information
Environment and Increase Market Value?, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 317 (2003) (positing that
firms that cross list on U.S. exchanges maintain higher analyst coverage and
accuracy than firms that are not cross listed).
90
Id.; see also Mezentsev, infra note 163 (identifying that few Russian
companies have CDS contracts and that only three to five Russian companies have
CDS contracts characterized by considerable liquidity).
91 Mark Leftly, Scandal-Hit Miner ENRC Shunned by Leading City Brokers, THE
INDEPENDENT
(May
10,
2013),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/scandalhit-miner-enrcshunned-by-leading-city-brokers-8610218.htm; see also Gilson & Kraakman, infra
note 176 (discussing the central role of intermediaries).
92 See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note 86; Black, supra note 2, at 798.
93
In Russia, e.g., the number of administrative offenses in the area of
disclosure seemed to be on the rise. Otshchet o deiatel’nosti Regional’nogo
otdeleniia Federal’noj sluzhby po finansovym rynkam v Sibirskom federal’nom
okruge za 2012 God [Report of Activities for the Year 2012], REGIONAL’NOGO
OTDELENIIA FEDERAL’NOJ SLUZHBY PO FINANSOVYM RYNKAM V
SIBIRSKOM
FEDERAL’NOM OKRUGE [REGIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE FEDERAL FINANCIAL MARKET
SERVICE IN THE SIBERIA FEDERAL DISTRICT] (2013) (mentioning that the number of
administrative reports doubled between 2011 and 2012). In January 2014 alone,
the centralized financial markets division of the Central Bank of Russia reviewed
ten major cases involving reporting violations and ten other violations of
securities market regulations.
Informatsiia ob administrativnyh vzyskaniiakh,
nalozhennykh Bankom Rossii v sfere finansovykh rynkov [Information About
Administrative Fines Issued by the Bank of Russia in the Sphere of Financial Markets],
TSENTRAL’NII BANK ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [CENTRAL BANK OF RUSSIA],
http://www.cbr.ru/sbrfr/?PrtId=sanctions (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). Regional
enforcement divisions conduct thousands of investigations. See, e.g., Godovye
otchety 2009 [FSFR Annual Report 2009], FEDERAL’NAYA SLUZHBA PO FINANSOVIM
RINKAM
[FEDERAL
FINANCIAL
MARKETS
SERVICE]
(2010),
http://www.cbr.ru/sbrfr/archive/fsfr/archive_ffms/common/upload/FSFR_ot
chet.pdf (providing annual reports of the Federal Financial Markets Service).
In Kazakhstan, despite the improvements in financial reporting, disclosure
remains inadequate, particularly, as concerns affiliated persons, remuneration of
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Shareholder litigation, particularly in the form of class actions,
cumulatively serving as signaling and corporate governance
mechanisms,94 is still in its infancy.95 The public enforcement of
executives and other issues. See, e.g., Elena Pastuhova et al., Issledovanie
informatsionnoi prozrachnosti kazahstanskikh kompanii v 2009 g.: Nizkii start — vysokii
potentsial [Study of Transparency Among Kazakh Companies in Year 2009: Low Start –
High
Potential],
STANDARD
&
POOR’S
(2009),
http://www.kase.kz/files/mix/research.pdf (describing improvements in
transparency among Kazakh companies, but noting, for example, that in 2009 only
eighteen percent of large public Kazakh companies disclosed information on the
compensation of directors and only nine percent disclosed information on the
compensation of their management).
The public electronic disclosure system in Ukraine is still being developed. It
was clearly inadequate until 2003. See, e.g., Shapran Vitalii, Sistemy raskrytiia
informatsii v Rossii i Ukraine [Disclosure System in Russia and Ukraine], 23 ZHURNAL
“RYNOK
TSENNIKH
BUMAG”
[J.
“SEC.
MARKET”]
(2003),
http://www.old.rcb.ru/archive/articles.asp?id=3791
(explaining
that
the
Ukrainian disclosure system, as of 2003, is in the stages of introduction and
development). Only recently did the national regulator request that all reports be
presented in electronic format and unify some reporting obligations. See, e.g.,
LIGABiznesInform, NKCBFR uzhestochila trebovaniia k raskrytiiu informatsii ob
emitentahk [The National Commission of Stock and Financial Markets Hardened
Disclosure Demands of Issuers], LIGAFINANSY (Jan. 10, 2014, 11:45 AM),
http://finance.liga.net/stock/2014/1/10/news/36959.htm
(describing
the
institution of new requirements for electronic disclosures, requiring less
information of companies but uniform and more frequent disclosures); ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF
UKRAINE’S STATE-OWNED AVIATION SECTOR: THE CASE OF ANTONOV 57 (2012),
http://www.oecd.org/investmentcompact/AntonovEN.pdf (noting that many
public state-owned enterprises in Ukraine rigorously report to regulatory bodies
within the government, but “public disclosures are far more selective”).
94
See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Kazakhstan, supra note 86, at 8–9
(remarking on government involvement in the economy); Black, supra note 2, at
783–90, 798 (“[W]ithout any liability risk, accounting firm partners will sometimes
accept the ever-present temptation to squander the firm’s reputation to gain or
keep a client”); Black et al. (2000), supra note 38 (discussing the effect of litigation
on corporate governance in Russia); Merritt B. Fox, Comment on Russian Corporate
Governance Today 4–12, 1 CORP. GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA & TRANSITIONAL ECON.
(2006) (manuscript at 4–12),
http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/fulltime?&main.ctrl=contactmgr.detail&top.robots=all&main.view=profiles.inline_de
tail&global.id=8514&global.elem_id=0&main.id=8514.
95 See, e.g., APK RF, supra note 16, art. 53 (Russ.), arts. 225.1, 225.11 (setting
regulations in the area of cumulative action); Dmitry Magonya, Class Actions in
Russia, 1 RUSS. L.J. 57, 57–65 (2013) (analyzing the necessity and a method of
introduction of class action suits into the Russian legal system); Dmitrii M.
Zabrodin, Gruppovye iski v grazhdanskom protsessual’nom prave Rossii: problema
poriadka prisoedinenia k gruppe [Group Suits in Civil Procedure Law of Russia: the
Problem of Joining the Class], 9 ZAKONY ROSSII: OPIT, ANALYZ, PRAKTIKA [LAWS OF
RUSSIA: EXPERIENCE, ANALYSIS, PRACTICE] 65, 65–69 (2012) (describing problems in
the Russian legal system with adding new plaintiffs to class suits); ASTERS, DOING
BUSINESS
IN
UKRAINE
40
(2012),
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securities law also raises serious concerns. It may be procedurally
easy 96 yet inefficient as a deterrent against securities law
transgressions. The reputational value of the administrative
proceedings is questionable, while the maximum civil penalties for
misleading or incomplete disclosures are exceptionally low.97
Consider the following example. A fine in the amount of about
$30,000 was imposed on a large and profitable aluminum
producer. 98 In its annual report, the aluminum giant omitted
material information about the compensation of its management
company and the “substantive terms” of the management
agreement and appendices thereto. The management company
was, in fact, a part of the same holding structure. It was an
offshore entity registered in the Netherlands. Incidentally, the
http://www.asterslaw.com/upload/iblock/db2/Doing%20Business%20in%20U
kraine.pdf (explaining that “Ukrainian procedural law does not provide for class
actions”); N. S. Kuznetsova, Corporate Governance in Ukraine 2, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/1930958.pdf
(exploring the impact of Ukraine’s failure to develop collective action suits and
legal procedures requiring insiders to disclose information on share holdings).
96
See, e.g., Kontrol’no-revіzіina dіial’nіst’ [Control and Audit Activities],
NATSІONAL’NA KOMІSІIA Z TSІNNIH PAPERІV TA FONDOVOGO RYNKU [NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON SECURITIES AND SECURITIES MARKET OF UKRAINE] (Jun. 2014),
http://www.nssmc.gov.ua/activities/controlaudit (outlining the supervisory
authority of the Ukrainian securities commission); O SOSTOYANII RINKA TSENNIH
BUMAG V GOSUDARSTVAH-UCHASTNIKAH SNG, ISPOLNITELNIY KOMITET SNG 31–32
(2012) (summarizing the regulatory actions and new statutory amendments in
2011); FSFR Annual Report 2009, supra note 93 (presenting the impact of the
Federal Service of Financial Regulation); FZ RF on Securities, supra note 16, at ch.
5 (Russ.) (on the authority of the federal securities regulators); Information About
Administrative Fines Issued by the Bank of Russia in the Sphere of Financial Markets,
supra note 93 (providing concise information about the method by which fines are
imposed); Postanovlenie FAS Moskovskogo okruga ot 26 noiabria, 2013 goda
[Decision of the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow Circuit of Nov. 26,
2013], case No. A40-30770/13-72-263 (mentioning that if a corporation can publish
the report but does not undertake bona fine efforts to do so, the liability under the
Administrative Code follows naturally).
97 In Russia, the civil penalties are roughly between $11,000 and $20,000.
KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII OB ADMINISTRATIVNYKH PRAVONARUSHENIIAKH
[KOAP RF] [CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATIONS] art. 15.19 (Russ.) (civil penalties
for failures to disclose constitute 500,000 to 700,000 rubles in fines and potential
disqualification from listing on the market for one year); US Dollar-Russian Ruble
Exchange Rate, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/USDRUB:CUR
(last visited Nov. 21, 2014) (showing an exchange rate of 45.83 rubles to 1 U.S.
dollar).
98
See
Financial
Statements,
RUSAL,
http://rusal.ru/en/investors/financial_stat.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2014)
(providing the financial statements of Rusal, an aluminum company fined for
disclosure failure).
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single shareholder of many subsidiaries of the holding appointed
that management company as the sole executive authority for the
subsidiaries. On appeal, the Circuit Court upheld the regulatory
decision.99 Yet that did not alter the fact that the actual amount of
the penalty was disproportionately small compared to the profits
of the aluminum giant and remuneration of its management.
What are the consequences of undeterred misleading
disclosure? Self-evidently, absent robust disclosure, insiders may
be more inclined to act opportunistically.100 If one adds the superconcentrated ownership systems existing in all three sample
economies to this problem, 101 such inclinations logically must
99 See, e.g., Postanovlenie FAS Vostochno-Sibirskogo okruga ot 9 oktiabria
2013 g. [Decision of the Circuit Court of the East-Siberia District of Oct. 9, 2013],
case No. A74-6004/2012 (denying the plaintiff's motion to have the fine waived).
100 Selective disclosure and enforcement do not help in this regard. Black,
supra note 2, at 784, 804–05; Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian
Financial Crisis, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 141, 144 (2000); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997).
101
Similar trends affect all three jurisdictions. See, e.g., KORPORATIVNOE
UPRAVLENIE:
KAZAHSTANSKII
KONTEKST
[CORPORATE MANAGEMENT: THE
KAZAKHSTAN
CONTEXT]
47
(C.A.
Filin
ed.,
2009),
http://www.kazid.kz/books/1/Page47-print=yes.htm
(observing
how
ownership accumulates under control of a small group of shareholders); Anna S.
Buzelo, Model’ korporativnogo upravleniia v Respublike Kazakhstan [Model of Corporate
Management in the Republic of Kazakhstan], G GLOBAL (2013), http://old.groupglobal.org/ru/lecture/view/6022 (discussing various models of corporate
ownership and governance in Kazakhstan and ownership concentration patterns);
Study of Transparency Among Kazakh Companies in Year 2009: Low Start – High
Potential, supra note 93 (describing also the general lack of transparency among
Kazakh companies despite improvements in corporate governance); Mekhanizm
Zashchity Prav Aktsionerov [Shareholder Protection Mechanism], GRATA (Feb. 2004)
(underscoring collusion between large shareholders and management),
http://www.gratanet.com/ru/news/recent_publications/2004/february/1805/;
Trendy razvitiia kazahstanskoi ekonomiki [Trends in the Development of the Kazakh
Economy], ZAKON.KZ (Oct. 12, 2011, 1:39 PM), http://www.zakon.kz/4452982trendy-razvitija-kazakhstanskojj.html (commenting on a different type of
concentration – the increasing presence of the state in the economy); A.N. Kostiuk
& Y.V. Kostiuk, Evoliutsia Struktury Korporativnoi Sobstvennosti v Ukraine [Evolution
of the Structure of Corporate Ownership in Ukraine], 2 VІSNIK UKRAINS’KOI AKADEMІI
BANKІVS’KOI SPRAVI [JOURNAL OF THE UKRAINIAN ACADEMY OF BANKING AFFAIRS], no.
17,
2008,
at
4,
available
at
http://dspace.uabs.edu.ua/jspui/bitstream/123456789/2365/1/2004_2(17).pdf
(describing the problematic relationship between the structure of corporate
ownership in Ukraine and both the productivity and financial efficiency of
Ukrainian companies); B. Stetsenko,
Stanovlenie otechestvennoi modeli
korporativnogo upravleniia v kontekste mirovogo opyta [Formation of a Domestic Model
of Corporate Management in the Context of Global Knowledge], 35 TSENNYE BUMAGI
UKRAINY 1, 10-12 (2005) (comparing Ukrainian and foreign models of corporate
ownership); L.S. Ruzhanskaia, Koncentratsiia sobstvennosti i formirovanie osnovnekh
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increase dramatically.
Another issue is that the smaller and more opaque sample
markets with lesser visibility of national companies in the
international markets create fewer opportunities to identify the
nature and probability of performance based on the past and
present reporting by the local parties. Parties trading in the
securities of such “locals” will be unable to properly assess them
tipov kontrolia v rossijskikh kompaniiakh [The Concentration of Ownership and
Formation of Basic Methods of Control in Russian Companies], 1 ZHURNAL
“KORPORATIVNYE FINANSY” [J. “CORP. FIN.”], no. 5, 2008, at 5–11, available at
http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/933/769/1223/5_rujanskaya_5_11.pdf
(contemplating the shift in both central and regional Russian companies from
insider-concentrated to outsider-concentrated control, and noting the large role
being played by regional government in the development of otherwise
independent firms); A.E. Molotnikov, Kontroliruiushchie, krupnye i minoritarnye
aktsionery: problemy vzaimodeistviia i pravovogo regulirovaniia [Controlling Majority
and Minority Shareholders: Problems of Interaction in Legal Regulation], 11
AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO: VOPROSY KORPORATIVNOGO UPRAVLENIIA [JOINT-STOCK
COMP: QUESTIONS OF CORP. MGMT.], no. 54, 2008, available at http://cgaspect.ru/library/59/498#16 (noting the radical centralization of control into the
hands of a few Russian shareholders and the Russian government); P.V.
Kuznetsov & A.A. Murav’ev, Struktura aktsionernogo kapitala i resultaty
deiatel’nosti firm v Rossii [Structure of Shareholder Capital and the Results of
Firm Activity in Russia] (unpublished doctorate thesis, Konsortium
ekonomicheskih issledovaniy i obrazovania [Consortium of Economic Research
and Education]) (on file with the consortium) (describing a trend in the Russian
stock markets, where a few powerful shareholders take control of blue chip
companies, withdraw the private value of their control, and in the aggregate drive
down the value of these companies); V.A. Korolev & A.S. Semenov, Preimushestva
i riski prisutstviia v kompanii kontroliruiushchego aktsionera [The Value and Risk of
Controlling Shareholders in Companies], 2012 JOINT-STOCK COMP: QUESTIONS OF CORP.
MGMT.,
no.
2,
available
at
http://www.cfin.ru/investor/ao/controlling_stake.shtml (listing and analyzing
the benefits and risks of the prevalence of Russian companies that are owned by
controlling shareholders); T.G. Dolgopiatova, Koncentracija sobstvennosti v rossijskoj
promyshlennosti: evoliutsionnye izmeneniia na mikrourovne [Concentration of
Ownership in Russian Industry: Firm-Level Evolution], 8 ZHURNAL NOVOI
EKONOMICHESKOI ASSOTSIATSII [J. NEW ECON. ASS’N] (2010), at 80–99,
http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2010-8-80-99r.pdf (examining 100 large
and medium-size companies that, during a period of de-concentration in
shareholder ownership between 2005 and 2009, experienced increased entry into
securities market and also increased ownership by foreign investors); Oleg
Shvyrkov: “V sovetahk direktorov kompanii usilivaetsja nezavisimaia sostavliaiushchaia”
[Oleg Shvyrkov: “Independence is Strengthening in Companies’ Councils of Directors],
PROMISHLENNIK
ROSSII
[INDUS.
OF
RUSSIA]
(Nov.
2012),
http://promros.ru/magazine/2012/nov/oleg-shvyrkov-v-sovetah-direktorovkompanij-usilivaetsya-nezavisimaya-sostavlyayuschaya.phtml (noting progress in
the independence of Russian companies’ boards, but emphasizing the need for
amendments to and improvements in the civil code that bolster democratic
corporate governance).
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based on publicly available information. This may distort trading
strategies and affect liquidity and volatility of securities. Similarly,
the trading participants will be less likely to make valid
assessments of each other’s exposure and future performance.
Without ex ante robust disclosure and market transparency, the
pre-contractual pricing and performance assessment become
weaker and costly. In turn, the probability of future performance
(P(t1)) is more uncertain.
The second typical public monitoring mechanism is financial
institutions like lenders, operating as a substitute for or
supplement to the capital market monitoring. For instance, various
capital providers are often involved in monitoring their customers’
businesses.
Such monitoring entails significant benefits for
borrowers, their contracting parties and creditors, who may now
rely on the lender’s type-identification research and monitoring
efforts. 102 Yet, in the developing world, the accuracy of such
monitoring and ensuing signaling may be undermined by personal
“connections” between lenders and debtors, corruption, agency
costs, and otherwise underdeveloped financial practices.103
102
See generally James R. Booth, Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the CrossMonitoring Hypothesis, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 25 (1992); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory
of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 912–25 (1986).
103 This may also be a typical externality of bank-based monitoring. See, e.g.,
Christian Leuz & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Political Relationships, Global Financing, and
Corporate Transparency: Evidence from Indonesia, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 436–37 (2006);
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East
Asian Crisis, 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 40 (1999) (explaining the disadvantages of a
relationship-based system).
On the financial system in the sample economies, see, e.g., Black, supra note 2;
Koen Schoors & Ksenia Yudaeva, Russian Banking as an Active Volcano, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY 570 (Michael Alexeev & Shlomo
Weber eds., 2013); Brian Sawers, Reevaluating the Evidence for Anticommons in
Transition Russia, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 233, 245–49 (2010); Ukraine: Request for StandBy Arrangement-Staff Report; Staff Supplement; and Press Release on the Executive
Board
Discussion,
INT’L
MONETARY
FUND
(May
2004),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04129.pdf; INT’L MONETARY
FUND, UKRAINE: FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT, INCLUDING REPORTS ON
THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND CODES ON THE FOLLOWING TOPICS: MONETARY
AND FINANCIAL POLICY TRANSPARENCY, BANKING SUPERVISION, AND PAYMENT
SYSTEMS
(Nov.
2003)
[hereinafter
IMF,
2003],
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03340.pdf; Ukraine Country
Profile 2008, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION ENTERPRISE SURVEYS, WORLD
BANK
(2008),
at
11,
available
at
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/FPDKM/EnterpriseSurveys/Docu
ments/Profiles/English/ukraine-2008.pdf (providing indicators and a description
of the development of financial markets in Ukraine); Kazakhstan Country Profile
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An important and somewhat idiosyncratic feature of the
sample is that their national capital providers may rationally
believe that they operate under unstable, “endgame” conditions.
Their unfortunate “experiences” are numerous:
from the
government-related financial crisis of 1998 to the recent failures
and de-privatization of financial institutions.104 This “last period”
problem may effectively discourage local financiers from investing
in ex ante identification or long-term monitoring efforts. A good
example is the typical domestic practice of curtailing credit and
charging high interest rates.105
The resulting signals from traditional lenders thus become
inaccurate:
all companies, regardless of their individual
willingness and ability to perform, are charged higher rates and, in
turn, subject to less monitoring, even though the well-connected
clients may be continuously undercharged.106
2009, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION ENTERPRISE SURVEYS, WORLD BANK
(2009),
at
11,
available
at
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/FPDKM/EnterpriseSurveys/Docu
ments/Profiles/English/kazakhstan-2009.pdf (providing indicators and a
description of the development of financial markets in Kazakhstan); INT’L
MONETARY FUND, REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN—FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM UPDATE—DETAILED ASSESSMENTS AND UPDATES OF FINANCIAL SECTOR
STANDARDS AND CODES 19 (Oct. 2004) [hereinafter IMF Report No. 04/338],
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04338.pdf.
104 See, e.g. Padma Desai, Why Did the Ruble Collapse in August 1998?, 90 AM.
ECON. REV. 48 (2000); Andrea Zazzarelli, Sovereign Default and Recovery Rates, 19832006,
MOODY’S
INVESTORS
SERV.
(2007),
http://ksuweb.kennesaw.edu/~dtang/CRM/Moodys_SovereignDefault.pdf
(arguing that the collapse of the ruble was at least partially a result of the
unanticipated Asian financial crisis); Ukraine Defaults on Domestic Debt, KYIVPOST
(Sept. 15, 1998, 1:00 AM), https://www.kyivpost.com/content/business/ukrainedefaults-on-domestic-debt-675.html?flavour=mobile (describing the Ukrainian
default of 1998 and that “[t]he Ukrainian government will always have the default
stamp on its forehead”); Oksana Kobzeva and Daria Korsunskaya, TB RF obrek
banki na ukrupnenie [The Central Bank of Russia Condemned Banks to Consolidation],
BANKI.RU
(Dec.
31,
2013,
0:03
AM),
http://www.banki.ru/news/bankpress/?id=6042669
(describing
Russia’s
decision to consolidate domestic banks and that, for the first time since the 2008–
2009 financial crisis, a lack of confidence in the banking system has returned).
105 See, e.g., Sawers, supra note 103, at 246; Ruta Aidis & Yuko Adachi, Russia:
Firm Entry and Survival Barriers, 31 ECON. SYS. 391, 407 (2007); IMF, 2003, supra
note 103; Genrikh Salata, Barriers to Bilateral Business Relations: The Case of Australia
and Ukraine, 6, 9, 20 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1832044 (documenting key
complaints of Australian companies doing business in Ukraine).
106 Market actors are also generally aware that shirkers attempt to mimic the
behavior of the “fair” type and may mistrust all. See, e.g., D’Agostino &
Lisciandra, supra note 78, at 9 (outlining a framework of contacting types and
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Thus, neither capital markets nor other capital providers
logically operate as efficient producers of information regarding
the “trustworthiness” of private parties and the value of their
securities and other financial instruments. To summarize, the
following two consequences are important. On the one hand,
trading participants will be unable to assess the quality and value
of the products in which they are transacting. On the other hand,
by extrapolation, reporting and signaling problems may
undermine the transparency and predictability of performance by
trading participants, which operate within the same opaque
environment. Overall, the resultant information losses should
become costly to the whole economy and affect not only capital
markets and trading per se but also their C&S segment.107
3.4.1.2. Private Contracting as a Type-Revealing Technique
3.4.1.2.1. Costly
Uncertainty

Probabilistic

Assessments

Under

In theory, this may leave inter se contracting techniques as a
second-best strategy for assessing the ability and willingness to
perform. Based on privately generated information, parties may be
in a better position to choose appropriate contractual formats,
enforcement and performance incentives.108
Yet there are four important caveats. First, this method requires
significant upfront investments into the exploration of every single
candidate or product and, potentially, individualized contract
drafting.109 This makes it less cost-efficient than a combination of
privately and publicly generated information. 110 Moreover,
clearing agencies are expected to benefit from the economies of
scale generated by public reporting, market transparency and
clarifying the incentive to appear “fair”).
107 See generally Simeon Djankov et al., Private Credit in 129 Countries, 84 J.
FIN. ECON. 299 (2007); Thorsten Beck et al., Financial Intermediation and Growth:
Causality and Causes 18 (Central Bank of Chile Working Paper No. 56, 1999),
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/chb/bcchwp/56.html.
108 Gilson et al., supra note 12, at 1381.
109 Such investments are justified mainly in transactions where the payoffs
outweigh the original type identification efforts.
110 See, e.g., Fox (1999), supra 85, at 1362–70 (underscoring the “public good”
aspects of valid issuer disclosure).
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capital market monitoring.111 Individual type identification is also
inefficient in the case of smaller deals or transactions that are
supposed to be standardized, such as sales of securities and their
clearing and settlement. Consequently, it may be cheaper for the
parties to demand and pay additional, potentially indiscriminate
risk premiums for uncertain A and W.
3.4.1.2.2. Trust and Culture
The second caveat is the cultural ambience, undermining the
expected value of private contracting in the sample. Specifically, in
a typical market, parties are supposed to transact bearing in mind
an estimated average level of “trust” among market actors and in a
society in general.112
Obviously, even in the “fairest” and relatively stable market,
parties may move outside a self-enforcing range of performance
and disregard originally “trustworthy” commitments if the ex post
profitability of defecting substantially increases compared to the
bargained-for payoff or the value of reputation.113 All contracts are
thus drafted bearing in mind that ex post performance may
deteriorate with time regardless of the parties’ original type and
bona fide nature. The A and W factors may change over time.
There is, however, a cultural assumption allowing local parties
to reduce the exploratory investments in type identification and
performance monitoring. This is the public trust presumption that
is implicitly incorporated in the probability of performance and of
the frequency of “fair” type parties.114
111 For example, the NSCC rules and procedures rely on such mass-scale
public reporting obligations. NSCC, supra note 80, at Rule 2B.
112 See MILL, supra note 73 (opining that joint action among parties is directly
correlated with the degree of trust among the parties); Williamson, supra note 75
(explicating the notions of trust among social actors).
113 Almost obligatory references are, of course, Ronald Coase, The Conduct of
Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General Motors, 15 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 255, 260 (2006); Benjamin Klein, Fisher—General Motors and the Nature of
the Firm, 43 J.L. & ECON. 105, 129 (2000) (discussing the correlation between the
self-enforcing relationship and changes in market conditions).
114 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 73; LANDA, supra note 4, at 15; Kenneth J. Arrow,
Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 357 (1972) (observing that “[v]irtually
every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust”); Stephen
Knack, Trust, Associational Life, and Economic Performance 2 (Munich Personal
RePEc Archive, Paper No. 27247, 2010) (“Where social and legal mechanisms for
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In this sense, the sample countries do not fare well in terms of
both social and market interactions. For instance, an abysmal 1%
of Muscovites reportedly trust people in general, including the
sentiments towards long-term acquaintances or even their
families,115 while Ukrainians trust church above all and the level of
social and interpersonal trust has been low in the past years.116 In
fact, many contracting parties seem to expect that defection is
highly probable.117
the efficient resolution of prisoners’ dilemma and principal-agent games are weak
or absent – i.e., where most potential pairs of economic transactors cannot trust
each other – the private returns to predation increase while the private returns to
production fall.”). Trust, obviously, is part of “[c]ultural values represent[ing] the
implicitly or explicitly shared, abstract ideas about what is good, right, and
desirable in a society.” Amir N. Licht et al., Culture, Law, and Finance: Cultural
Dimensions of Corporate Governance Laws 6 (Soc. Sci. Res. Network, Working Paper,
2001), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=267190; René M.
Stulz & Rohan Williamson, Culture, Openness, and Finance, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 313
(2003).
115
See, e.g., The Matter of Trust in Russia, RUSS. MEDIA (May 14, 2013),
http://russmedia.wordpress.com/2013/05/14/the-matter-of-trust-in-russia/
(citing the findings of the Eurobarometer in Russia and the research by the
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration);
Pavel Stepantsev, Vse na lichnihk sviaziahk [Everything on Personal Connections],
VEDOMOSTI,
May
13,
2013,
http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/11931461/svoi_lyudi#ixzz2TFWzeyo
Z (arguing that in Russia people are less likely to trust each other than in the
majority of economically developed countries – with the exclusion of France and
Spain – and citing that less than one percent of Moscovites think that in general
people can be trusted, independent of whether those people are acquaintances or
not). See also Gerry Mackie, Patterns of Social Trust in Western Europe and Their
Genesis, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 245, 255 (Karen S. Cook ed., 2001) (discussing social
trust data of modern European societies); Jo Crotty & Andrew Crane, Transitions
in Environmental Risk in a Transitional Economy: Management Capability and
Community Trust in Russia, 7 J. RISK RES. 413 (2004) (analyzing Russia’s
environmental changes as a result of dramatic economic changes).
116 Ukrainians Trust Church Most, UKRAINE BUS. ONLINE (Dec. 28, 2011, 10:17
AM), http://www.ukrainebusiness.com.ua/news/4167.html; John M. Johnson &
Andrew Melnikov, The Wisdom of Distrust: Reflections on Ukrainian Society and
Sociology, in STUDIES IN SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 11 (Norman K. Denzin ed., vol. 33
2009) (contemplating the high level of distrust of government institutions in
Ukrainian society and the challenges this introduces when attempting to poll
Ukrainians to better understand their relationship with government). Cf.
NATALYA PANINA, UKRAINIAN SOCIETY 1994–2005: SOCIOLOGICAL MONITORING
(2005), http://dif.org.ua/modules/pages/files/1337234258_1666.pdf (observing
that although after the Orange Revolution, societal trust somewhat increased,
interpersonal conflicts, including conflicts among family members, increased as
well). Id. at 130. See also id. at 37–39, 41, 45–46 (comparing the trust level among
different constituencies).
117 See, e.g., Kathryn Hendley, Coping With Uncertainty: The Role of Contracts in
Russian Industry During the Transition to the Market, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 417,
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Examples of trust-related problems in the sample economies
are legion. Corporate governance rules may be routinely violated
by even respected managers,118 defaults in payment are common
even among repeat players, 119 and significant hold-up risks
manifest themselves in long-term agreements even among the
largest and “best” domestic companies. Those “best” contracting
parties readily hold counterparties who have made an assetspecific investment hostage in order to renegotiate performance
schedules or extort price concessions.120 To top it off, widespread
corruption and bribery seem to be indispensable variables in
private contracting.121

455–59 (2010) (discussing how many firms “had no sustained expectation of
repeated interactions[, as] . . . [t]hey were always waiting for the proverbial shoe
to drop.”).
118 Bernard S. Black, Does Corporate Governance Matter? A Crude Test Using
Russian Data, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2131 (2001) (describing how Russia’s laws are
often weak at constraining behavior); Bernard S. Black, The Corporate Governance
Behavior and Market Value of Russian Firms, 2 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 89
(2001) (suggesting cultural constraints are weak and “Russia has weak laws
governing behavior by firms and insiders[,] . . . weak norms for insider conduct,
and weak reputational constraints on insider conduct”) (citation omitted).
119
Kathryn Hendley, The Puzzling Non-Consequences of Societal Distrust of
Courts: Explaining the Use of Russian Courts, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 517, 537 (2012)
(commenting that the firms that did not receive payments often also failed to
make payments).
120
See, e.g., Andrei Yakovlev et al., Empirical Analysis of Suppliers’ NonPerformance Risks in Execution of Public Procurement Contracts in Russia, in
CHARTING A COURSE IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT INNOVATION AND KNOWLEDGE
SHARING 253–87 (G. L. Albano, K. F. Snider & K. V. Thai eds., 2013), available at
http://ippa.org/jopp/download/vol12/Book/Chapter%2010_YakovlevDemidova-Balaeva.pdf (analyzing empirical data on state contracts for
procurement of goods, observing a reduction in prices at auctions when state
actors bid, and indicating contract performance problems).
121 See generally Paul B. Stephan, Rationality and Corruption in the Post-Socialist
World, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 533 (1999); Ukraine Country Profile 2008, supra note 103
(“Inefficient regulations constrain firm efficiency as they present opportunities for
soliciting bribes where firms are required to make ‘unofficial’ payments to public
officials to get things done”); TRENDS IN CORRUPTION AND REGULATORY BURDEN IN
EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA, WORLD BANK (2011). The press continuously
expresses similar concerns. See, e.g., European Business Association: Trust of
Investors in Ukraine Before Election Plunges to Record Low Indicator, KYIV POST (Oct. 5,
2012, 1:31 PM), http://www.kyivpost.com/content/business/european-businessassociation-trust-of-investors-in-ukraine-before-election-plunges-to-record-lowindicator-313969.html.
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3.4.1.2.3. Transactional Implications
Cumulatively, these maladies should make appropriate inter se
identification efforts costlier or unfeasible. Private parties should
respond to these problems by resorting to the mechanisms that
eliminate the need for a precise type identification. For instance,
one may view corporate ownership concentration in the sample as
a way of protecting property and controlling untrustworthy
outside shareholders, albeit at the expense of company value,
inversely correlated with such concentration. 122 In contracting, a
defensive strategy would be using easily enforceable contracts
with hard terms.123 This is indeed a popular method in the sample
jurisdictions.
Contracts are often based on specific terms, such as penalty
clauses, cash on delivery or before delivery, or the right to
unilaterally change the price, which eliminates the delivery and
payment risks in case of either inadvertent or opportunistic
breach. 124 Contracting parties do that routinely and often
regardless of whether they are dealing with a one-time or a longterm customer.125 Thus, the initially low-trust environment moves
122 P.V. Kuznetsov & A.A. Murav’ev, supra note 101, at 38 (registering lower
Tobin’s Q ratio of Russian companies with concentrated ownership).
123
See generally D’Agostino & Lisciandra, supra note 78, at 17–21
(expounding on the costs of complete, hard-terms contracting); Gilson et al., supra
note 12, at 1400, 1381 n. 6 (discussing the preference for more contingent
arraignments, undesirability of “price tags” for defaults and reviewing literature
showing that voluntary cooperation may be ousted by formal mechanisms).
124
Yuliya Guseva & Oleksiy Kononov, Enforcement of Contracts in Russia:
Positive Developments and Persisting Dilemmas, in THE CASE LAW OF CENTRAL &
EASTERN EUROPE: ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS 818–27 (Stefan Messmann & Tibor
Tajti eds., 2009) (discussing the heavy use of payment penalties in modern
Russia); Leonila Guglya & Oleksiy Kononov, Enforcement of Contracts in Ukraine, in
THE CASE LAW OF CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE: ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS 1034–
41 (Stefan Messmann & Tibor Tajti eds., 2009); Sh. B. Malikova et al., Ugolovnopravovye aspekty bor’by s prestupleniiami v sfere oborota tsennykh bumag [CriminalLegal Aspects of Fighting Securities Crime], in “VOPROSY PRAVA V SOVREMENNOM
MIRE”:
MATERIALY
MEZHDUNARODNOI
ZAOCHNOI
NAUCHNO-PRAKTICHESKOI
KONFERENTSII [QUESTIONS OF LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD: MATERIALS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL REMOTE SCIENTIFIC AND APPLIED RESEARCH CONFERENCE] (SibAk
2013), available at http://sibac.info/index.php/2009-07-01-10-21-16/7810-2013-0516-15-18-55.
125 Compare Hendley (2010), supra note 117, at 435–44 (commenting on how
ineffectual contracts were and how they provided only artificial guarantees), with
Kathryn Hendley et al., Law, Relationships, and Private Enforcement: Transactional
Strategies of Russian Enterprises 4, 17 (The William Davidson Inst., Univ. of Mich.
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private actors away from Pareto-superior contractual formats,
incomplete agreements, cheaper informal agreements based on
relationships, or better corporate governance practices.126
The fact that private parties in the sample have started to use
courts more often and that recently established firms initiate
litigation more frequently than older enterprises may be also
indicative of the new growing trend resulting from the ex ante low
level of trust.127 Recall that when the anticipated probability of the
adverse changes in the Willingness or Ability is high, Enforcement,
based on payoff expectations, looks like a more attractive
alternative. First, parties use specific terms and penalties whose
proof, verification and enforcement in court are much easier.
Afterwards, they go to court to enforce them regardless of whether
they trust the judiciary in the first place. They just have to trust
courts more at time 1 if the expected value of enforcement (E)
exceeds the expected value of performance.
Unfortunately, these risk-reduction strategies may not only
distort future contractual practices128 but also are unsuitable for all
industries. Thus, the third caveat is that such strategies do not fit
within a centralized C&S structure.129
Recognizing this problem, the sample economies attempted to
change them whenever possible. For instance, in Ukraine, it was
indeed common to complete securities trades on the prepayment
or pre-delivery terms. 130
Today, in compliance with the
Bus.
Sch.,
Working
Paper
No.
72,
1998),
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/39462/wp72.pdf?seq
uence=3 (analyzing firms’ different reasons for engaging in self-enforcement
techniques).
126 See, e.g., D’Agostino & Lisciandra, supra note 78, at 2 (concluding that the
value of the contract is far less influential on behavior than the overall framework
for fairness in the contractual environment); Robert Gibbons, Trust in Social
Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated Games, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 339, supra
note 115 (observing that “[e]ven ostensibly formal processes such as
compensation, transfer pricing, internal auditing . . . often cannot be understood
without consideration of their associated informal agreements”); Knack, supra
note 114, at 10 (mentioning that “[t]rust can . . . reduce transactions costs”).
127 See, e.g., Hendley (2012), supra note 119, at 523, 544–45 (explaining the
reasons for Russian firms to use courts to resolve problems).
128 The lack of “normal” relational contracting and breach may become selfpropagating. David Campbell, Breach and Penalty as Contractual Norm and
Contractual Anomie, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 681, 691 (2001).
129 See supra Section 3.2.
130 UNICREDIT, supra note 44, at 10, 14 (noting that “[m]ost of the deals in
Ukraine involving foreign investors are settled OTC” and settled on pre-payment
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international practices, the transplants reinforce other C&S
methods, like DVP or RVP, and call for stronger risk management
of clearing agencies.131
Finally, a counterparty or clearinghouse cannot add a large and
indiscriminate default price tag to every deal, post-trading
operation or membership standard lest that prohibitively increases
the cost of capital. This is precisely the opposite of what the C&S
reformers intend to achieve.
3.4.1.2.4. Market Perceptions: Game Over
The fourth caveat undermining the efficiency of the inter se type
identification touches upon deeper, fundamental issues. In a
normalcy scenario, a rational party should view breach and
opportunism as possible but extraordinary and undesirable events.
Justifying causes are usually limited to impracticability of
performance due to unforeseeable supervening events or
frustration of purpose, which are both in part premised on the
severity of the events whose risks cannot not be deemed assumed
by a contracting party. 132 If a party does breach absent
extraordinary market circumstances causing the breach, the market
becomes aware of the breach and incorporates this information
into the future dealings with the breaching party.
The
consequences are possibly fewer deals or more price discounts.133
Honest performers become well-known players whose past
contractual experiences should multiply future fair and reciprocal
deals. 134 People also seem to reciprocate in response to either
and pre-delivery bases, but that stock exchange clearing differed and was done
through a depository).
131 On DVP/RVP and STP, see generally SEC Release No. 8,398, supra note 6;
SEC Release No. 44,188, supra note 69.
132 See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 59
(1980) (discussing the doctrine of frustration, other contractual doctrines, and the
correlation between Essex’s advantage and high profits with the losses ALCOA
suffered).
133 See generally Black, supra note 2, at 820 (discussing an example of Russian
companies whose cross-listed securities were discounted); Coase, supra note 113;
Hendley et al. (1999), supra note 125, at 7.
134 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 113, at 260 (observing “that the incentive for
opportunistic behavior is usually checked by the need to take account of the effect
on future business”); Gilson et al., supra note 12, at 1396 n.49, 1411 (“’[W]hile
benefits of enhanced pro-social behavior can be substantial in the static case, the
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positive or negative actions by awarding the fair and punishing the
unfair. 135 These objective factors and subjective propensities
increase the mutual confidence in performance and minimize
contractual losses.136
A challenge faced by the sample economies, however, is that
there may be no culprit to reciprocate against and no performer to
award. Neither is there a sufficient number of repeated “games.”
Absent repeated interactions and other trust-building or
information-revealing mechanisms, short-term inter se cooperation
cannot significantly improve trust through identifying the A and W
of the parties.137
There is an obvious lack of long-term players, which is partly
due to the profound changes in the composition of local elites and
businesses between the 1990s and in the second decade of the 21st
century.138 The reasons vary from political risks and instability to
the proliferation of corporate raiding, multiple arrests of
entrepreneurs and the slow breakdown of formerly gigantic Soviet
enterprises.139
The history of the three sample jurisdictions is also replete with
cases where: (a) it was profitable for a party to exhibit some
alacrity exiting the domestic markets when their private assets
suddenly came to the attention of persons connected with
authorities and (b) certain assets were de facto or de jure deprivatized by the state on a whim.140
potential impact . . . is greater in a dynamic context, particularly in economic
environments featuring repeated personal interaction.’”).
135 Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental
Evidence, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833, 839 (1997); Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 83, at 32–
37; Gilson et al., supra note 12, at 1384 n.14.
136 Russell Hardin, Conceptions and Explanations of Trust, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 3,
3–4, supra note 115 (reviewing these reputational and self-interest aspects of trust);
Arrow, supra note 114; Campbell, supra note 128, at 688–90; Ernst Fehr et al.,
Fairness and Contract Design, 75 ECONOMETRICA 121, 151 (2007) (confirming in their
experiments that “the principals understand that fairness matters and
predominantly choose the superior bonus contract that relies on fairness as an
enforcement device,” although the combination of a percentage of fair players and
specific strategic situations also matters).
137 Individual “trust” expectations are partially based on past transactional
experiences and require a significant number of interactions. D’Agostino &
Lisciandra, supra note 78, at 3, 20–21.
138 Kazakhstan in this sense may be viewed as a politically stable exception.
139
See, e.g., infra notes 140, 152–57 (chronicling the unstable and statecontrolled business environments in the former Soviet states).
140 See, e.g., Thomas Firestone, Criminal Corporate Raiding in Russia, 42 INT’L L.
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In this sense, it does not matter what Probability of performance
a contracting party assigns to its counterparty – the latter may
convert into a defector due to sudden exogenous events regardless.
The discussed above opacity of the market and the unexpected
nature of the events may make the actual moment of the
transformation from an honest collaborator into a defector
unobservable to outsiders. In a way, the conversion becomes a
local species of “force majeure” or “exit by necessity.”
Recall that in a normalcy scenario, the gains from defection are
less than the gains from preserving reputation.141 Domestic market
boundaries should be also tight and exit limited 142 so that the
market can ostracize the defectors. These conditions do not hold in
the sample. In fact, the ubiquitous flight of capital from the sample
countries to offshore jurisdictions may be viewed as both safe and
1207 (2008) (describing the illegal corporate raiding that has become common in
Russia); Hendley (2010), supra note 117, at 455–59 (stating that the development of
new transactional norms was hindered because post-Soviet managers carried the
cultural norms from the Soviet era into the nineties); Andrei Yakovlev et al.,
Means of Production Versus Means of Coercion: Can Russian Business Limit the
Violence of a Predatory State?, 30 POST-SOVIET AFF. 171 (2014) (describing the
transition of developing societies to societies with sustained economic growth);
Aaron Beitman, The Challenge of Corporate Raiding in Russia, TERRORISM,
TRANSNAT’L
CRIME
&
CORRUPTION
CTR.
(Jan.
3,
2013),
http://traccc.gmu.edu/2013/01/03/the-challenge-of-corporate-raiding-inrussia/ (“[H]igh uncertainty around property rights, extensive corruption and
poor corporate governance have facilitated the rise of the phenomenon known as
corporate raiding in Russia.”); Carl Schreck, The Danger of Doing Business in Russia,
TIME (Dec. 19, 2009) (discussing examples of corporate actors who suffered due
to raiding tactics); Maria Danilova, Ukraine Corporate Raids Stifle Foreign
Investment,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(May
27,
2012,
6:20
AM),
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/05/27/ukraine-corporate-raids-stifleforeign-investment/(commenting on the negative impact of corporate raids in
Ukraine); Kazakhstan Aims to Nationalise Top Three Private Pension Funds, REUTERS
(Mar.
5,
2013,
5:56
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/kazakhstan-fundsidUSL6N0BX4RJ20130305 (describing Kazakhstan’s plans to nationalize the
nation’s largest pension funds); Alexei Goriaev & Konstantin Sonin, Is Political
Risk Company-Specific? The Market Side of the Yukos Affair (Soc. Sci. Research
Network,
Working
Paper
No.
772,
2005),
http://papers.ssrn.com/Sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=676875 (looking into the
“nature of company-specific political risks in emerging markets”).
141 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 113; Klein, supra note 113.
142 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 557 (2003) (arguing that reputational effects of
contracts work only in relatively small and homogenous markets where actors
will quickly know why bad actors continually fail to honor their contracts);
Williamson, supra note 75, at 473 (discussing the evolution of commercial trust
with the advent of new communication technologies).
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profitable exit ordinarily resorted to by domestic players.143
It is also not necessary for the endgame pressures and resultant
personal “unreliability” to be proven. Even ostensibly most
reputable public players tend to “misbehave” in the last-period
game. 144 Furthermore, a generalized opinion may suffice and
weigh heavily on individual property relations.145 One may argue
that this has already happened in the sample nations where the
private sector is dwindling, in unison with investments and the
state has to step in in its stead.146

143 It was reported in the media that Prime Minister Medvedev referred to
the 2013 Cyprus banking crisis as “stealing the [burglars’] loot.” Medvedev: na
Kipre prodoljayut grabit nagrablennoe [Medvedev: On Cyprus, They Continue to Steal
the
Loot],
BFM.ru
(Mar.
25,
2013,
2:43
PM),
http://www.bfm.ru/news/211721?doctype=news; Maksim Kvasha, Kak Kremliu
Kipr prigoditsia [How Cyprus Serves the Kremlin], KOMMERSANT.RU (Apr. 1, 2013, 0:00
AM), http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2144346.
See also Peeter Vahtra,
Expansion or Exodus? Trends and Developments in Foreign Investments of Russia’s
Largest Industrial Enterprises 8 (Pan-Eur. Inst., Paper No. 1/2006, 2006),
http://www.utu.fi/fi/yksikot/tse/yksikot/PEI/raportit-jatietopaketit/Documents/Vahtra_12006.pdf; $30bn in Russian Money Sent to Cyprus
in
2
Decades,
RUSS.
TODAY
(June
18,
2013,
12:46
PM),
http://rt.com/business/russia-cyprus-money-transfer-877/ (citing a study by the
Russian State Statistical Agency, ROSSTAT).
144 See, e.g., Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming
to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 694–702 (1999)
(discussing the final-period problem and urging for more stringent regulation of
the interim nondisclosure problem among the largest, most well-established
companies).
145 Arguably, personal and property security “in modern nations is the effect
of manners and opinion,” including a complex system of trust and fear of
exposure. MILL, supra note 73, at 135–136, 444. For example, a recent opinion poll
found that foreign managers “general[ly] mistrust . . . regional outsourcing
partners” in Russia. RICHARD GERMAIN & ARMIN GÜNTER, CONTRACT LOGISTICS
AND OUTSOURCING IN RUSSIA: A REPORT BY THE DEUTSCHE BAHN AND RUSSIAN
RAILWAYS CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
11
(2012),
http://www.dbschenker.com/hoen/news_media/studies/2847098/ContractLogistics_Outsourcing.html. See also
Salata, supra note 105.
146 See, e.g., Aidis & Adachi, supra note 105, at 394 (noting that often, new
companies are merely an extension of old enterprises, which means the growth
numbers are misleading); Putin’s Russia: Sochi or Bust, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 2014, at
17 (detailing the enormous expenditures by the Russian Government for the 2014
Sochi Olympics); Sputtering: Slow Growth Reflects Structural Failings that the Kremlin
Is Not Tackling, ECONOMIST, Jun. 22, 2013, at 58 (discussing the need for
government intervention in Russia’s slowing economy). In Kazakhstan, the
influence of the state grows. See, e.g., KORPORATIVNOE UPRAVLENIE: KAZAHSTANSKII
KONTEKST, supra note 101; Trendy razvitiia kazahstanskoi ekonomiki, supra note 101.
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3.4.1.2.5. Presumptive Negative Reciprocity
If an average contracting party suspects that the others may
exit and defect at virtually any moment and if that party has little
control over the defectors through reputational repercussions or
otherwise, two corollaries seem possible. First, the parties’ ex ante
state of mind is that they are potentially mistreated.147 Inasmuch as
parties’ actions are influenced “by the perceived fairness” of a
relationship,148 the perception of ex ante unfairness might trigger a
reciprocal desire to act opportunistically and breach contracts.
It is one thing when defaults increase in crisis. In fact, it
happens everywhere.149 Yet it is a completely different ballgame
when the shirking party exonerates herself by viewing defection as
a justified prospective punishment of the future untrustworthy
behavior of other actors and when the others are a priori labelled as
opportunists.
The same may be equally applicable to the
prospective punishment of bullying regulators-owners of certain
industry facilities, including clearing agencies. Thus, the very
human propensity towards reciprocity and the sense of fairness
may distort a stereotypical cost-benefit analysis of performance
versus non-performance. In practice, market actors may default
more easily.150
147
See, e.g., David K. Levine, Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in
Experiments, 1 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 593, 595 (1998) (“[S]uggest[ing] that players
care not only about other players’ utility, but also that their attitudes toward other
players depend on how they feel they are being treated.”); Knack, supra note 114,
at 5 (citing studies confirming that “[i]f government leaders, judges and
bureaucrats are corrupt, market participants can more easily justify and
rationalize their own dishonest behavior”) (quoting John N. Drobak, Law Matters,
76 WASH. U. L. REV. 97, 103 (1998)).
148
Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 83, at 3–4 (providing examples in which
fairness considerations “shape the behavior of people in particular economic
domains,” including compliance with contractual obligations).
149 There are typically more defaults, expropriation and defection in crises.
See, e.g., WORLD BANK, RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REPORT 27: MODERATING RISKS,
BOLSTERING
GROWTH
21–22
(2012),
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/rer-27march2012-eng.pdf (commenting on the large share of non-performing loans after
the crisis); Gilson et al., supra note 9, at 204–05 n. 92 (exploring an example where
a surge in contractual breaches was prompted by the extraordinary price
volatility); Johnson et al., supra note 100, at 143 (referring to defaults and
expropriations in relation to the Asian financial crisis).
150 This may be viewed as an extension of the scenario combining ex ante
low trust and ex post penalties for observed behavior. See e.g., Gilson et al., supra
note 12, at 1393 n.43 (citing studies which found that many subjects punished
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Obviously, this is merely a logical extension of the current
theories and more research is needed with respect to the ex ante
negative reciprocity in the developing economies. However, if one
juxtaposes the discussed above problems, the suggestion seems
plausible.
Since commonly “[b]usiness contracts must be
construed with business sense, as they naturally would be
understood by intelligent men of affairs,”151 sophisticated men of
affairs may perceive certain forms of breach and opportunism as a
norm rather than an unwise aberration.
The uncertainties
surrounding the shrinking private sector in the sample may bear
witness to it.152

3.4.2. The Role of Enforcement
The crucial repercussion of opacity and the lack of trust and
reputational sanctions is the need for efficient formal enforcement
(i.e., E).153 Recall that parties should expect that at time 1 they will
have to make a choice between continuing performance with
shirkers).
151 North German Lloyd v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 244 U.S. 12, 24 (1917).
152 See generally supra note 146 and accompanying text. For an illustration of
the uncertainties and the dangers of nationalization and reprivatization in
Ukrainian, compare, e.g., Reprivatizatsii na Ukraine ne budet [There Will Not Be
Reprivitization in Ukraine], SEGODNIA (March 3, 2014, 5:26 PM),
http://www.segodnya.ua/economics/business/reprivatizacii-v-ukraine-nebudet-yacenyuk-500217.html (exemplifying that there is a need for the new
leaders in Ukraine to assuage the business communities concerns over the sanctity
of property rights after years of reprivatization and government seizures in the
region); Irshanskii GOK i Vol’nogorskii GMK vernut gosudarstvu [GOK of Irshanskii
and GMK of Vol’nogorskii Return to the Government], UNIAN (July 10, 2014, 2:44 PM),
http://economics.unian.net/industry/938174-irshanskiy-gok-i-volnogorskiygmk-vernut-gosudarstvu.html (describing how two large resource companies
were taken control of by the Ukrainian government); Ukrainskaia reprivatizatsiia
stala beskonechnoi i bespredel’noj [Ukrainian Repirivitization Became Never-Ending and
Limitless], IZVESTIA (Mar. 24, 2005, 7:59 PM), http://izvestia.ru/news/300943
(illustrating the “never-ending and limitless” amount of corrupt reprivatization in
Ukraine and its negative impact on Ukraine’s image among foreign investors).
153
Gilson et al., supra note 9, at 190–91 (highlighting that “[c]ontracting
parties must be able to count on the state’s enforcement monopoly if they are
confidently to rely on novel forms of agreement”); D’Agostino & Lisciandra, supra
note 78, at 8–17; Knack, supra note 114, at 9 (citing studies emphasizing that
“governmental mechanisms for the effective enforcement of contracts . . . are
associated with higher trust”).
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probability P(t1) or look to enforcement. Namely,

Expected Value = P(t0) x [P(t1) x V + [1 – P(t1)] x P(a) x E]
Just like with the evaluation of W and A, the general
perceptions regarding the quality of public enforcement are
embedded into pre-contractual assessments. This variable is
premised on the trust in the judicial efficiency, impartiality and
expertise.
Unfortunately, all these qualities are rare in the developing
world.154 That is true even admitting that the actual propensity of
154 See, e.g., Irina Solomko & Aleksandr Il’chenko, Skol’ko stoit kupit’ sud’iu
[How Much Does It Cost to Buy a Judge], SEGODNIA, Dec. 18, 2008,
http://www.segodnya.ua/ukraine/ckolko-ctoit-kupit-cudju.html
(discussing
how much it costs to bribe Ukrainian judges in different courts); Assotsiatsiia s ES:
Za nespravedlivye sudy Ukraine groziat torgovye sanktsii [Association with the E.U.: For
Injustice in the Courts Ukraine Is Threatened with Trade Sanctions], SEGODNIA, Oct. 18,
2013,
http://www.segodnya.ua/economics/enews/Associaciya-s-ES-Zanespravedlivye-sudy-Ukraine-grozyat-torgovye-sankcii-468378.html (describing
the European Union’s demands of Ukraine to reduce its level of corruption, and
until it does so, the process for acquiring visas to enter the E.U. will not be
simplified); Patrick Reevell, Legislation Merging Russia’s 2 Top Courts Stokes
Worries,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
7,
2014,
at
A8,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/07/world/europe/merger-of-russias-twotop-courts-worries-legal-experts.html?_r=0 (discussing changes to Russian courts,
including the dismantling of Russia’s Supreme Arbitration Court by President
Putin, referred to as “one of the few successful institutions in the often corrupt
and ineffective Russian judicial system”); Black, supra note 2, at 790–91, 813;
Hendley (2012), supra note 119, at 520–23, 526 (discussing the judicial “culture of
impunity”); Aidis & Adachi, supra note 105, at 403 (emphasizing a large share of
breached contracts and lack of enforcement); BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, BTI 2012 –
UKRAINE
COUNTRY
REPORT
12–13
(2012),
http://www.btiproject.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Ukraine.pdf (noting the lack of
judicial training and independence); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2013), supra note 86, at 1,
5 (warning about the inconsistent application of law and lack of judicial
independence in Kazakhstan); Glenn P. Hendrix, Business Litigation and Arbitration
in Russia, 31 INT’L LAW. 1075 (1997); Karen Halverson, Resolving Economic Disputes
in Russia’s Market Economy, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 59, 102–05 (1996); Judicial Reform
Index for Ukraine, 2 AM. BAR ASS’N 1, 59, 68 (2005); Pistor et al., supra note 41, at 342
(observing that “in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, three quarters of
all enterprises do not trust the legal system to enforce their rights”); Glaeser &
Shleifer, supra note 22, at 1195 (commenting on the practice of bribery in Russia);
Glaeser et al. (2001), supra note 38, at 868, 897 (comparing legal and judicial
indices for various transition economies and also observing that “where the costs
of verifying the circumstances of specific cases and interpreting statutes are high,
judges may not be sufficiently motivated to enforce legal rules”); Kathryn
Hendley, Enforcing Judgments in Russian Economic Courts, 20 POST-SOVIET AFF. 46,
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private parties to use post-Soviet courts and the weight the
litigants assign to the judicial competence are unclear, 155 the
amount of litigation is swelling,156 and, as some researchers argue,
the overloaded judges are trying to do their best micromanaging
cases argued by inept attorneys.157
There are still potent reasons to doubt the judicial systems of
the sample economies. Bribery and corruption are considered
pervasive and the quality and impartiality of public enforcement
routinely doubted by the market and academics.158 Moreover, in
case of a dispute between a private party and a clearing agency,
directly or indirectly owned by the state, the private litigant may
reasonably expect to lose.
Even though in terms of such criteria as the timing and costs of,
cumulatively, litigation and enforcement of judgments our three
sample countries fare better than about a half of the jurisdictions
surveyed by the World Bank, 159 these formal indicators may be
78 (2004) (discussing judgment enforcement problems); Blumenfeld, supra note 15
(generally criticizing the private law system in Russia); WORLD BANK (2011), supra
note 121, at 50–57.
155 Compare Hendley et al. (1999), supra note 125, at 30–32 (concluding that
companies do use courts), with WORLD BANK (2011), supra note 121, at 50–57;
Kathryn Hendley, Are Russian Judges Still Soviet?, 23 POST-SOVIET AFF. 240, 254–55
(2007) (admitting that only 25% of decisions are well-reasoned, although the
perception of judicial competence might have improved); Hendley (2010), supra
note 117, at 447, 452 (documenting cases where companies preferred informal
negotiations); and Hendley (2012), supra note 119, at 520–23 (noting that “presentday Russian courts do a better job of living up to the ideals of independence and
competence than did their Soviet counterparts,” and that judicial corruption
largely arises in political cases, leaving “the vast majority of mundane cases” to be
resolved by courts “in accord with the written law”).
156 See, e.g., BTI 2012, supra note 154, at 13; Hendley (2012), supra note 119, at
520–23 (“Individuals and firms are flocking to the [Russian] courts in ever-greater
numbers.”).
157 Hendley (2007), supra note 155, at 256–63.
158 See generally supra note 154 and accompanying text.
159 In 2013, Russia was ranked 112th with respect to the overall ease of doing
business and 12th in terms of contract enforcement. This can be contrasted with,
Kazakhstan – 49th and 28th, respectively, and Ukraine – 137th and 42th,
respectively.
See Doing Business: Economy Rankings, WORLD BANK (2014),
http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings; Doing Business: Ease of Doing Business
in
Russian
Federation,
WORLD
BANK
(2015),
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/russia/#enforcingcontracts (listing the rankings of 189 countries in these areas based on individual
percentile rankings in particular sub-topics). The “enforcing contracts” indicator
is purely formal and procedural. See also WORLD BANK (2011), supra note 121, at
50–57 (explaining the importance of ”[a]n effective and efficient justice system”
for “a growing market economy,” and describing enforcement as a “critical
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misleading. Neither do they have any bearing on the actual
analysis of “trust” in the effectiveness of formal enforcement or
“trust” in the impartiality of proceedings against the state.
In addition, a large body of literature has shed light on the
inadequacy of judicial expertise.160 Even admitting that procedural
law and judicial expertise have recently improved, 161 courts still
lack the finest level of expertise necessary in complex capital
market transactions, such as – for example – derivatives contracts,
and sometimes unpleasantly surprise the market. Among the
pertinent cases was the January 2013 decision by the Moscow
Circuit Court, arguably, a highly qualified judicial authority. The
Court annulled an interest swap agreement on the grounds that inbetween payments parties owed no obligations to each other and
permitted unilateral termination of the agreement by one of the
parties.162
Unfortunately, the constant changeability of financial market
practices and pre-existing regulatory focus on simple exchangetraded securities as opposed to more complex financial
instruments, rare in the sample economies, 163 leave the courts
component” of a “well-functioning court system”).
160 See generally supra note 154 and accompanying text.
161
See, e.g., Hendley (2007), supra note 155, at 254–63; Andrei Shleifer &
Daniel Treisman, A Normal Country: Russia After Communism, 19 J. ECON. PERSP.
151, 171 (2005).
162 Unfortunately, this case casts doubts on the expertise of, arguably, the
most qualified judiciary in the country. Postanovlenie FAS Moskovskogo okruga
ot 30 Ianvaria, 2013 g. [Decision of the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow
Circuit of Jan. 30, 2013], case No. A40-55358/12-100-391 (deciding that between
the days of payment in a CDS, parties do not owe each other any other duty, and
that after the date of a payment, a party may withdraw from the contract by
informing the other of her intent to breach the contract).
163
The authorities and regulations focus mostly on exchanges. See, e.g.,
Strageia razvitia finansovogo rinka Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2020 goda
[The Strategy of Development of the Russian Financial Market of the Russian
Federation Until 2020], Rasporiazhenie Pravitelstva Rossiiskoy Federatsii [Resol.
of the Gov’t of the Russ. Fed’n] No. 2043-r, Dec. 29, 2008, available at
http://www.fcsm.ru/ru/press/russia2020/strategy2020/ (Russ.); Red Book, infra
note 300, at 299, 316 (discussing the role of the Russian Federal Financial Markets
Service, the regulation of the four different stock exchanges in Russia, and the
leading providers of trade, clearing, and settlement services on the Russian
securities market); V.V. Mezentsev, Otsenka kreditnogo defoltnogo svopa na rossiiskie
kompanii pri pomoshi redutsirovannoi modeli i modeli Mertona [Evaluation of Credit
Default Swaps in Russian Companies with the Help of a Reduction Model the Merton’s
Model], 1 ZHURNAL KORPORATIVNIE FINANCY [J. OF CORP. FIN.] 44, 48 (2012),
http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/2012/05/22/1272867933/cfj_21_44_57_mezentsev_
.pdf (mentioning that Russian companies are not active in the CDS market and
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without any guidance. The recent upgrade of the clearing
transplants, in all probability, should entail analogous problems.
Similarly, the Supreme Courts, often providing something like
explanatory “codes of best practices,” may not do that in time.
Coupled with the historical propensity for textualism, 164 this
“novelty problem” may undermine the coherence of trial court
decisions, at least in the short term. Alternatively, it is possible that
courts may instinctively side with the expert regulators, which also
happen to be the owners of the C&S facilities. 165 To conclude,
private parties’ pre-contractual expectations regarding the
probable payoff from formal Enforcement (E) may be reasonably
minimal.
3.4.3. Broken Private Linkages: The Model and Its Potential
Implications for C&S
Let us now summarize this willingness-ability-enforcement
discussion by imagining two scenarios: a normal market and the
discussed above distorted one. In the first one, there are two
populations of market actors: A and B. The A companies have
good reputation and during their long history, as confirmed by
market analysts, regular corporate reports and the opinion of
former contractual counterparties, have been in good standing.
Their valuation is significantly higher than that of other companies
within an economy. The Bs, by contrast, are newer, untested
companies whose former counterparties have had reasons to
complain about Bs’ contractual defaults and/or the quality of their
performance. Equally, Bs’ assets may be located in jurisdictions
where their counterparties cannot easily reach them through the
formal enforcement of their agreement and/or Bs’ management is
known for former asset tunneling, self-dealing and bankrupting
other companies. 166 Overall, the Bs may be seen as riskier and
commenting on the illiquidity of Russian CDS).
164 See, e.g., Guseva, supra note 15, at 89–93; SHERSHENEVICH, supra note 14, at
235–44.
165 See infra Section 4 (discussing the evolution of C&S).
166
For pertinent examples, see Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarassova,
Institutional Reform in Transition: A Case Study of Russia, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 211,
232–61 (2003) (discussing the institutional flaws in the Russian legal and economic
system and the effect of corruption); Black et al. (2000), supra note 38, at 1740–78
(discussing the flawed privatization and self-dealing in Russia).
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more likely to default.
Finally, there is always a sliver of C companies. This is a subset
of A companies, which will be forced to default due to either
internal causes, such as the rising agency costs and managerial selfdealing, or external causes, including economic crises, embargoes,
sizeable defaults by counterparties, etc. In essence, a C becomes a
B under pressure of exogenous and, more rarely, endogenous
events.
One may present this market actors’ continuum as follows:

A: Low Risk, Observable Quality

C: Conversion Possible
and Observable

B: High Risk, High
Observability and
Visibility

First, under normal market circumstances, the share of the A
companies is supposed to be larger.167 Second, contracting with
the B companies will, potentially, add extra transaction costs and
prompt parties to use specific contractual mechanisms. The
arsenal obviously varies depending on the types of the deals and
includes higher price terms or interest rate, specific payment terms,
price adjustment clauses, indemnity provisions, holdbacks, escrow
accounts, numerous contractual covenants, and others. Thus, the

167 Obviously, the population’s normal choices are affected by a variety of
factors, including the institutional environment, strategic situations, etc. Studies
differ on the share and behavior of do-gooders in a population. Fehr & Schmidt,
supra note 83, at 25–30, 44 n.37 (discussing and problematizing various economic
models about fairness behavior); Gilson et al., supra note 12, at 1393 n.42 (citing
studies finding that by making public-good decisions, individuals contribute
more than individually optimal contributions).
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market itself may find ways to deal with the Bs. That is, of course,
provided the market knows which company is an A and which one
is a B.
Third, the fact of conversion from an A to a C and pertinent
behavioral changes are observable by other counterparties and the
market at large. Particularly observable are the external causes of
conversion and, sometimes, even internal causes. To recap, this is
due to adequate corporate and securities disclosure, prosecution of
insider
trading,
well-tested
institutional,
reputational
intermediaries or better lender monitoring, institutional investors,
and newly emerging collaborative contractual practices, like
braiding. These mechanisms may all send early warning signals to
the market and contractual counterparties. Observability and a
low number of Bs, which are variant species and not a market rule,
become a norm. Based on the discussion above, that normalcy may
be seriously undermined in a developing economy.
Let us summarize the trust-related deficiencies affecting the
three sample jurisdictions. First, due to the innate propensity to
reciprocate and reasonable apprehensions of the commonness of
defaults, all caused by the discussed above reputational and trust
deficiencies coupled with enforcement problems, the B segment
may be substantially larger than the A’s.168 Secondly, the fact of
conversion from an A to a C may be blurred and principally
unobservable, and, possibly, more difficult to detect than an ex
ante determination of which company is a B and which one is a
good-natured A. To recap, corporate disclosure and capital market
monitoring mechanisms are generally weaker in the developing
economies, thus making the market less efficient and transparent
and vitiating its signaling function. Similarly, other capital
providers do not operate as efficient monitors.
Thirdly, previous cooperation may not be indicative of future
compliance if the ex ante level of trust is low. That is provided, of
course, that trust cannot be improved endogenously through
parties’ collaboration, changes in social attitudes or bespoke
Fourthly, the exit strategies
contractual mechanisms. 169
characteristic of emerging markets may make both external and
internal causes of conversion latent and exit profitable. Recall that
even an average company, regardless of whether it is an honest A

168
169

MILL, supra note 73.
See generally Gilson et al., supra note 12.
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or an opportunistic B, may exercise its “exit by necessity” option
and do so in an expedient and/or clandestine manner. Thus, the
devolution from an A to a C or a B may be sporadic and comes as a
surprise to outsiders.
As a result, the population of rational market actors may look as
follows:

B: High Risk Majority, Changed
Normalcy, Lemons Equilibrium Possible

C: Conversion
Expected

A: Low Risk, Low
Observability

What is described here is a type of a situation that may be
reasonably denoted a “lemons equilibrium,” 170 turning into a
“thick market” “as measured by the number of actors who
understand themselves to be transacting under similar
circumstances.”171 The self-evident danger of a lemons equilibrium
is that like in the markets for goods, 172 performing and honest
parties, i.e., the sector A, will be driven out of a domestic market
since: (a) their performance is not rationally expected and,
therefore, not properly awarded by the contractual counterparties

Black, supra note 2, at 784.
Gilson et al., supra note 9, at 173 n.3.
172 A reference to George A. Akerlof is required. George A. Akerlof, The
Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON.
488 (1970).
170
171
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through better prices for their products, cheaper capital raising
opportunities, better C&S terms, etc., and (b) sporadic nonperformance is reasonably more profitable than performance.
To an extent, the scenario reminds one of an extended
exculpatory contractual or force majeure provision, which negates
the value of the concept of “impracticability” since many atypical
risks become at least expected, if not fully foreseeable, and
impliedly undertaken by the parties. The very nature of risk
changes as the knowledge of “unknown but possible” is imputed
to both parties. If these extended risks are over- or underpriced,
which may well happen when parties do not know the nature of
the counterparties, cannot monitor their performance and, thus,
assume the worst,173 there are more incentives to default.
Some parties, as discussed above, can distinguish themselves
through bonding or the voluntary acceptance of more transparent
policies, thus creating a separating equilibrium.174 However, the
stigma associated with their countrymen-Bs will put them at a
price disadvantage compared to foreign companies,175 cross-listing
is expensive, and adopting better accounting and corporate policies
internally may suffer from the verifiability problem.176 Hence, the
domestic lemons problem is not resolved and while “[i]ndividuals
in higher-trust societies can spend less to protect themselves from
being exploited in economic transactions,”177 the less fortunate As
from low-trust jurisdictions must perish, join the Bs or
overspend. 178 Recall that this “overspending” conclusion also
173 This is somewhat similar to a capital markets non-disclosure scenario.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 683 (1984) (explaining that silence must
be interpreted as the worst news possible in project investment).
174 See, e.g., Iacobucci, supra note 33 (discussing equilibria and alternative
methods for firms to signal their behavior).
175
See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 820 (examining the discount on share
prices of a Russian business traded on the NYSE due to potential for insider
cheating and a distrust of Russian courts).
176
Obviously, all markets have to deal with the verification costs. See
generally Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation
Around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81 (2007); Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The
Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 736–38 (2003); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 594–609 (1984).
177 Knack, supra note 114, at 2.
178 See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 841 (mentioning also that “[t]he better a
country’s institutions, the more companies will be able to sell shares, relying
partly on their own and partly on the country’s reputation.”); Fehr et al. (2007),
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follows from the Expected Value of contract performance analysis:
if the value of enforcement is low and so are A and W, then the
value of the contract is abnormally low. An additional risk
premium is required to make contracting profitable.
Now, let us place the C&S transplants within this peculiar
socioeconomic environment. Imagine an originally foreign market
structure that is placed in the middle of a large number of Bs and
Cs in a low-trust jurisdiction such as the sample economies.
Imagine further that this structure participates in each transaction
involving specific assets, that it becomes a conduit of sorts and
“interposes” itself between all buyers and sellers of a certain class
of assets or several classes and that it also provides a guarantee
that every trade will be completed according to its terms, including
short-term exchanges, like trades in securities, or longer-term
transactions, like derivatives trades. Such a structure becomes a
form of insurance for all counterparties-members. The cost of large
defaults are spread among non-defaulting members. Its other
functions may include, e.g., registering trades and thus facilitating
more transparent pricing by all As, Bs and Cs.
How will the discussed above trust and reputational problems,
aggravated within the distorted B-C-A population, affect such a
transplanted structure? 179 How efficient will the transplanted
structure itself be, if its members are all from the local B-C-A
population?
These are serious concerns that may undermine the operations
of systemically important C&S transplants.180 Clearinghouses are
faced with the same trust concerns as every market actor but due
to their central position in a market have no other option but to
properly assess factors A, W and E to determine the Expected Payoff
and set up prices and internal safety valves accordingly.
The following Section illustrates that the transplanted C&S
models were not designed to mitigate the discussed above risks.
Instead, the C&S mechanisms developed in response to completely
different conditions and risks. Hence, the original model is
supra note 136, at 126, 151 (discussing the importance of the percentage of the fairminded players vis-à-vis the defectors).
179
Even “fair-minded actors” may be self-interested depending on
circumstances. Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 83, at 25–30. The lemons equilibrium
should only exacerbate these issues.
180 Although the examples above refer mostly to CCPs, CSD are also affected
by similar problems that may manifest themselves through fraudulent transfers of
share ownership or registries fraud.
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dangerous and systemically important and, at the same time, ex
ante unsuitable for the transplant-recipients’ socioeconomic
environment.
4. THE ORIGINS OF THE TRANSPLANTS:
A CENTRALIZED SOLUTION TO TRUST CONCERNS
4.1. Introduction: A Different Set of Problems and Different Solutions
In contrast to the discussed above phenomena, the
transactional inefficiencies that the centralized C&S was designed
for in the transplant-origins were completely different. The originmarkets were comparatively more efficient and transparent. There
was plenty of repeat players, such as comparatively transparent
corporate issuers, vigilant banks, and major brokerage houses
concerned with their reputation. The regulators, as opposed to
their counterparts in the sample economies, wore a single
regulatory hat. State ownership of the conduits was (and remains)
uncommon. Finally, the “last period” and “exit by necessity” were
comparatively rare. 181 The expected willingness and ability of at
least the majority of counterparties were ex hypothesi better
observable.
Instead, the new facilities were designed to reduce
inefficiencies of a different nature. Specifically, to complete a
single transaction, broker-dealers had to exchange dozens of
documents. 182 Without modern technology, mistakes were
numerous and closings costly. 183
A sufficiently centralized,
reliable and transparent C&S was rather a logical necessity than a
caprice of a few industry sages, lobbyists or national regulators
engaged in transplanting reforms.
The evolution of C&S was marked by an explicit search for a more
reliable, more “trustworthy” medium for asset exchange, the
medium that simultaneously was more efficient and reduced the
time and costs of a single transaction.
Simultaneously,
181 An obvious exception is, of course, market crashes and financial crises,
which are by definition rare events.
182 See, e.g., Bergmann, supra note 51 (explaining the old practices and the
ability of central counterparties to decrease documentation through better
processing).
183 See infra Subsection 4.1.1.1.
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centralization created economies of scale and, possibly more
importantly, reduced the costs of an individual assessment of
future performance.184
This, logically, further reduced the need for individual
assessments of the nature, willingness and ability of the market
participants to perform. From the perspective of private parties, W
and A evaluations, particularly in smaller, routine transactions,
were largely outsourced to the CCPs and CSDs, insured by their
membership standards, margin payments, and reporting
obligations.185 The conduits thus serve as proxies of the parties’
“trustworthiness.”
4.2. The Industry: History, Market Concentration and the State as a
Monitoring Agent
4.2.1. U.S. Markets: Market Initiatives and Supporting Regulations
4.2.1.1. The Origins of the Model
The formation of a centralized C&S system began about forty
years ago and was effectively completed by the beginning of the
21st century. Until the 1970s, however, there was no national
clearing and settlement mechanism and each securities exchange,
preserving market fragmentation, 186 performed C&S through its
own facilities.187 At the same time, depositories were virtually nonexistent.
As a result, closings required exhaustive paperwork to execute
a single trade. Traditional brokerages had to exchange multiple
documents to confirm the exact terms of a transaction and ensure
delivery and payment.188 It is almost self-explanatory that without
automated and centralized C&S systems, the resolution of
See infra notes 217–27 (assessing the regulatory and market responses).
Bernanke, supra note 6, at 136–46 (describing the role of clearinghouses as
financial intermediaries).
186 See, e.g., Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp. v. S.E.C., 590 F.2d 1085, 1096, n.13
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing the separate clearing agencies for each national and
regional exchange).
187 See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Law of Securities Regulation, 5 L. SEC. REG. §
14.1 (6th ed. 2010); 48 Fed. Reg. 45167-02 (1983); 48 Fed. Reg. 45167-01 (1983)
(examining the registration of the first clearing agencies).
188 Bergmann, supra note 51.
184
185
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uncompared trades, i.e., trades where a buyer and a seller submit
documents indicating erroneous and nonmatching terms, is
inefficient.189 Moreover, as is the case with any other contract, the
longer the closing, the greater the risk of nonperformance will be.
The financial community apparently viewed the status quo as
untenable. The NASD was working on designing more efficient
clearing conduits,190 while the NYSE and several custodian banks,
launched a one-year “Pilot Operation for Central Handling of
Securities,” which simplified deliveries among members.191
Unfortunately, the initiatives were only partially successful.
For instance, NASD broker-dealers continued delivering
certificates directly to counterparties.192 The NYSE’s clearinghouse,
the Central Certificate Service dealing with book transfers of
securities, 193 failed to process the growing volume, which
ultimately reached the unprecedented 21.3 million on June 13,
1968.194
189 See, e.g., DAVID M. WEISS, AFTER THE TRADE IS MADE: PROCESSING SECURITIES
TRANSACTIONS 239–49 (3rd ed. 2006) (discussing various automated comparison
processes and technological improvements, as well as the failures to deliver or
receive). See also OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, CONG. OF THE U.S., ELECTRONIC BULLS
AND BEARS (Sept. 1990), Box 3A, §§ F, G, at 45 [hereinafter ELECTRONIC BULLS AND
BEARS], http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9015.pdf (explaining the confirmation
and payment process of a trade).
Today, most retail and institutional securities trades flow through NSCC.
Institutional trades may be combined with other broker-dealer’s activities netted
through NSCC’s Continuous Net Settlement System. See DTCC, Institutional
Delivery
Netting
Service
(2009),
http://www.dtcc.com/products/cs/equities_clearance/idnet.php
(describing
how DTC, NSCC and Omgeo interface to combine the benefits of the CNS system
and institutional equity trades). Everything is done automatically. There are also
matching service providers and other parties, together with CCPs facilitating
“straight-through processing” (“STP”) of transactions based on a series of
automated transfers between the original parties and a number of intermediaries.
SEC Release No. 8,398, supra note 6.
190 See, e.g., Michael J. Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System
for Over-the-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 89 n.349 (1986) (mentioning
that in 1961, the NASD created the National OTC Clearing Corporation).
191 Future of C&S, supra note 72, at 47.
192
Simon & Colby, supra note 190. Even by 1972, the NASD was still
groping for an efficient C&S system. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES,
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S.
REP. NO. 93–13, at 90 (1973) [hereinafter SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY].
193
See, e.g., Wall Street: Attack on the Snarl, TIME, May 24, 1968,
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,844480,00.html
(explaining the implementation of an 8 million-a-year NYSE clearinghouse
system).
194 SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 192, at 28.
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As problems grew, “[d]eliveries and transfers of securities
became inexorably mired,” 195 in part, due to inadequate
recordkeeping. 196 Even corporate governance suffered as stock
records differed.197 A perfect storm ensued.198
It culminated in a combination of technical delivery problems,
associated fraud, the depletion of the resources of market
participants, a decline in securities prices, negatively affecting
commission revenues and the value of securities held by firms and
in proprietary accounts, serious changes in the trading volume,199
and, most importantly, the absence of a reliable channel for C&S.
This was exactly a scenario where the A-type companies, i.e., the
brokerages that were formerly reputable, had to rapidly convert
into C-defectors and be liquidated, primarily because of their
internal inability to process the transactions and due to low
revenues.
By no means was there evidence of a pervasive lemons
equilibrium. Instead, the industry faced technical problems of how
to ascertain that both parties were performing precisely what they
agreed to and do so in an efficient way. The second concern was
minimizing the C category by making sure that brokerages would
not convert from the good-natured As to Cs and would continue
performing under stress conditions, by definition rare events.
The exchanges’ response was precisely tailored to solve these
problems as they ramped up the efforts to provide market
participants with a reliable conduit. Already in December 1969,
the NASD created the new National Clearing Corporation, which,
similar to modern CCPs, “interposed” itself between trading
counterparties. 200 It also interfaced with depositories and other
clearinghouses.201 Similarly, by the early 1970s, the AMEX and the
195
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF
BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R. DOC. NO. 92–231, 92nd Cong., at 19 (1st Sess. 1971)
[hereinafter UNSAFE AND UNSOUND].
196 Id. at 13–14; Guttman, supra note 69, at 446, n.61.
197 UNSAFE AND UNSOUND, supra note 195, at 97 (discussing problems with
unresolved dividend receivables).
198 Id. at 13–19.
199 Exchange Act Release No. 13,163, 42 Fed. Reg. 3916, 3918 (Jan. 21, 1977);
UNSAFE AND UNSOUND, supra note 195, at 14, 18 (observing that increased trading
“taxed the . . . virtually static . . . [processing] facilities”).
200 Simon & Colby, supra note 190, at 73–74 n.349.
201
See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 3916, 3923–27 (1977) (discussing the exchanges’
application, rules, and history); SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 192, at 90;
Simon & Colby, supra note 190, at 89 (explaining how competition has led to
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NYSE had improved their clearinghouses,202 soon operating in the
continuous netting mode, interfacing with the other C&S entities
and allowing participants to make book-entry settlements in
DTC.203
These early successes led to more mergers and more
centralization.204 The major industry players, such as the Securities
Industry Association, the NASD and the NYSE, united in search
for a national clearing facility.205
The state de facto backed these market-driven initiatives and
centralization of the conduits. 206 By 1977, pursuant to its new
authority under the 1975 Amendments to the Exchange Act,207 the
SEC granted temporary registration to as many as 13 clearing
agencies, most of which were exchange subsidiaries. 208 After a
positive changes).
202
They jointly owned the Securities Industry Automation Corporation
running processing facilities for their clearinghouses. 42 Fed. Reg. 3916, 3923–24
(1977).
203 Id. at 3927.
204 See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 3916, 3922, 3930 (1977).
205 For instance, the industry organized the National Securities Processing
Committee and exchanges signed an MOU regarding the establishment of either a
single or heavily interfaced C&S system. See, e.g., Single National Clearing and
Settlement Organization, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,631, 39 Fed. Reg.
9884 (Mar. 14, 1974); Eli Weinberg, Joseph F. Neil Jr., Joseph P. Coriaci & David
Rubin, Development of a National System for Clearing And Settling Securities
Transactions, in 2 EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH 3, 353–77 (National Bureau
of Economic Research ed. 1975), http://www.nber.org/books/conf75-1.
206 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2010) (explaining the national securities C&S
system); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k-1(a)(1), 78l-1(c)(5) (2012) (summarizing congressional
findings concerning development of linkages among markets); Bradford Nat’l
Clearing Corp. v. S.E.C., 590 F.2d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that the
registration of a national system of securities clearance, the National Securities
Clearing Corporation (NSCC), was valid under Section 17A); Bergmann, supra
note 51, at 4–6 (describing the centralization of the formerly fragmented U.S.
clearance system); Donald L. Calvin, The National Market System: A Successful
Adventure in Industry Self-Improvement, 70 VA. L. REV. 785, 790–91, 800–09 (1984)
(reviewing congressional debates, the underlying objectives of the Amendments,
and the development of the national market system); Walter Werner, The SEC as a
Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755, 770–71 (1984) (commenting on the 1975
Amendments and SEC’s actions).
207 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (1975).
208 See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 3916, 3922–34 (Jan. 21, 1977) (granting temporary
registration to several clearing agencies); 41 Fed. Reg. 38841 (Sept. 13, 1976)
(providing notice of “proceedings to determine whether to grant or deny the
registration . . . [of various] clearing agencies, . . . at the expiration of the
registrations previously granted to the registrants . . . under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934”).
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long and careful review, several clearinghouses and depositories
for securities markets and the Options Clearing Corporation
(“OCC”) were granted permanent registration. 209 The largest
registrants were the currently active agencies – NSCC and its
associated depository, DTC. 210 In 1999, they transformed into a
single holding company – the Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation (“DTCC”).211
The reliability of the C&S facilities was tested several times.
An example was the 1987 crash. Recall that once a consolidated or
interconnected system is created, it must evaluate the prospective
performance of as many market actors as possible. One of the
major issues, which transpired in the crash, was precisely the
inability of transacting parties and the C&S facilities to evaluate the
A and W of others.
As the interrelatedness of the markets for futures, options and
equity grew, many clearing members operated in two or more
markets and clearinghouses provided contra-clearing services.212
The clearing agencies were often unable to assess the exposure of
their clearing members to other markets and gauge possible
failures.213 The concomitant lack of transparency and information
exchange among clearinghouses threatened the whole industry.
Overall, the newly interconnected C&S system exhibited

209
Registration as Clearing Agencies of Boston Stock Exchange Clearing
Corp., and New England Securities Depository Trust Co., Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 20,222, 48 Fed. Reg. 45167–01 (Oct. 3, 1983);, 48 Fed. Reg. 45167–02
(1983) (granting registration to other major clearing agencies).
210 By the early 1990s, they were processing almost all equity transactions.
See, e.g., ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 189, at 107–29 (providing
background and data on equity transactions since clearing agencies came about);
Hazen & Markham, supra note 57 (discussing how transactions in the futures
industry are handled by clearing agencies).
211 Today, DTCC provides clearing, settlement and ancillary services to the
U.S. equity and bond markets. DTCC, THE U.S. MODEL FOR CLEARING AND
SETTLEMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF DTCC 6–7 (2007).
212 See generally Securities Exchange Act Release No. 27,044, 44 SEC Docket
15, at 18 n.26, 1989 WL 550672, 4 n.26 (Jul. 18, 1989) [hereinafter Exchange Act
Release No. 27,044] (observing that by the late 1980s, 848 broker-dealers
participated in about 8 agencies, 541 of them—in two or more agencies, and 221—
in three or more); GAO, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 61
(evaluating progress made following the release of the Brady Commission Report,
and providing background information).
213 Exchange Act Release No. 27,044, supra note 212, at 4–5 (underscoring the
shared exposure of clearinghouses); BRADY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 61, at
55.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

GUSEVA (DO NOT DELETE)

596

4/20/2015 12:13 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 36:2

vulnerability to unprecedented trading volumes,214 the “fear” of a
default contagion,215 liquidity shortages, the resulting defaults by
broker-dealers and liquidation of clearing members.216
The regulatory and market responses were, again, carefully
weighed and narrowly defined.217 To name a few, the reforms and
proposals generally improved the speed,218 efficiency and safety of
transactions; 219 emphasized the importance of information
exchange across markets; 220 further immobilized securities
certificates, amending U.C.C. Article 8 accordingly; 221 improved
intraday payments systems for derivatives exchanges;222 etc.

214
See generally SEC STAFF REPORT¸ supra note 70, at 10–26; Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 27,044, supra note 212, at 5.
215 See generally BRADY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 61, at 51–55; Bernanke,
supra note 6, at 147–48; Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock
Market Crash of 1987—The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J.
1993 (1988) (providing excellent examples of market “fears”).
216 See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 6, at 147 (describing problems faced by
clearing members). Securities Exchange Act Release No. 27,044, supra note 212, at
6 (describing the positions that NSCC liquidated).
217
The responses echoed the conclusions of several private and public
assessment reports. See, e.g., BACHMANN TASK FORCE, supra note 69, at 31–32;
BRADY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 61, at 51–69; GAO, CLEARANCE AND
SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 61, at 21, 28, 38–39, 50–51; SEC STAFF REPORT, supra
note 70; ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 189, at 109–17. See also Mark
Carlson, A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash with a Discussion of the Federal
Reserve Response, FED. RES. BD. (Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Working
Paper
No.
2007–13,
2006),
available
at
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200713/200713pap.pdf (discussing the
liquidity support provided by the Federal Reserve as well as other cooperative
solutions).
218 For instance, a uniform T+3 settlement cycle for securities markets was
introduced. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1 (1993). See also 69 Fed. Reg. 12922-01 (Mar. 18,
2004) (discussing the original adoption of the shortened settlement cycle rule and
further initiatives); BACHMANN TASK FORCE, supra note 69, at 14–15 (reporting on
the correlation between time and risk in C&S).
219
69 Fed. Reg. 12922-01, 12926 (Mar. 18, 2004); GAO, CLEARANCE AND
SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 61, at 33–34; Securities Exchange Act Release No.
36,091, 1995 WL 493313, at 2–3, n.9, 10 (Aug. 10, 1995).
220 GAO, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 61, at 37; Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 27,044, 44 SEC Docket Release 15, 1989 WL 550672, at
16.
221 James S. Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1431, 1435–36 (1996) (“The article 8 revision project was one part of
worldwide efforts to assure that the clearance and settlement system for securities
trading is adequate for the task of processing the ever-increasing volume and
complexity of trading in the modern securities markets.”).
222 GAO, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 61, at 42.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss2/4

GUSEVA (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/20/2015 12:13 PM

KGB’S LEGACY

597

Within the securities markets, NSCC spearheaded the
development of deeper operational linkages, 223 information
exchange and better margining.224 Numerous operational links in
cross-market C&S grew by leaps and bounds.225
The interconnectedness of the system was further supported
through the 1990 Market Reform Act, which required the SEC to
promote linked facilities for C&S of securities, securities options,
futures, and commodity options.226 The SEC was also granted the
emergency authority227 in case of “a substantial disruption of the
safe or efficient operation of the national system for clearance and
settlement.”228 To an extent, the drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act
have followed a similar approach towards a regulated national,
and now international, system by expanding centralized
clearing.229
4.2.1.2. Coping with Market Concentration and Centralization
An interconnected and highly concentrated market, in theory,
may aggravate a number of risks, including the monopoly and

Hazen & Markham, supra note 57, § 13:5.
See e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 36,091, supra note 219, at 2–3
(describing the provisions for access to information on margin deposits at
different clearinghouses).
225 For instance, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (“CBOE”) entered
into an Interregional Interface Agreement with NSCC and MCC. Order Relating
to the Clearance of Securities Transactions Executed on the Chicago Board
Options Exchange, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 28,825, 48 SEC
Docket 76, 76–78 (Jan. 25, 1991).
226 The Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–432, 104 Stat. 963. See,
e.g., 15 U.S.C.A § 78q–1(a)(2) (2010) (finding that the Commission should use its
authority to establish a national system for the efficient clearance and settlement
of securities transactions); Hazen, supra note 187.
227 The Commission may suspend registration or impose requirements or
restrictions “with respect to any matter or action subject to regulation by the
Commission or a self-regulatory organization . . . as the Commission determines is
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors . . . (ii) to ensure
prompt, accurate, and safe clearance and settlement of transactions in securities
. . .” 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l(k)(2) (2012).
228 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l(k)(7)(ii) (2012).
229 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank Act), Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified as amended
in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., and 15 U.S.C.) (illustrating a system in
which centralized clearing is expanded to derivatives).
223
224
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systemic risk. In C&S, the answer to these concerns was never the
government, like it seems to be the case in Russia, Ukraine and
Kazakhstan, but rather, improvements in the governance of private
C&S institutions. How does the concentrated U.S. system deal
with those risks, while also preserving its status as a reliable
conduit?
Monopoly arguments do resurface in some C&S segments.230
For instance, the CME dominates the market, even though, of
course, there are other companies. 231 Yet, although alert to the
risks of insufficient competition, policy actors seem satisfied with
the status quo.232
Incidentally, similar centripetal tendencies may begin to affect
the swap industry, historically clearing transactions over the
counter (OTC) and recently modified by a host of post-Dodd-Frank
regulations.233 Although it is too early to make specific predictions,
230 Already in the mid-1990s, most futures trading occurred and was settled
at CBOT and CME. GAO, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 61, at
65; GAO, PAYMENTS, CLEARANCE, AND SETTLEMENT, supra note 60, at 68–75.
231 Today, it is a leading Derivatives Clearing Organization. See CME GRP.,
CME
CLEARING
FINANCIAL
SAFEGUARDS
3
(2012),
http://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/files/financialsafeguards.pdf (describing
CME’s services and risk management policies for clearing derivatives). Among
other companies, a large market share in futures and credit default swaps belongs
to ICE Clear.
See, e.g., The Clearing Corporation, ICE CLEAR,
https://www.theice.com/clearing-corp (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (presenting
itself as one of the oldest independent clearinghouses in the world).
232
See, e.g., Will Acworth, Justice Department Urges Treasury to Examine
Clearing Arrangements in U.S. Futures Industry, FUTURES INDUS. MAG., Mar./Apr.
2008,
available
at
http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/MarApr_Wash_Watch.pdf. The letter suggested that, “[i]f greater head-to-head
competition for the exchange of futures contracts could develop, we would expect
it to result in greater innovation in exchange systems, lower trading fees, reduced
tick size, and tighter spreads, leading to increased trading volume.” However, the
general tone of the letter did not denounce mergers within the industry (the CME
was at the moment discussing the acquisition of the New York Mercantile
Exchange), but urged the Treasury to improve the regulatory structure in order to
foster competition and innovation.
233
See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 60, at 1317–24 (describing the resulting
clearinghouse mandate of Dodd-Frank and the wide discretion left to the SEC and
CFTC as “a highly detailed, largely perspective set of requirements”); CFTC,
Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed.
Reg. 43785 (Jul. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R., ch. 1) (extending temporary
relief to clearinghouses as “Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act goes into effect piece
by piece”); Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Release:
PR6684–13: CFTC Announces that the Third Phase of Mandatory Clearing of
Certain Credit Default Swaps and Interest Rate Swaps Begins Today (Sept. 9,
2013) (announcing the beginning of “the third phase of required clearing for
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there are already a few C&S leaders.234
Apparently, in the derivatives and securities markets, the
regulators have decided that the centralization benefits may
outweigh antitrust considerations. 235 Possibly, the market and
regulators believe that insofar as all C&S entities are registered
with the authorities and comply with the key registration
principles, including the fair representation of users, conflicts of
interest are minimized.236
For instance, DTCC is among a few C&S entities based on the
user-owned model, i.e., the principal users of DTCC’s services own
its shares. The holding operates on an at-cost basis, returning
profits and excess revenue from transaction fees to the members in
the form of rebates and discounts.237 Additional cost savings result
from other infrastructural benefits.238
Multiple stakeholders participate in the management, which ex
hypothesi helps to mitigate potential conflicts of interest among the
facility’s users and exchange-shareholders.239 The dialogue among
all stakeholders is channeled through the Board of Directors,
representing a variety of constituencies.240
certain credit default swaps (CDS) and interest rate swaps”); Exemptions for
Security-Based Swaps Issued by Certain Clearing Agencies, Security Act Release
No. 9,308 (Mar. 30, 2012); Exemptions for Security-Based Swaps Issued by Certain
Clearing Agencies, 77 Fed. Reg. 20536–01 (Apr. 5, 2012) (listing exemptions “for
security-based swaps issued by certain clearing agencies satisfying certain
conditions”).
234
See,
e.g.,
Industry
Filings,
CFTC,
http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/IndustryFilings/index.htm (providing
information about various trading and clearing organizations).
235 Order Granting Partial Permanent Approval, Exchange Act Release No.
39,444, 62 Fed. Reg. 66703–01, 66705 (Dec. 19, 1997) (observing that the SEC is “at
most required to decide that any anticompetitive effects of its actions are
necessary or appropriate to the achievement of its objectives”).
236
See, e.g., Ruben Lee, THE GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL MARKET
INFRASTRUCTURE, OXFORD FIN. GRP., 277–79 (2010) [hereinafter Lee], available at
http://www.oxfordfinanegroup.com/media/10347/gfmi%20ofg.pdf (discussing
the reasons behind the SEC evaluation of DTCC).
237 DTCC (2007), supra note 211, at 6–7.
238 Id. at 7.
239 All decision-making power rests with the stakeholder-users holding the
voting shares of stock. Lee, supra note 236, at 271–75.
240 For information on the Board and its election process, see, e.g., Board of
Directors,
DEPOSITORY
TRUST
&
CLEARING
CORP.,
http://www.dtcc.com/about/leadership/board.aspx; The Board of Directors of
Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation:
Mission Statement and Charter (Apr. 2012) [hereinafter DTCC, 2012 Mission
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In options, a number of exchanges still “share equal ownership
of OCC.
This ownership, along with a clearing memberdominated Board of Directors, ensures a continuing commitment
to servicing the needs of OCC’s participant exchanges, clearing
members and their customers.”241
Such “centralized status quo” is associated with significant
economies of scale and scope, network externalities and
considerable cost savings, 242 putatively benefiting the investing
public and the financial industry.243 As a result, the C&S industry
provides high quality and low cost services244 and also aligns the
risks and interests of its participants.245 Although this has not
precluded antitrust suits against clearinghouses,246 the state did not
pursue interventionist policies. Instead, the conduits developed
mostly through the process of evolution. They improved their
reliability and “trustworthiness” through cooperation with various
stakeholders and strict participation standards and monitoring.

Statement
and
Charter],
http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/policy-andcompliance/DTCC-BOD-Mission-and-Charter.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2014); The
Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., Procedure for the Annual Nomination and
Election of the Board of Directors (Apr. 2013) [hereinafter DTCC, 2013 Election
Procedure],
http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/policyand-compliance/DTCC-BOD-Election-Procedure.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
241
OPTIONS CLEARING CORP., STATEMENTS FROM A FORWARD-LOOKING
COMPANY: THE OPTIONS CLEARING CORPORATION 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2010),
http://www.theocc.com/about/corporate-information/annual-reports/
(last
visited Oct. 25, 2014).
242 See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 39,444, 62 Fed. Reg. 66703–01, 66705
(Dec. 19, 1997) (approving the Philadelphia Stock Exchange proposals to
withdraw); Decision by the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Incorporated to
Withdraw, Exchange Act Release No. 39,220, 62 Fed. Reg. 53848, 53849 (Oct. 16,
1997) (discussing the withdrawal of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange from the
C&S businesses).
243 Exchange Act Release No. 39,444, 62 Fed. Reg. 66703–01, 66705 (Dec. 19,
1997) (mentioning that smaller C&S facilities withdrew from the business
voluntarily).
244 Id. See generally DTCC (2007), supra 211, at 6–19.
245 DTCC, 2012 Mission Statement and Charter, supra note 240, at 5, A-1.
246 See, e.g., the cases indicated in infra note 381.
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4.2.2. European Markets: Industry Concentration and the Limited
Role of Public Actors
The European C&S services and regulators to some extent
follow in the footsteps of those in the U.S. Originally, each
exchange had its own clearinghouse and/or a CSD tasked with
C&S of trades and custodial services.247 Some countries did have
centralized CCPs, while in others, divisions of local exchanges
cleared and settled transaction with securities listed solely on the
respective exchanges.248 Just like in the U.S., albeit about 20 years
later, the European C&S market has become less fragmented. 249
Already by 2010, five CSDs accounted for 81% of the total value of
all delivery instructions250 and there were only about 20 CCPs,251 all
247 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 236, at 280 (discussing the research findings of the
European Securities Forum and their resulting C&S proposals); EUR. CENT. BANK,
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 23 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter ECB, FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION],
www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialintegrationineurope201004en.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 25, 2014) (“There were 22 legal entities operating a central securities
depository (CSD) in the euro area in 2009.”).
248
See, e.g., HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES LAW
SERIES, 10B INT’L CAP. MKTS. & SEC. REG. §§ 39A:2, 39A:11 (2009) (describing
Spain’s central government and its power to make securities market law, and
explaining that Spain’s local clearing and settlement practices are not centralized,
yet are moving towards an interconnected system).
249 See e.g., Beata Wróbel et al., NAT’L BANK OF POLAND ET AL., SECURITIES
SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN POLAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 51–58 (2009)
[hereinafter
NAT’L
BANK
OF
POLAND],
http://www.nbp.pl/en/system_platniczy/securities_settlement_systems.pdf
(last visited Oct. 25, 2014) (describing the role of central counterparties and the
current trend towards centralization in the EU); EUR. CENT. BANK & FED. RES. BANK
CHI., THE ROLE OF CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 49–60 (July 2007),
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/rolecentralcounterparties200707en.p
df (last visited Oct. 25, 2014) (presenting results of an ESCB survey assessing the
degree of integration between CCPS); Future of C&S, supra note 72, at 5
(presenting a report that sides with the centralization side of “the current debate
on creating an efficient and integrated clearing and settlement infrastructure for
Europe”).
250 See ECB, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, supra note 247, at 56 (“With close to 40
CSDs operating in the EU in 2009 . . . and with the five largest of these CSDs
accounting for 81% of the total value of delivery instructions processed in the
market, harmonisation is likely to trigger a process of consolidation and reorientation.”).
251
Central
Counterparties,
EUR.
SEC.
&
MKTS.
AUTH.,
http://mifiddatabase.esma.europa.eu/Index.aspx?sectionlinks_id=24&language=
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closely interlinked throughout the EU. 252 Moreover, American
DTCC’s EuroCCP and NASDAQ OMX’s subsidiary also launched
CCP services for various European markets and their Boards were
recently entertaining a possibility of a merger.253
Overall, the playing field looks almost as concentrated as in the
U.S. For instance, one of the leading CCPs is LCH.Clearnet Group.
The Group operates subsidiaries servicing trades executed on a
variety of exchanges, including Euronext and the LSE. The Group
is basically a product of the merger of the London Clearing House
(LCH) and Clearnet, which were originally established around
1888 to clear trades in commodities. Their ownership system,
however, profoundly differed, with LCH being a not-for-profit
limited company owned primarily by its members,254 and Clearnet
operating in a vertical silo structure with Euronext.255
Just like in the U.S., the ownership structure was revised to
achieve better efficiency and fair user representation. 256 As a
result, the majority of the Group’s shares were owned by the users
of its services.257 Similar to the case of DTCC, most of the directors
represented the users, i.e., large financial institutions and
investment banks.258
The settlement system closely affiliated with NYSE Euronext,
the LSE and Clearnet’s clearing services is Euroclear, established in
0&pageName=CENTRAL_COUNTERPARTIES_Display&subsection_id=0
(last
visited Oct. 25, 2014).
252 NAT’L BANK OF POLAND, supra note 249, at 51–58.
253 See, e.g., Clearing Solutions for All to See: Annual Report 2012, EMCF, at 4,
10–11
(2012)
http://www.euroccp.com/sites/default/files/annual_report_2012_final_0.pdf
(last visited Oct. 25, 2014) (“On 14 March 2013 . . . [t]he owners of EMCF and the
current owner of EuroCCP . . . (DTCC)—along with BATS Chi-X Europe . . .
entered into a memorandum of understanding to become equal shareholders in
the new combined clearing house.”).
254 HASENPUSCH, supra note 47, §§ 8.2.1.1.1, 8.2.1.1.2.
255 Id. §§ 8.2.1.1.2, 8.2.1.1.4.
256 Id. §§ 8.2.1.1.3, 8.2.1.1.4; Lee, supra note 236, at 347–56; LCH.CLEARNET
GRP. LTD., REPORT AND CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2004, at 5 (2004),
http://www.lchclearnet.com/documents/731485/762550/LHC.Clearnet+Annual
+Report+and+Consolidated+Financial+Statements+2004.pdf/902b88fd-82444b94-92e4-c9673b9314bd (mentioning cost-related integration problems).
257
LCH.CLEARNET, EQUITYCLEAR SERVICE DESCRIPTION 5 (2012),
http://www.lchclearnet.com/documents/515114/515783/EquityClear+service+
description/399acff5-a59e-48ef-a975-ded76bcabd62.
258 Board of Directors, LCH.CLEARNET, http://www.lchclearnet.com/aboutus/governance/board-of-directors.
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1968 by Morgan Guaranty Trust Company.259 Its local subsidiaries
provide settlement for trades in equity, bonds and investment
funds in more than 80 countries.260
Considering its complex multijurisdictional structure and
continuous corporate expansion, this major clearinghouse seems to
be struggling with intra-group depository cooperation, which had
to be bolstered by the disclosure, user communication and anticonflicts-of-interest mechanisms.261 For this reason, the boards of
its holding companies also decided to voluntarily comply with the
UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance, although none of
them was a publicly traded entity.262
Another major group of players are incorporated within a
vertical silo created under the umbrella of Deutsche Borse AG. As
a vertically integrated holding company, it operates a number of
subsidiaries, including Eurex Clearing and Clearstream. Eurex
Clearing AG provides CCP services for a range of instruments
traded on all Eurex exchanges, trades executed on the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange, transactions on the Irish Stock Exchange and
others.263 In turn, Clearstream acts as a CSD for most transactions
cleared through Eurex Clearing, as well as other entities.
Originally, Clearstream’s predecessor, Cedel, operated as a
user-owned cooperative, where “no single shareholder was
259 See, e.g., Hazen & Markham, supra note 57, § 13:20 (2010); Lee, supra note
236, at 301–12 (stating that Morgan Guaranty created Euroclear in 1968 to process
the Eurobonds settlement).
260 Euroclear was traditionally built on the user ownership model and, to
preclude single shareholder control, the articles of association imposed a 5%
voting cap on shares. As is typical in the industry, most non-executive directors
of the boards within the Holding represent the service users. Id. at 297–300, 313–
14; Hazen & Markham, supra note 57, § 13:20 (discussing the Group’s history).
261
Lee, supra note 236, at 313–20. See also Market Advisory Committees,
EUROCLEAR,
https://www.euroclear.com/en/about/our-structure/macs.html
(explaining that the Committees harmonize the markets in which Euroclear is the
central securities depositary).
262
In addition, by preserving a high ratio of user representation on the
boards and balancing the interests of all users and shareholders, the group assures
continuous compliance with C&S standards. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 236, at 313–
20; NAT’L BANK OF BELGIUM, ASSESSMENT OF THE EUROCLEAR SYSTEM AGAINST CPSSIOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 110 (2005),
http://www.nbb.be/doc/cp/nl/settle/fsr2005cpps.pdf
(reporting
the
observance of CPSS-IOSCO recommendation by the Euroclear System).
263
HASENPUSCH, supra note 47, 8.1.2.1.1; Lee, supra note 236, 287–91;
Organizational
Structure,
EUREX
CLEARING,
http://www.eurexclearing.com/clearing-en/about-us/corporateoverview/organizational-structure/.
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permitted to own more than 5% of Cedel’s share capital.” 264
Today, both clearinghouse groups operate within a vertical silo
whose corporate governance is premised on the two-tier board
structure, typical of German companies.265
The European public authorities, just like their counterparts
across the ocean, seem to be keen on facilitating such
interconnected
marketplace
through
both
technological
improvements, such as the Trans-European Automated Real-time
Gross Settlement Express Transfer, a payment transfer
infrastructure, 266 and a network of Directives promoting C&S
centralization and uniform standards for securities and various
derivatives.267
Policy actors also have long entertained an idea of creating a
single pan-European C&S facility. 268 However, the industry
merely became more consolidated, while policymakers refused to
take the initiative ahead of private entities.269

Lee, supra note 236, at 292–93.
Shareholders did not fully support the move from a user-owned system
to a vertical silo with a two-tier board. Cedel, e.g., formed a joint venture with
Deutsche Borse over objections of its shareholders. Lee, supra note 236, at 293–95.
On the pros and cons of the two-tier board models and related litigation against
corporate management, see, e.g., Martin Gelter, Why Do Shareholder Derivative
Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe?, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 843, 848–52 (2012).
See also Griffith, supra note 63 (proposing targets for regulatory attention and its
links to derivative tools).
266 See generally EUR. CENT. BANK, INFORMATION GUIDE FOR TARGET2 USERS
(Oct. 2009), http://www.ecb.int/paym/t2/shared/pdf/infoguide_V3_1_0.pdf.
267 See infra Section 4.3.
268 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 236, at 279–81; Future of C&S, supra note 72, at 21–
38 (explaining the benefits of consolidation and proposing a method of achieving
it); Eur. Sec. Forum, ESF’s Blueprint for a Single Pan-European Central Counterparty
11
(Dec.
6,
2000)
[hereinafter
ESF],
www.csdl.lt/en/data/legal/inter/2_Blueprint_pdf_as_of_11dec.pdf
(highlighting the benefits of the unification of the CPP).
269 See, e.g., EUR. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN ON
THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 16 (Feb. 15, 2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/fina
l-report-wise-men_en.pdf (underscoring that “[m]arket forces should mainly
determine the contours of European clearing and settlement”).
264
265
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4.3. Regulatory Philosophy and Its Risk Premises
4.3.1. U.S. Regulators as Standard Setters
The regulatory policies in the transplant-origins developed
through the process of local market evolution as policymakers
acted in response to narrow and specific risks of an existing
industry. The key characteristics of the regulatory approaches may
be taxonomized as follows. First, all clearing organizations must
register with the CFTC or the SEC, or both, unless exempted from
registration.270 The Commissions are at the center of the national
C&S standard setting,271 guided by such key policy objectives as
investor protection and market efficiency concerns. 272 The
centrality of the Commissions resonates through case law as
“Congress did not impose any specific standards of efficiency and
instead relied on the Commission [the SEC in that case] to regulate
the clearing agencies.”273
Second, the Commissions generally support the industry’s
initiatives, while assuring the transparency and fairness of the
utilities and maintaining the internal stability of the centralized
systemically important facilities. For instance, from the beginning,
the SEC required agencies 274 (1) to assure nondiscriminatory
270 15 U.S.C § 78c(a)(23) (2013); 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2 (2013); 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(b)
(2013); 7 U.S.C § 7a-1 (2013); 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2013); Amendment to Rule Filing
Requirements for Dually-Registered Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act Release No.
69,284, 78 Fed. Reg. 21046–01 (Apr. 9, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240,
249); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ab2–1 (2014).
271 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C § 78s(b) (2013) (providing guidelines for “proposed rule
changes; notice; proceedings”); 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2013) (discussing the “[n]ational
system for clearance and settlement of securities transactions”); 7 U.S.C § 7a-2
(2013) (presenting the “common provisions applicable to registered entities”); 7
U.S.C. § 7a-1 (2013) (concerning the registration requirement for derivatives
clearing organizations); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (2013) (prioritizing these functions as
central among the roles of the Commission).
272 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C § 78c(f) (2013).
273 Whistler Inv., Inc. v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corp., 539 F.3d 1159,
1167 (9th Cir. 2008).
274 These principles reflect the statutory language and are also embedded
into the post-Dodd-Frank new regulations. 15 U.S.C § 78q-1(b) (2013); Clearing
Agency Standards, Exchange Act Release No. 68,080, 77 Fed. Reg. 66220–01 (Nov.
2, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad–22 (2013). The
CFTC’s registration policy is based on a number of generally similar “core
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participation standards, 275 which also translates into “fair
representation” and participation of shareholders in the election of
directors and management, 276 (2) to have adequate capacity to
enforce rules and discipline participants observing due process
requirements,277 the requirements mirrored in the corresponding
obligation to monitor participants and deny participation to
disqualified or incompetent applicants, 278 and (3) to disseminate
various reports to participants.279 Agencies were also required to
apprise participants of fee increases and to provide appropriate
notices of proposed rule and management changes to
participants.280
Since “thou shall not steal,” the SEC required clearinghouses
safeguard securities and funds, assure prompt and accurate C&S
and have proper organizational and processing capacity, verified
by proper accounting policies and audit controls.281 The regulators
also acknowledged the centrality of clearing funds as a cushion
protecting clearinghouses against defaults by participants and
general market distress. This understanding translated into
specific standards of care concerning clearing fund contributions,
evaluation of the financial and operational safety of participants,
maintaining liquidity of the funds, liquidity risk assessments, and
others.282
The financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing rules promulgated
under the Dodd-Frank Act were purported to strengthen these
traditional statutory requirements by calling for more transparency
and data reporting in C&S as well as more centralized clearing and
principles.” 7 U.S.C § 7a-1(c)(2) (2013).
275 Regulation of Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 16,900, 45
Fed. Reg. 41920, 41921–23 (June 23, 1980).
276 Id. at 41923–24.
277 Id. at 41924; 15 U.S.C § 78q-1(b)(5) (2013).
278 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C § 78q-1(b)(3) (2013) (requiring that a clearing agency not
be registered unless it is efficiently organized and capable to “facilitate the prompt
and accurate clearance and settlement” and to ensure compliance of participants
with its rules).
279 Regulation of Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 16,900, 45
Fed. Reg. 41920, 41923–31 (June 23, 1980).
280 Id.
281
Id. at 41925. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad–22(c) (2013) (requiring
clearinghouses to maintain proper records and conduct annual audits).
282 Regulation of Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 16,900, 45
Fed. Reg. 41920, 41929–30 (June 23, 1980). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad–22(d)
(2013) (requiring clearinghouses to establish certain safeguard procedures).
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netting, including clearing of swaps, in order to prevent systemic
risk accumulation.283 In this sense, the new regulations target the
same old combination of policy objectives in application to more
financial instruments.284
4.3.2. European Regulations: Pan-European Harmonization
The European regulations have generally developed in
response to the same policy objectives and market concerns. The
primary difference, however, was the diversity of the regulatory
regimes within the EU. 285 Therefore, with the growth in crossborder securities and derivatives trading, the regulators focused on
the harmonization of C&S across the EU and, recently, in accord
with their international commitments and the U.S. reforms,
derivatives C&S.
First, a new “linchpin” has begun to emerge as the post-crisis
regulations streamlined the formerly heterogeneous approach to
C&S supervision. Facilities like trade repositories, as well as
traditional CCPs and CSDs, register with local and European
authorities (or the European Securities and Markets Authority
(“ESMA”) in the case of repositories). The agencies may be
monitored by colleges of regulators including the authorities from
other countries-stakeholders, as well as ESMA itself.286
283
See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 60, at 1317–24. See also CFTC, Final
Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed.
Reg. 858–01 (Jan. 7, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. ch. 1) (promulgating new
regulations that administer C&S transactions); CFTC, Clearing Requirement
Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74284–01 (Dec. 13,
2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39, 50) (requiring certain classes of credit
default swaps to be cleared by a clearing derivatives organization); CFTC, EndUser Exception to the Clearing Requirement for Swaps, 77 Fed. Reg. 42560-01 (Jul.
19, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39); Clearing Agency Standards, Exchange
Act Release No. 68,080, 77 Fed. Reg. 66220–01 (Nov. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240) (establishing minimum requirements for clearinghouses’ risk
management, procedures and controls).
284 For instance, the new Rule 17Ad-22 requires better financial disclosure,
risk management practices, participant monitoring, performance and credit
exposure assessment, and margining policy. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad–22 (2013).
285 See, e.g., Future of C&S, supra note 72 (discussing the multiple regulatory,
fiscal, and legal regimes across the EU); ESF, supra note 268, at 4–8 (drawing
parallels between the U.S. and European C&S structures).
286
See, e.g., Regulation 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade
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The search for uniformity has fostered a cooperative reform
environment.287 About a decade ago, the European Commission
established a number of task forces, including the Legal Certainty
Group (LCG), a group of securities law experts, with the objective
to advise national and European authorities on the removal of legal
barriers related to cross-border securities holdings and trade
settlement. 288 The LCG’s suggestions effectively seconded the
concepts proposed by industry groups, such as the European
Securities Forum,289 as well as the Giovaninni Reports,290 the Final
Lamfalussy Report291 and the ECB Studies.292
Repositorities, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, art. 17–18, 55; recitals § 74 (discussing the
establishment of colleges of regulators); Regulation 575/2013, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, on Prudential Requirements for
Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Regulation No.
648/2012, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1 (requiring the applicant CPP to submit to
authorization by a “competent authority of the Member State where it is
established”). For an overview of the reforms in the area of derivatives and the
April 2014 Regulation on Securities Settlement and on Central Securities
Depositories adopted by the European Parliament, see Derivatives/EMIR, EUR.
COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financialmarkets/derivatives/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2014) (providing
information regarding legislation, reports, regulation, and other topics concerning
derivatives/EMIR);
Central
Securities
Depositories,
EUR.
COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financialmarkets/central_securities_depositories/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2014)
(providing links for historical background and proposals concerning central
securities depositories).
287
For the list of task forces and their participants, see Clearing and
Settlement,
EUR. COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financialmarkets/clearing/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2014).
288 Legal Certainty Group, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/financial-markets/clearing/certainty/index_en.htm#maincontentSec2
(last visited Oct. 23, 2014). The 2008 LCG Recommendations, emphasizing the
creation of a successful framework for the intra-EU trading, called for further
integration of C&S services, greater legal certainty with respect to book-entry
transfers and better contract enforceability in C&S. Legal Certainty Group, Second
Advice of the Legal Certainty Group: Solutions to Legal Barriers Related to Post-Trading
Within the EU, EUR. COMM’N (Aug. 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financialmarkets/docs/certainty/2ndadvice_final_en.pdf.
289 Lee, supra note 236, at 380–82; ESF, supra note 268.
290
Second Report on EU Clearing and Settlement Arrangements, GIOVANNINI
GRP. (Apr. 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financialmarkets/docs/clearing/second_giovannini_report_en.pdf.
291 Committee of Wise Men, supra note 269.
292 See, e.g., ECB, Financial Integration, supra note 247 (providing a report that
complements the European Commission’s findings regarding financial integration
and uniformity); Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
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These joint efforts germinated multiple policy initiatives,
regulations and directives, starting with the Settlement Finality
Directive and the Financial Collateral Directives and including
more homogenous rules for CSDs and CCPs, ultimately setting
forth a uniform foundation for a pan-European regime.293 On the
market side, clearinghouses developed the European Code of
Conduct for Clearing and Settlement.294 The Code dovetailed with
the provisions of the original Directive on Markets in Financial
Instruments (“MiFID”), which required, inter alia, access to
national C&S by investment firms from all EU countries, disclosure
of post-trade rules by regulated markets and application of
nondiscriminatory standards to participants.295
The post-crisis changes to MiFID and other new regulations do
not significantly change these basic premises except for the
requirements regarding OTC derivatives settlement and pricing.296
To the extent that the key European initiatives focus on the
disclosure, transparency, nondiscriminatory policies and
strengthened prudential and organizational requirements for
clearinghouses, they are principally consonant with the U.S.

Parliament: Clearing and Settlement in the European Union – Main Policy Issues and
Future Challenges, COM (2002) 0257 Final (2002), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52002DC0257:EN:HTML
(providing links to historical documents concerning the LCG and discussing what
was subsequently adopted).
293
For examples of these multiple policy initiatives, see Directive
2009/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009,
Amending Directive 98/26/EC on Settlement Finality in Payment and Securities
Settlement Systems and Directive 2002/47/EC on Financial Collateral
Arrangements as Regards Linked Systems and Credit Claims, 2009 O.J. (L 146) 37;
Directive 98/26/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May
1998 on Settlement Finality in Payment and Securities Settlement Systems, 1998
O.J. (L 166) 45; Directive 2002/47/EC, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 6 June 2002 on Financial Collateral Arrangements, 2002 O.J. (L 168) 43;
Directive 2010/78/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 120; Decision ECB/2011/20, of the
European Central Bank of 16 November 2011, Establishing Detailed Rules and
Procedures for Implementing the Eligibility Criteria for Central Securities
Depositories to Access TARGET2-Securities Services, 2011 O.J. (L 319) 117. See
also the Directives listed in supra note 286.
294
Federation of European Securities Exchanges et al., European Code of
Conduct for Clearing and Settlement, EUR. COMM’N (Nov. 7, 2006), at 1,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financialmarkets/docs/code/code_en.pdf.
295 Directive 2004/39/EC, arts. 34, 42, 45, 46, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1; Directive
2008/10/EC, 2008 O.J. (L 76) 33; Directive 2014/65/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349.
296 See supra notes 286, 293; Directive 2014/65/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349.
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homologues 297 and with the CPSS and IOSCO’s Principles for
Financial Market Infrastructures.298
4.4. Conclusion
To conclude, the C&S history underscores that the principal
industry models and respective regulations evolved in response to
narrow and temporary transactional inefficiencies.
Their
formation was not influenced by fundamental socioeconomic
distortions or cultural phenomena. Instead, the market reforms
addressed transitory infrastructure inefficiencies and operational
risks of C&S facilities. The ultimate C&S models were premised on
the principles of transparency, self-reliance, member monitoring,
and “trustworthiness” of operations, governance and risk
management.
Transplanting these facilities into the sample economies of
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan as is would be a typical example
of a failed methodology. As discussed above, all three economies
suffer from a number of fundamental inefficiencies affecting
transactional exchange. Using foreign law in hopes of achieving
similar transactional efficiencies, i.e., the national law-market
paradigm, is emblematic of the criticisms of transplanting.
Self-evidently, under such circumstances, local conditions
would call for transplant modifications, i.e., the introduction of a
domestic “gradient.” Such a gradient should, in theory, remedy
local aberrations. The following Sections discuss the gradient
devised by the three sample jurisdictions.

297
Both the EU reforms and the Dodd-Frank proceed from the global
consensus hammered out at the international level starting with the Pittsburgh
G20 Summit. The Summit called for concerted efforts to reduce the counterparty,
non-disclosure and operational risks in OTC derivatives C&S and trading. G20
Statement, supra note 3.
298 CPSS, supra note 3.
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5. SAMPLE JURISDICTIONS: COMBINING PUBLIC OWNERSHIP WITH
REGULATION IN PRIVATE MARKETS?
5.1. Introduction
My analysis of the C&S statutes and facilities in Russia,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan has identified only one principal
modification of the western C&S models. That “gradient” is the
state ownership of financial market institutions. Presumably, this
adaptation was purported to respond to the local market
inefficiencies and adjust the transplant to the conditions of the
three sample economies. In most other respects, the three
jurisdictions and their C&S statutes are in compliance with the
western and international C&S standards and pursue regulatory
policies similar to those of the transplant-origins.
5.2. National Industry Structure: We Own You Now, Please Be
Efficient
5.2.1. Russia
Considering the absence of similar research, this Section must
delve into the details of the local regulatory and market
landscapes. Let us start with the Russian C&S structure, which is
currently in flux due to a deluge of new regulations.
Generally, Russian C&S entities operate within the vertical silo
structures of several major trading platforms and exchanges,
although there are also a few facilities that belong to “oligarchic”
resource corporations.299 The two formerly independent securities
299
See, e.g., "Kliringovyi tsentr MFB”: Obshchaia informatsiia [General
Information About the “Clearing Center of the Moscow Stock Exchange“], KLIRINGOVYI
TSENTR
MFB [CLEARING CENTER OF THE MOSCOW STOCK EXCH.],
http://www.mse.ru/docs/mfb/(last visited Dec. 23, 2014) (presenting the
registration information about the Moscow clearing center, including its services
and contact information); Novosti [News] SANKT-PETERBURGSKAIA VALUITNAIA
BIRZHA
[ST.
PETERSBURG
CURRENCY
EXCH.],
http://www.spcex.ru/clearing/index.stm (last visited Dec. 23., 2014) (listing
updates made to the St. Petersburg clearing center to maintain legal compliance);
GODOVOI OTCHET ZAKRYTOGO AKTSIONERNOGO OBSHCHESTVA "RASCHETNODEPOZITARNAIA KOMPANIIA” ZA 2O12 GOD [ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2012 OF THE CLOSED
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and derivatives markets – the Moscow Interbank Currency
Exchange Group (MICEX Group) and the Russian Trading System
Group (RTS Group) – deserve a closer look. The first one
historically operated in the stock, government debt and derivatives
markets, including, inter alia, options and futures based on shares
of stock, interest rates, currencies and commodities, while the
second was a major trading platform for both stock and bond
markets and derivatives based on stocks and stock indices.300
The major Russian groups merged in 2011, forming the
Moscow Exchange.301 As a result, a multistep C&S merger ensued
in order to reduce the duplicate C&S facilities. By 2013, the
industry mainly comprised (1) the National Clearing Center
(“NCC”), owned by the joint exchange,302 (2) the Depository and
Clearing Company, merged into the new Central Securities
Depository – the National Settlement Depository (“NSD”), which,
in turn, is a member of the MICEX-RTS Group, Moscow
Exchange.303 There also were the two entities owned through the
RTC structure: the Clearing Center of the RTC and the Payment
[Transfer] Chamber of the RTS.304
CORPORATION
“CLEARING
AND
DEPOSITARY
COMPANY]
26
(2013),
http://www.sdco.ru/about/files/RDK_GO_2012_w.pdf (describing the structure
and principles of management); Centralization of Clearing, infra note 306
(commenting on the centralization of the Moscow Exchange, the St. Petersburg
Exchange and the Moscow Energy Exchange into one group on Dec. 3, 2012).
300 COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE CPSS COUNTRIES 316 (Sept.
2011) [hereinafter RED BOOK], http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss97.pdf.
301
MMVB i RTS podpishut dogovor o sliianii do serediny aprelia [Moscow
International Stock Exchange and Russian Fund Index Sign an Agreement on Merging
by
the
Middle
of
April],
RBK
(Jan.
1,
2011),
http://top.rbc.ru/economics/01/02/2011/536598.shtml; Welcome to Moscow
Exchange, MOSCOW EXCH., http://moex.com/s348 (last visited Dec. 23, 2014).
302
Nat’l Clearing Ctr., Shareholders, MOSCOW EXCH. GRP.,
http://www.nkcbank.com/viewCatalog.do?menuKey=37.
303
Obhshaya Informatsia [General Information], NATSIONAL'NYI RASCHETNYI
DEPOZITARII: GRUPPA MOSSKOVSKAIA BIRZHA [NAT’L SETTLEMENT DEPOSITORY,
MOSCOW EXCH. GRP.], https://www.nsd.ru/ru/about/info/; National Settlement
Depository,
THOMAS
MURRAY
LTD.
(2013),
http://ds.thomasmurray.com/sites/default/files/downloads/nsd_csd_public_r
ating_20130301.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2014).
304 See Zakrytoe aktsionernoe obshchestvo "Kliringovyi tsentr RTS" [Private JointStock Company “Clearing Center RTS”], RTS [RUSSIAN TRADING SYSTEM], available at
https://archive.today/TA4UV
(last visited Apr. 17, 2012) (archiving
http://www.rts.ru/s155, which described the license and functions of the
Clearing Center of the Russian Trading System); NKO "Raschetnaia palata RTS"
[Credit
Union
“Financial
Organization],
RTS,
available
at
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The C&S and depository arms of the merged exchanges
traditionally operated as CCPs and CDS, providing book-entry
transfers of assets and records, and ran centralized depositories.305
The NCC, of course, still works as a CCP. In December 2012, it
consolidated the clearing operations for the Moscow Exchange, the
St. Petersburg Exchange and the Moscow Energy Exchange.306
The NSD acts as a CSD of the new group. Together with the
NCC, it facilitates DVP settlement, a significant development for
the sample markets.307 It also serves as an OTC trade repository for
derivatives and repo contracts. The NSD owns the DCC, which
serviced RTC transactions, transferred records among RTC and
MICEX accounts and, by and large, worked closely with its
parent.308 The Depository may also become an important player in
the swap market when the new Moscow Exchange’s derivatives
CCP project takes off.309
The ownership structure and, correspondingly, corporate
governance of the Russian CSDs and CCPs is, to a large degree, a
“domestically oriented” vertical silo. The new Statutes on C&S
support this trend. For instance, as discussed in more detail below,
only Russian legal entities may be stockholders of a CSD.310 The
rules are slightly different with respect to other clearinghouses and
merely impose a 5% voting cap on certain stockholders,
particularly entities from either offshore jurisdictions, from
countries with inadequate disclosure regulations, or whose licenses
have been annulled.311 An applicant for a C&S license must be a
https://archive.today/iXkLJ (last visited Apr. 17, 2014) (archiving
http://www.rts.ru/s162, which described the functions of the RTS group).
305 RED BOOK, supra note 300, at 316.
306 Tsentralizatsia Kliringa [Centralization of Clearing], MOSCOW STOCK EXCH.,
http://www.nkcbank.ru/viewCatalog.do?menuKey=194 (last visited Dec. 23,
2014).
307 For more on DVP and RVP, see generally SEC Release No. 8,398, supra
note 6; Kliringovye uslugi – osushchestvlenie rascchetov na usloviiah DVP [Cleaning
Services – Settling Accounts Under the Terms of DVP], CLEARING CTR. OF THE
MOSCOW STOCK EXCH., https://www.nsd.ru/ru/services/clearing/ (last visited
Dec. 23, 2014).
308
Uslugi DKK [Services of the DCC (Depository Clearing Company)], NAT’L
SETTLEMENT DEPOSITORY, MOSCOW EXCH. GRP., http://www.dcc.ru/ru/serv/serv/
(last visited Dec. 23, 2014).
309 Produkty [Products], MOSCOW EXCH., http://moex.com/s942 (last visited
Dec. 23, 2014).
310 FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 4(1) (Russ).
311 FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, arts. 7(1), 26 (Russ.). An application for a
clearing license should include information on all shareholders of 5% of the
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domestic corporation.312
Who owns the major C&S facilities? It is mainly the major
exchanges. The National Clearing Center is, e.g., 100% owned by
the merged exchange group.313 This vertical silo, however, is not
similar to that of Deutsche Bourse or other western silos. The key
difference is a large share owned by the state through either the
National Bank of Russia or state-related banks.314
5.2.2. Kazakhstan
The C&S system of Kazakhstan is equally geared towards
domestic players. The primary distinction is that it is more
centralized compared to its Russian counterparts. In contrast to
the still merging neighbors to the north, Kazakhstan’s capital
markets are a one-player structure with one exchange and one
CSD, both marked by a heavy government participation.
First, the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (“KASE”) is the key
trading platform for most securities and derivatives products in
the country.315 Second, since 1997, there has been just one single
CSD acting as a nominal holder of securities, settling trades,
providing a payment guarantee and holding securities in a
dematerialized form.316 The exchange sends all trades to the CSD
as matched trades, and the CSD does matching for broker-dealers
in the OTC markets.317
In contrast to the CSD, the clearing business was somewhat less
developed. For years, there were no CCPs in Kazakhstan, and all
clearing was on a trade-by-trade and gross DVP basis. Therefore,
applicant’s voting stock.
312 Id. art. 5(1).
313
Aktsionery [Shareholders], NATSIONAL'NYI KLIRINGOVYI TSENTR GRUPPY
MOSKOVSKAIA BIRZHA [NAT’L CLEARING CTR. OF THE MOSCOW EXCH. GRP.]
http://www.nkcbank.ru/viewCatalog.do?menuKey=7 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
314
Korporativnye dokumenty [Corporate Documents], MOSCOW EXCH.,
http://moex.com/s798 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014); Shares and Dividend Policy,
MOSCOW
EXCH.
(Dec.
23,
2013),
http://moex.com/en/Report/2013/aktsii_page.html.
315 NAT’L BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN & COMM. ON PAYMENT &
SETTLEMENT SYS., PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN KAZAKHSTAN 4 (Nov. 2003) [hereinafter
PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN KAZAKHSTAN], http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss57.pdf.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 13.
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there, by definition, were “no counterparty credit risk exposures to
manage . . . [and] a settlement guarantee fund [did] not exist.”318
While this structure took care of the exposure to large defaults
and market disruptions in the first two decades of the transition,
more recent regulations have overturned the status quo. In mid2012, for instance, one clearing license was granted to the clearing
subsidiary of the KASE, which now operates as a CCP and
provides netting services to participants.319
Just like in Russia, an important characteristic of the Kazakh
market is a distinct focus on domestic players and active state
participation in the economy.320 For instance, by law, the CSD is
more than 50% owned by the National Bank of Kazakhstan
(“NBK”) and the rest of the shares are owned by the KASE and
commercial banks and brokers. 321 The list of potential private,
domestic and international, owners shall be approved by the
regulators.322
The state participation is in fact not capped at 50.1% since the
KASE itself is majority owned by the NBK, while various banks
and broker-dealers have a minority stake. 323 Perhaps for this
reason, the KASE for years did not even have to be an SRO per se.324
To conclude, just like in the Russian vertical silos, the CCP
functions are carried out through the partially state-owned KASE.

IMF Report No. 04/338, supra note 103, at 50.
PRAVILA OSUSHESTVLENIA KLIRINGOVOY DEYATELNOSTY PO SDELKAM S
FINANSOVIMY INSTRUMENTAMY [Rules of Clearing Activity Concerning Transactions
with Financial Instruments], АKTSIONERNOE Оbshchestvo “KAZAKHSKAYA
FONDOVAYA BIRZHA” [JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “KAZAKHSTAN STOCK EXCHANGE”]
[KASE]
2013,
available
at
http://www.kase.kz/files/normative_base/clearing_rules.pdf.
320
Transition Report 2012: Country Assessments: Kazakhstan, EUR. BANK FOR
RECONSTR. & DEV. 121 (2012), http://tr.ebrd.com/tr12/index.php/countryassessments/kazakhstan.
321 PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN KAZAKHSTAN, supra note 315, at 13; ZRK RCB, supra
note 15, art. 78 (Kaz.).
322 Id. art. 78(2).
323 Shareholders, KAZ. STOCK EXCH., http://www.kase.kz/en/shareholders
/index.
324 IMF Report No. 04/338, supra note 103, at 37.
318

319
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5.2.3. Ukraine
Similar to its neighbors to the east, in Ukraine, equity and debt
instruments dominate domestic trading, while complex derivatives
remain a rarer animal. 325 Today, the recently modernized C&S
facilities provide depository services and function as CCPs
although some trades traditionally were and still are cleared
OTC.326
The C&S of the trades executed on exchanges is mainly
conducted through the Settlement Center (“SC”), which, among
other services, operates as a CCP, a bank and, until October 2013, a
depository
providing,
inter
alia,
book-entry
transfers,
dematerialization of securities, their immobilization and settlement
of OTC trades.327 There is also the National Depository (“ND”),
which handles transactions with government securities and, since
October 2013, has taken over most CSD functions. 328 This C&S
structure was, similar to those of the other sample jurisdictions,
established in the mid-1990s as a CSD. More recently, the SC
evolved into a full-fledged clearing center.329
The country shares significant structural similarities and ties
with its former USSR “sister-republics,” which is reflected in its
market structure. For instance, some major stock exchanges are
currently 43% and 50% owned by the above-mentioned Russian

UNICREDIT, supra note 44, at 7–10.
Id.
327
Id. at 11–14; Poslugi [Services], PUBLICHNOE AKTIONERMOE TOVARISTVO
ROZRAHUNKOVIY CENTR [SETTLEMENT CENTER FOR CONTRACTS IN FINANCIAL
MARKETS]
[hereinafter
RC],
http://www.settlement.com.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=8&Itemid=100021 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
328 UNICREDIT, supra note 44, at 12, 13. See also ZU DS, supra note 15, art. 1(5)
(Ukr.) (defining the “depository business” and the role of the Settlement Center);
Poslugi z rozmishennia CP na fondovih birzhah [Services for Placing Securities on Stock
Exchanges],
NATIONAL
DEPOSITORY
OF
UKRAINE
http://csd.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4543&Itemid=2
82&lang=en (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (furnishing an updated list of services
offered by the National Depository since October 12, 2013).
329 For a description, see, e.g., Public Joint-Stock Company “Settlement Center,”
ASS’N
OF
EURASIAN
CENT.
SEC.
DEPOSITORIES
(AECSD),
http://aecsd.com/en/aecsd/members/irsu/.
325
326
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exchange group,330 although there are, of course, several bourses
with a different ownership structure. 331 Similar to the Kazakh
market, the National Bank of Ukraine (“NBU”) owns about
seventy-eight percent of the shares of stock of the public
corporation SC, which may seem like a significant increase in the
state ownership accompanying the conversion of the company
from a closed to a publicly owned corporation in 2013. 332
Furthermore, as of December 2012, the NBU and the National
Capital Markets Committee cumulatively owned 50% of the ND.333
By the first quarter of 2014, state presence through the National
Bank and state-related companies increased dramatically.334
Such majority-ownership is not a statutory prerequisite for
either the SC or the ND. It may merely function as a short-term
transitional mechanism. However, there is still, for instance, a 25%
plus one share statutory minimum for permanent state
participation in a national depository335 To summarize, in all three
330 See, e.g., UNICREDIT, supra note 44, at 8–9 (presenting basic data on the
Ukrainian Exchange and the PFTS Stock Exchange, including their ownership
structure); About Exchange, UKRAINIAN EXCH., http://www.ux.ua/s111 (noting
that the Moscow Exchange has a 43% stake in the Ukrainian Exchange).
331
For the list of exchanges clearing transactions through the national
depository
system,
see
Exchanges,
NDU,
http://www.csd.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=178&Ite
mid=105&lang=ru. Some exchanges have their own clearinghouses.
332 Informatsia pro vlasnikiv istotnoy uchasti v banku [Information About Major
Shareholders
of
the
Bank],
RC,
http://www.settlement.com.ua/content/doc/about_company/pablik_informati
on/stryktyra_vlasnosti.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2014); AECSD, supra note 329
(explaining the old ownership structure).
333 NATSIONALNIY DEPOZITARIY UKRAYNY / NATIONAL DEPOSITORY OF UKRAINE,
RICHNYI
ZVIT
/
ANNUAL
REPORT
57
(2012),
available
at
http://www.csd.ua/images/stories/pdf/ndu_annual_report_2012.pdf.
333 CSD’s Ownership Structure, NATIONAL DEPOSITORY OF UKRAINE (2014),
http://www.csd.ua/images/stories/pdf/CSD_ownership_structure.pdf;
NATSIONALNIY DEPOZITARIY UKRAYNY / NATIONAL DEPOSITORY OF UKRAINE, RICHNYI
ZVIT
/
ANNUAL
REPORT
73
(2013),
http://www.csd.ua/images/stories/pdf/ndu_annual_report_2013.pdf
(reporting the following ownership shares of the National Depository: corporate
pension fund of the National Bank of Ukraine – 10.979%; State represented by the
National Securities and Stock Market Commission – 25%; National Bank of
Ukraine – 25%; State Savings Bank of Ukraine, Public Joint-Stock Company –
24.99%).
334 CSD’s Ownership Structure, supra note 333; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
333, at 73.
335 See ZU NDS, supra note 15, art. 10 (Ukr.) (providing that no party may
provide more than twenty-five percent of the capital for the depository); ZU DS,
supra note 15, arts. 9(4)(Ukr.) (requiring the Central Bank of Ukraine to have
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jurisdictions, extensive public ownership is a surprising aspect of
centralized C&S.
5.3. Ostensible Compliance with International Standards and Foreign
Models
5.3.1. Clearing Facilities
Just like in the West, all C&S entities are licensed and regulated
by their respective national regulators and the rules appear to be
prima facie compliant with the international requirements and
foreign transplants. Until mid-2013, the Russian “SEC,” the
Federal Financial Market Service, was a member of the IOSCO and
federal regulator in charge of supervising a range of capital
markets and financial services providers, including C&S. Today,
after a total overhaul of the regulatory system and a bold move
away from the twin-peak regulatory system, all financial market
regulation is consolidated under the aegis of the Central Bank. 336
In Ukraine, the national “SEC” and the National Bank of
Ukraine (“NBU”) regulate C&S activities.337 In addition, market
entities may establish SROs.338 Kazakhstan, by contrast, is a single
regulator country. Since the first regulations on payments, clearing
and fund transfers of 1995-1998 and disregarding a short break
between 2003 and 2011, the regulations have been centered on the
National Bank of Kazakhstan (“NKB”).339
twenty-five percent plus one of the shares of the Central Depository).
336 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii No. 645 [Decree of the President of
the Russian Federation No. 645] Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii
[SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2013, No. 30 (Part II), Item
4086.
337 See generally ZU DS, supra note 15 (Ukr.) (Ukrainian regulation of the
depository system); ZU NDS, supra note 15, arts. 2, 8 (Ukr.) (describing the twotiered structure of the NDS and the responsibility of the National Bank of Ukraine
to operate governmental securities and depository activities in participation with
the National Commission on Securities; and establishing that the National
Securities Commission, in collaboration with the National Bank of Ukraine and
the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, set rules and operational standards for
clearing and securities operations); ZU on Securities (2006), supra note 16, arts. 19,
19–3; ZU on Securities Market Regulation (1996), supra note 16, art. 7 (outlining
responsibilities of the National Commission on Securities and the Stock Market).
338 ZU on Securities (2006), supra note 16, art. 2.
339 See generally Istoriia Sozdaniia Komiteta [History of the Establishment of the
Committee], KOMITET PO KONTROLIU I NADZORU FINANSOVOGO RYNKA I
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The C&S Laws have recently undergone a series of structural
and conceptual changes across the sample. For instance, in
Kazakhstan, a new, albeit somewhat undetailed, Chapter on
Clearing was inserted into the 2003 Law on Securities Markets.340
In Ukraine, the 2012 Statute converted the ND into the key national
CSD and de facto required it to complete the dematerialization of
securities, improve finality of settlements and simplify the
exchange of trade instructions between clients and custodians.341
Similarly profound reforms occurred in Russia.
Perhaps most importantly, the Statutes endorse certain western
ССP and CSD concepts, like “netting,” changing bankruptcy law or
recognizing netting in derivatives accordingly. 342 Following the
FINANSOVYKH ORGANIZATSYI NATSIONAL’NOGO BANKA [KKNFRFO] [COMMITTEE
FOR THE CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE FINANCIAL MARKET AND FINANCIAL
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN] (May 7,

2012), http://www.afn.kz/?docid=516 (describing the stages of development of
the financial and banking sector in Kazakhstan, and describing the role of the
Committee for supervision); Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan No. 25
[Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 25] SOBRANIE AKTOV
PREZIDENTA I PRAVITEL’STVA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [SAPP RK] [COLLECTION OF
ACTS OF THE PRES. AND GOV’T OF KAZ.] 2011, No. 31, Item 387 (transferring
responsibility for monitoring financial activity from two separate governmental
organizations to the National Bank of Kazakhstan); PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN
KAZAKHSTAN, supra note 315, at 1–3, 12–13 (discussing earlier statutes and rules on
clearing); Postanovlenie Soveta Direktorov o Komitete po Kontroliu i Nadzoru
Finansovogo Rynka i Finansovykh Organizatsyi Natsional’nogo Banka ot 7
fevralia 2013, No. 28 [Decision of the Board of Directors of the NBK on the
Committee for the Control and Supervision of the Financial Market and Financial
Organizations of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan of Feb. 7, 2013,
No. 28] NATSIONAL’NYI BANK RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [NBK] [NATIONAL BANK OF
THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN] art. 12(28), 12(48), 12(51) (authorizing the National
Bank of Kazahkstan to monitor investments, trades, and clearing and other
financial transactions).
340 ZRK RCB, supra note 15, at ch. 15.1 (Kaz.) (added by the Statute No. 524IV, Dec 28, 2011).
341
See, e.g., Issue 5: UKRAINE - Law on the Depository System of Ukraine Summary of Market Changes, RBC INVESTOR & TREASURY SERV. (Oct. 10, 2013),
http://gmi.rbcits.com/rt/GSS.nsf/news/34F550D297EAB52B85257C0000481029?
opendocument.
342 See, e.g., FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, arts. 2(11), 14 (Russ.) (regarding
CSD concepts); ZU DS, supra note 15, arts. 1, 11-2, 19-4 (Ukr.) (2012) (concerning
CCPs). At an earlier time, netting might have been traditionally analogized with
“setoff” and was virtually inoperative in the context of insolvency.
Accompanying legislation on bankruptcy also needed to be amended. See, e.g.,
Special Update on Clearing and Netting in Russia, WHITE & CASE (Mar. 24, 2011),
http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/3931c67d-bf0f-45b4-a9aac2396b896549/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5dec3517-b4a3-44e1-ad03ce4fc8d6d173/alert-Special-Update-on-Clearing-and-Netting-in-Russia-
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western prototypes, the new regulations focus on risk
management, corporate governance, disclosure and membership
standards. On the regulatory side, the Laws delineate the key
policies, which C&S entities must pursue, 343 and detail the
authority of the national regulators concerning the mandatory
registration and licensing of C&S facilities, disclosure of their
clearing rules, and rule approvals.344
Information asymmetry problems are tackled along the
following dimensions: between clearing houses and regulators,
and between the houses and their members.
To assure
transparency, clearinghouses must provide public access to their
rules, are often required to indicate their depositories and banking
institutions managing their clearing pools, should specify the size
of their capital and guarantee funds, and need to ensure adequate
disclosure and publish annual corporate and financial reports.345
March%202011.pdf (discussing the introduction of netting rules in regard to
derivative instruments).
343
See, e.g., Postanovlenie Pravleniia Natsional’nogo Banka Respubliki
Kazakhstan o Vnesenii Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Nekotorye Normativnye
Pravovye Akty Respubliki Kazakhstan po Voprosam Kliringovoi Deiatel’nosti s
Finansovymi Instrumentami ot 4 iiulia 2012 No. 205 [Resolution of the Board of
the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Making Changes and
Amendments to Certain Normative Legal Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Concerning Clearing Activity with Financial instruments of July 4, 2012 No.205],
KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA] 2012, No. 375-376, Stat.
27 (requiring establishment of and compliance with rules on monitoring, capital
contributions, and other aspects of clearing activity); ZU DS, supra note 15, § 1, art.
5.6 (defining the relationship between various governmental bodies in the
regulation and management of securities accounts); id. § 9, arts. 19(3)–19(4)
(establising a national system for the regulation of clearing activity and outlining
a set of deliverables for the rules on clearing activity).
344 FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, arts. 4, 5 (Russ.); ZRK RCB, supra note 15,
arts. 77(1), 81 (Kaz.); ZU on Securities, supra note 16, art. 19-3; ZU on Securities
Market Regulation, supra note 16, art. 11 (Ukr.); ZU DS, supra note 15, arts. 9(7), 12,
15 (Ukr.).
345
See, e.g., FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 19 (Russ.) (requiring
companies to disclose information about their activities, as defined by the Central
Bank of Russia, and to provide easy access to that information by publishing it on
their website); ZU DS, supra note 15 (Ukr.) (establishing reporting and monitoring
requirements generally); Statut Publichnogo Aktsionernogo Tovaristva
“Rozrakhunkovyi Tsentr z Obslugovuvannia Dogovoriv na Finansovykh
Rynkakh” [Charter of the Public Joint–Stock Company “Clearing Center for the
Service of Contracts on the Financial Markets”] 2013, available at
http://www.settlement.com.ua/content/doc/about_company/pablik_informati
on/Statut.pdf (containing, in article 3.13.11 of the bank's charter, an example of a
joint-stock company's disclosure rules in conformity with Ukrainian law and
supporting the trading infrastructure established in the Law on the Depository
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Regular reporting to public authorities, including, in some
instances, data on the membership or members in default, is also
required.346
Clearing agreements should impose extensive reporting
requirements on clearinghouse members. The reports include
items ranging from compliance with specific operational and
financial membership standards to risk management, margining,
guarantee funds, and others.347
System in Ukraine); Vnutrishni Dokumenty [Internal Documents], ROZRAKHUNKOVYI
TSENTR Z OBSLUGOVUVANNIA DOGOVORIV NA FINANSOVYKH RYNKAKH [CLEARING
CENTER FOR THE SERVICE OF CONTRACTS ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS]
http://www.settlement.com.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=123&Itemid=153 (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (providing a list of internal
documents of the Clearing Center for the Service of Contracts on the Financial
Markets); Rules of Clearing Activity Concerning Transactions with Financial
Instruments, supra note 319, §§ 26, 38 (Kaz.) (containing the Kazakhstan stock
exchange rules for funds for clearing activity and on the fees associated with
using the stock exchange); Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Securities
Market, supra note 16, arts. 87–88 (instituting when and in what cases the stock
exchange can charge users for the finance of its services, and describing the
function of the stock exchange, including organizing auctions for various financial
instruments).
346
Postanovlenie Pravleniia Natsional’nogo Banka Respubliki Kazakhstan
ob Utverzhdenii Pravil Predstavleniia Otchetnosti Kliringovymi Organizatsiiami
ot 26 marta 2012 No. 119 [Resolution of the Board of the National Bank of the
Republic of Kazakhstan on the Approval of the Laws Regarding How Clearing
Organizations Should Report Their Activities of Mar. 26, 2012 No.119],
KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA 2012, No. 256–257; FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, arts.
7, 25, 26 (Russ.); Natsionalna komissia z tsinnih paperiv ta fondovogo rinku,
Rishennia, “Pro zatverdzhennja Polozhennja pro porjadok zvіtuvannja depozitarnimi
ustanovami do Nacіonal'noї komіsії z cіnnih paperіv ta fondovogo rinku,” June 11, 2013,
No. 992 [Decision of the National Commission on Securities and the Securities
Market of Ukraine on the Approval of the Procedure for Depository Institutions to
Report to the National Commission on Securities Market No. 992], OFITSIINYI
VISNYK UKRAINY [OFFICIAL BULLETIN OF CURRENT LEGIS. OF UKRAINE] 2013, No. 59,
Item 2123; Law of Ukraine on the National Depository System and Special
Features of Electronic Circulation of Securities in Ukraine, supra note 15, arts. 28,
29; Pravila Publіchnogo Akcіonernogo Tovaristva “Rozrakhunkovyi Tsentr z
Obslugovuvannia Dogovoriv na Finansovykh Rynkakh” [Rules of the Public Joint-Stock
Company “Clearing Center for the Service of Contracts on the Financial Markets”]
ROZRAKHUNKOVYI TSENTR Z OBSLUGOVUVANNIA DOGOVORIV NA FINANSOVYKH
RYNKAKH [CLEARING CENTER FOR THE SERVICE OF CONT. ON THE FIN. MARKETS] ch.
17,
available
at
http://www.settlement.com.ua/content/doc/doc/Rules_SC_Bank_24092013.pdf
.
347
See, e.g., FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, arts. 4, 24(9), 24(11) (Russ.)
(establishing the rules and functions of a collective clearing fund, which operates
as an insurance system to guarantee the payments of clearing companies by
taking fees from firms in the form of cash and assets; in the case of a breach,
withdrawing the value of unpaid obligations first from the assets contributed by
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The Statutes weigh fairness against risk management
considerations. Clearinghouses generally are not supposed to

the firm in breach; and, when such assets are insufficient, taking money from the
collective fund, which the breaching firm is obligated to pay back); Rules of the
Public Joint-Stock Company “Clearing Center for the Service of Contracts on the
Financial Markets,” supra note 346, at ch. 4, 7, 12 (describing general rules for
establishing, developing and using the guarantee fund; identifying the clients of
the “Clearing Center;” and installing a system for the analysis and management
of risks); Reglament obslugovuvannja klієntіv v publіchnomu akcіonernomu tovaristvі
"Rozrahunkovij centr z obslugovuvannja dogovorіv na fіnansovih rinkah" No. 41
[Customer Service Plan of the Public Joint-Stock Company “Clearing Center for the
Service of Contracts on the Financial Markets” No. 41], PRAVLINNIA PUBLICHNOGO
AKTSIONERNOGO TOVARISTVA "ROZRAHUNKOVIJ CENTR Z OBSLUGOVUVANNJA
DOGOVORІV NA FІNANSOVIH RINKAH", [BOARD OF THE PUB. JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
“CLEARING CENTER FOR THE SERVICE OF CONT. ON THE FIN. MARKETS”] 2013, arts. 4.3,
4.5,
available
at
http://www.settlement.com.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=123&Itemid=153 (establishing proper procedures for corporate entities to open,
first, accounts and, second, correspondent accounts); Pravila prodvazhennia
kliringovoy dialnosty publichnogo akcіonernogo tovaristva "Rozrahunkovij centr z
obslugovuvannja dogovorіv na fіnansovih rinkah” [Rules on Clearing Activity of the
Public Joint-Stock Company “Clearing Center for the Service of Contracts on the
Financial
Markets”]
2013,
available
at
http://www.settlement.com.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=123&Itemid=153 (outlining rules on clearing activity for the Clearing Center
that harmonize with the laws on the Ukrainian depository system, and with other
regulations on the securities and capital market); Vіdkrittja Klіringovogo Rahunku
[Opening of a Clearing Account], ROZRAKHUNKOVYI TSENTR Z OBSLUGOVUVANNIA
DOGOVORIV NA FINANSOVYKH RYNKAKH [CLEARING CENTER FOR THE SERVICE OF
CONT.
ON
THE
FIN.
MARKETS],
http://www.settlement.com.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=629&Itemid=100074 (last visited Nov. 23, 2014) (listing the steps to enrolling
with the Clearing Center, including consenting to the Center's procedures and
regulations, providing disclosure documents, and agreeing to use the clearing
system); Postanovlenie Pravleniia Natsional’nogo Banka Respubliki Kazakhstan
ob Utverzhdenii Pravil Osushchestvleniia Kliringovoi Deiatel’nosti po Sdelkam s
Finansovymi Instrumentami ot 24 fevralia 2012 No. 58 [Resolution of the Board of
the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Approval of the Rules on
Clearing Activities in Deals with the Financial Instruments of Feb. 24, 2012 No.
58], KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA 2012, No. 199-200, §§ 5, 6, 7, 21–27 (defining how a
corporation can become a clearing market participant; that clearing market
participants must provide financial reports and pay fees in accordance with the
clearing organization's rules to enter the market; that participants must inform the
clearing organization if they are under sanctions or participants to lawsuits; and
lastly, delineating the clearing organization's disclosure obligations and other
rules of activity); Birzhevoi Sovet AO “Kazakhstanskaia Fondovaia Birzha”
[KASE Board of Directors], Poriadok Osushchestvleniia Monitoringa i Kontrolia
Kliringovykh Uchastnikov [Procedure of Clearing Participants Monitoring and
Control]
July
23,
2012,
No.
9,
available
at
http://www.kase.kz/files/normative_base/clearing_monitoring.pdf (providing
rules for clearing participants).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss2/4

GUSEVA (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/20/2015 12:13 PM

KGB’S LEGACY

623

discriminate against single members within various clearing groups
(i.e., individual members may be assigned to groups) based on
financial stability and other criteria. This requirement is either
directly spelled out in the laws or supposedly proceeds from the
standardized rules, which the C&S entities must establish.348
Just like in the West, the regulators also seemingly
acknowledge the dangers of the vertical silo structure, including
commingling of assets of a clearinghouse and its parent
Violations of the fund safety rules are feasible,
exchange. 349
particularly considering that an exchange may keep reserve and
guarantee funds on its own accounts.350 The three jurisdictions in
question approach this problem with various degrees of clarity
and, therefore, affirmative signaling.
A promising provision in the Russian Statute, for example, is
that it attempts to safeguard the guarantee fund from potential
expropriation by the clearinghouse’s own management, a
circumstance well known to emerging markets.351 Perhaps for the
same reason, and, again, just like in the West, the Statutes often
require Chinese walls be built in order to segregate non-clearing
businesses from clearing divisions of a C&S facility and limit the
use of funds to the CCP obligations of the clearinghouse.352
Another encouraging signal is the special treatment of claims
and assets included in a clearing pool. Protective rules may apply

348 See, e.g., FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 11 (Russ.) (establishing that
participants of different categories may be treated differently but that participants
of the same category must be treated identically); KASE Board of Directors,
Procedure of Clearing Participants Monitoring and Control, supra note 347; Rules
of Clearing Activity Concerning Transactions with Financial Instruments, supra
note 319, § 6 (Kaz.) (requiring all companies to provide financial reports every
quarter and in specified formats); Resolution of the Board of the National Bank of
the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Approval of the Rules on Clearing Activities in
Deals with the Financial Instruments of Feb. 24, 2012 No. 58, supra note 347, § 6
(establishing that clearing market participants must provide financial reports and
pay fees in accordance with the clearing organization's rules to enter the market).
349 See infra note 419 and accompanying text.
350
Rules of Clearing Activity Concerning Transactions with Financial
Instruments, supra note 319, §§ 27–28 (Kaz.).
351 FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 24 (Russ.) (requiring collateral for loans
from guarantee funds).
352 Id. art. 5; Resolution of the Board of the National Bank of the Republic of
Kazakhstan on the Approval of the Rules on Clearing Activities in Deals with the
Financial Instruments of Feb. 24, 2012 No. 58, supra note 347, § 3; Rules of Clearing
Activity Concerning Transactions with Financial Instruments, supra note 319, §
26(1).
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with respect to margin payments and collateral set aside by
clearing members in separate clearing accounts.353 Such statutory
provisions assure the status of clearinghouses as conduits
concerned with the safety of asset transfers, their reliability and
finality of settlements, which is precisely in line with the
international standards and the IOSCO requirements. The strength
of such direct statutory signaling varies.
For instance, a positive signal was sent with respect to tax
claims. Considering the history of dubious prosecutorial actions in
Russia, tax-related obligations are a notorious subset of claims after
the YUKOS affair.354 They are specifically enumerated as claims
that cannot be used as a ploy for either a seizure of the assets of
clearing members or suspension of transfers. 355 The Ukrainian
statute merely limits state intervention to circumstances provided
for in law, supports asset segregation and leaves the determination
of the guarantee fund policies to the regulators.356
The regulators have also directed their attention to corporate
governance as a source of agency risk, particularly strong in an
opaque centralized marketplace. By way of example, “fraudsters”
are often directly banned from being appointed as directors or
executive officers. The candidates to the key D&O positions must
comply with certain qualification requirements. 357 The national
353
See, e.g., Rules of Clearing Activity Concerning Transactions with
Financial Instruments, supra note 319, § 16 (Kaz.) (discussing the liability of the
clearinghouses). See also FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 23(22) (Russ.)
(providing that in the absence of an agreement regarding a company’s individual
funds to the contrary, companies consent to the use of their individual funds to
protect the health of the overall fund). The Russian Statute also, for instance,
explicitly ensures that assets included in a clearing pool are segregated from other
assets of not only the clearinghouse itself but also its members in case of their
insolvency or the execution of judgment liens. Id. art. 18.
354
See, e.g., Allen v. Russ. Fed’n, 522 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D.D.C. 2007)
(dismissing investors’ lawsuit against the Russian Federation and several Russian
leaders concerning the renationalization of Yukos Oil Co.); In re Yukos Oil Co.,
321 B.R. 396, 400–04 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (regarding Yukos’s bankruptcy that
was the result of unpaid taxes).
355 FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 18 (Russ.).
356 ZU DS, supra note 15, arts. 19(7), 19(10) (Ukr.); Natsionalna komissia z
tsinnih paperiv ta fondovogo rinku, Rishennia ta fondovogo rinku 26.03.2013
[Decision of the National Commission on Securities and the Securities Market of
Mar. 26, 2013] 2013, No. 429, §§ II.16.2, VI.11 (Ukr.).
357
See, e.g., FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 6 (establishing a list of
requirements to hold a position as a director or key officer, including department
heads, chief accountants, and risk managers); Postanovlenie Pravleniia
Natsional'nogo Banka Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 24 fevralia 2012 goda No. 59 Ob
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regulators are supposed to serve as the primary safety valve in
charge of screening all candidates to key positions.358
Furthermore, not anyone may be a shareholder of the
clearinghouses. In Ukraine, e.g., the law limits the types of the
stockholders to only the NBU, licensed capital market participants,
and international C&S entities. In a similar vein, the SC is
regulated not only as a C&S facility but also as a bank that should
comply with the management requirements applied to licensed
banks and C&S entities.359
5.3.2. Depositories
The brand new provisions on CSDs complement the Clearing
Statutes or, alternatively, cover mixed C&S facilities.360 Just like in
the U.S. and other “developed C&S jurisdictions,” improving
efficiencies through such means as prompt settlement,
immobilization of securities and better information exchange are
important premises of the depository reforms. For instance, there
are requirements applied to communications between depositories

utverzhdenii Trebovanii k sisteme upravleniia riskami kliringovoi organizatsii,
usloviiam i poriadku monitoringa, kontrolia i upravleniia riskami v kliringovoi
organizatsii [Resolution of the Board of the National Bank of Kazakhstan from
February 24, 2012, 59, on Approval of the Requirements for the Risk Management
System of the Clearing Organization, Conditions and Procedures for Monitoring,
Control and Risk Management in the Clearing Organization] 2012, No. 59, §§ 24–
28 (introducing new requirements for monitoring and reporting); Polojenie o
Birzhevom sovete [Position of the Exchange Council], KASE, §§ 31-36, Mar. 31,
2011, No. 07 (establishing institutional requirements for the independence of
directors).
358 Position of the Exchange Council, supra note 357.
359
See, e.g., Zakon Ukrainy “Pro banki і bankіvs'ku dіjal'nіst” [Law of
Ukraine on Banking Activities], VІDOMOSTІ VERKHOVNOI RADY UKRAINY [GAZETA
VERKHOVNOI RADI OF UKRAINE] Sept. 20, 2001, No. 2740-III, art. 19 (listing
responsibilities and requirements of executive management); ZU DS, supra note
15, art. 15 (Ukr.) (specifying the entities, which may become shareholders of the
clearing facilities, empowering the SC to perform certain roles exclusive to banks,
and requiring the National Bank of Ukraine to maintain a twenty-five percent
plus one share in the SC); ZU on Securities, supra note 16, art. 27 (setting
requirements for stock market players).
360 See, e.g., ZRK RCB, supra note 15, art. 80(2.1) (establishing that when the
central depository has licenses for special banking operations, it may manage
payments between brokers and dealers); ZU NDS, supra note 15, art. 1 (Ukr.)
(defining depositories and clearing depositories).
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and other parties.361 To promote immobilization, CSDs are allowed
to open accounts in their nominee’s name, i.e., just like DTC’s
Cede&Co in the U.S.362
Another set of structural provisions fall under the rubric of
corporate governance and risk management. The corporate
governance principles are generally similar to those of
clearinghouses.
A CSD should have a board of directors,
management board, separate executive officer and risk
management, auditing and monitoring division.363 In a somewhat
Sarbanes-Oxley style, such divisions may be obligated to report
directly to the board. In order to improve the integrity of CSDs,
persons without necessary professional qualifications, disqualified
members of securities and derivatives markets and investment
managers, insolvent entities, individuals whose licenses have been
revoked or those having “blemished” reputation are prevented
from serving on the boards of directors or management boards of
CSDs.364
A curious local peculiarity related to corporate governance is
the mentioned above tilt toward domestic, both private or public,
stockholders and the limitations on the shareholder voting power.
Recall that some western clearinghouses did limit shareholder
361 For example, communications between a CSD and transfer agents and
record keeping must be electronic. See, e.g., FZ RF CD, supra note 15, arts. 12, 29
(requiring electronic records); Pravila osushhestvlenija depozitarnoj dejatel’nosti
[Rules on the Implementation of Depository Activities], SVOD PRAVIL AO
“TSENTRAL’NYI DEPOSITARII TSENNYKH BUMAG” KAZAKHSTANA [KCSD] [COLLECTION
OF RULES OF THE JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “CENTRAL DEPOSITORY OF SEC.” OF KAZ.]
Sept. 5, 2011, arts. 11, 14, 69 (describing electronic copies of orders, and discussing
the reporting to account holders); ZRK RCB, supra note 15, art. 18 (Kaz.)
(establishing obligations for electronic reporting within one month of a change in
obligations).
362 FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 24 (Russ.); Rules on the Implementation of
Depository Activities, supra note 361, art. 2; UNICREDIT, supra note 44, at 26
(indicating that Ukrainian law in this area is less settled).
363 FZ RF CD, supra note 15, arts. 5, 7; ZU DS, supra note 15, art. 12 (Ukr.);
ZRK RCB, supra note 15, art. 79 (Kaz.) (adding a state representative to the
management structure); Organizatsionnaia struktura [Organizational Structure],
KACD, http://www.kacd.kz/ru/about_KACD/structure/ (last visited Dec. 31,
2014); Postanovlenie Pravleniia Agentstva Respubliki Kazakhstan po
regulirovaniiu i nadzoru finansovogo rynka I finansovykh organizatsii ot 29
dekabria 2008 [Decision of the Board of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan
for Regulation and Oversight of Financial Market and Financial Organizations of
Dec. 29, 2008] 2008, No. 238, available at http://normativ.kz/view/23673/.
364 FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 5 (Russ.); ZRK RCB, supra note 15, art. 54
(Kaz.); ZU on Securities, supra note 16, art. 27 (Ukr.).
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voting rights with the purpose to assure fair and
nondiscriminatory corporate policies, fee setting and membership
mechanisms. It was accomplished primarily by the clearinghouses
themselves. In the sample, by contrast, these practices were
promoted by the state. This raises the question whether such
statutory restrictions are de facto an idiosyncratic way to exert
control over the management.
For instance, the Kazakh statute imposes a 5% ownership cap
on all private shareholders, which, of course, leaves the state as the
majority holder.365 The Ukrainian provisions are more ambivalent
and apparently attempt to strike a balance between the historically
domestically-oriented policies and the need to attract foreign
investments and to capitalize on international expertise. In this
vein, the Charter of the ND and pertinent Statutes restrict holdings
by a single stockholder and affiliates to 5% while simultaneously
allowing the international financial organizations and C&S entities
to own up to 25%, but preserving the 25% plus of stockownership
of the NBU.366
By contrast, the Russian CSD law is surprisingly more lenient
with respect to prescriptive ownership requirements. The law
primarily focuses on the types of shareholders, who, in a nutshell,
should be Russian entities and mainly licensed capital market
participants. 367 In certain cases, e.g., in application to CCPs,
holding of 5% or more of shares must be merely reported to the
Russian securities regulator.368
ZRK RCB, supra note 15, art. 78(2) (Kaz.).
Statut Publichnogo aktsionernogo tovarystva “Natsional’nyi depozitarii
Ukrainy” [Charter of the National Depository of Ukraine], Oct. 9, 2013, art. 4.4,
available at http://www.csd.ua/images/stories/pdf/ndu_statut.pdf. See also ZU
NDS, supra note 15, art. 10 (limiting the holdings of one shareholder to no more
than twenty-five percent of the depository’s capital); ZU DS, supra note 15, art. 9
(Ukr.) (requiring the National Bank of Ukraine to hold twenty-five percent of the
shares of the national clearinghouse plus one share, allowing foreign depositories
to hold twenty-five percent, and limiting the holdings of other shareholders to
five percent).
367 FZ RF CD, supra note 15, arts. 4–8 (Russ.); Prikaz Ministerstva Finansov
Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 13 aprelia 2012 g. N 46n “Ob utverzhdenii Poriadka
prisvoeniia statusa tsentral’nogo depozitariia” [Order of the Ministry of Finance
of the Russian Federation of Apr. 13, 2013 No. 46n “Concerning the Approval of
the Process for Receving the Status of Central Depository”], ROZ. GAZ. 2012, Item
No. 5795, § 2.
368 FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 7 (Russ.); Prikaz Federal’noi sluzhby po
finansovym rynkam ot 4 dekabria 2012 g. No. 12-103/pz-n "Ob utverzhdenii
Polozheniia o trebovaniiakh k ob”emu, poriadku, srokam i forme predstavleniia v
365
366
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The adverse selection, discrimination and fair participation
concerns are also touched upon in the regulations. The CSDs must,
similarly to clearinghouses, apprise their members of all rule
changes, publish financial reports, disclose all rules and tariffs,369
and may have to follow a code of conduct of depositories370 or use
only the tariffs preapproved by the government authorities. 371
Since nondiscriminatory membership is an international rule of
thumb, the regulations and bylaws call for member equality and
standardize the rules and CSD agreements.372
In some cases, the Statues specifically permit inter-linkages
with foreign CSDs and set forth germane precautions.373 Russian
CSDs, e.g., should not participate in offshore and suspicious
transactions through opening accounts on behalf of their members
in foreign CSDs in jurisdictions other than the members of the
OECD or signatories to several anti-money-laundering and anti-

federal’nyj organ ispolnitel’noi vlasti v oblasti finansovykh rynkov uvedomlenii
litsami, ukazannymi v abzatse pervom chasti 1 stat’i 7 Federal’nogo zakona “O
kliringe i kliringovoi deiatel’nosti” [Order of the Federal Financial Markets
Service (FFMS of Russia) of Dec. 4, 2012 No. 12-103/pz-n "On Approval of the
Requirements (Volume, Order, Timing and Form) of Presentations of
Notifications to the Federal Executive Authority on Financial Markets; and
Regarding Persons Referred to in the First Subparagraph of Paragraph 1 of Article
7 of the Federal Law ‘On clearing and clearing activity’"], ROZ. GAZ. 2013, Item
No. 62.
369 FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 17 (Russ.); ZRK RCB, supra note 15, art. 81
(Kaz.); Rules on the Implementation of Depository Activities, supra note 361. See
also ZU DS, supra note 15, arts. 25, 28 (highlighting the confidentiality of
information and granting the authorities discretion regarding specific disclosure
rules).
370 FZ RF CD, supra note 15, arts. 10–11 (Russ.).
371 ZU DS, supra note 15, arts. 9(10)–(11) (Ukr.).
372
FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 9(3) (Russ.); Ostanovlenie pravleniia
natsional'nogo banka respubliki kazakhstan ot 25 noiabria 2011 goda No. 180 O
vnesenii izmenenii i dopolneniia v postanovlenie Pravleniia Agentstva Respubliki
Kazakhstan po regulirovaniiu i nadzoru finansovogo rynka i finansovykh
organizatsii ot 29 dekabria 2008 goda No. 238 "Ob utverzhdenii Pravil
osushchestvleniia deiatel'nosti tsentral'nogo depozitariia" [Resolution of the Board
of the National Bank of Kazakhstan from Oct. 25, 2011 No. 180 on Making
Amendments and Additions to the Resolution of the Board of the Agency of the
Republic of Kazakhstan for Regulation and Oversight of Financial Market and
Financial Organizations on December 29, 2008, No. 238 "On Approval of Rules of
Activity of the Central Depository"], KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA 2011, No. 102-03,
§ 30 (amending the Decision of the Board of the Agency of the Republic of
Kazakhstan for Regulation and Oversight of Financial Market and Financial
Organizations of Dec. 29, 2008, supra note 363).
373 FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 25(4) (Russ.).
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terrorism treaties. 374 Finally, when it comes to the actual
operational risks of CSDs, the clarity and generality of the
regulations differ, although there is, ostensibly, nothing patently
contrary to the international requirements or the original western
models.
5.4. Conclusion
To conclude, the sample markets are transplanting followers,
borrowing foreign statutory structures. They have modeled their
C&S facilities after the western templates, along the lines of their
international commitments. Just like in the West, their public
authorities have become the linchpin of standard setting and
monitoring policies and should be consulted regarding all rules of
clearinghouses.375 The following Sections examine whether such
replication, upending the models onto preexisting entities operating
within a preexisting institutional and transactional culture, is
374 FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 24. See also Rules on the Implementation of
Depository Activities, supra note 361, art. 4 (requiring a Board’s approval of
accounts in foreign depositories, unless such depositories are ICSD or CSD
registered by foreign regulators).
375 See, e.g., FZ RF CD, supra note 15, arts. 9(4), 32 (Russ.) (providing that
internal documents – including those outlining rules for the activities of the
central depository, regarding internal controls, establishing a code of professional
ethics of the CD, risk management, and disclosures – must be approved by the
Federal Executive Authority in Financial Markets; and also providing that the
federal executive authority regulates and monitors activities of the CD, establishes
requirements for internal documents of the CD, takes measures to detect
violations of the requirements of the federal law, and enforces observance of the
law); ZRK RCB, supra note 15, arts. 77-1, 81 (Kaz.) (listing the principles and rules
of clearing entities and the central depository); Nacіonal'naya Komіsіja z Cіnnih
Paperіv ta Fondovogo Rinku [National Commission on Securities and Securities
Market], Reguljuvannja dіjal'nostі Central'nogo depozitarіju Ukraїni [Regulation of
the CSD of Ukraine], available at http://www.nssmc.gov.ua/activities/depozitary
(last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (Ukr.) (defining how to acquire the status of “Central
Depository” and that the National Commission on Securities and the Stock
Market must approve the status of CDs); Nacіonal'naya Komіsіja z Cіnnih Paperіv
ta Fondovogo Rinku [National Commission on Securities and Securities Market],
Lіcenzіjna
dіjal'nіst'
[Licensing
Activity],
available
at
http://www.nssmc.gov.ua/activities/license (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (Ukr.)
(establishing that the National Commission on Securities and Stock Market issues,
re-issues, annuls, and regulates the rules governing licenses on such stock market
activities as: dealer/broker activities on securities trading, depository activities,
managing assets of institutional investors, keeping pension funds, and clearing
activities).
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rational and efficient.
Recall that the reforms and recent mergers of C&S entities
potentially enable those facilities to clear and settle most domestic
transactions, a priori converting them into systemically important
institutions. The regulators, therefore, must act with particular
care within this market segment.
The key factor that should bear on the future implementation
of the reforms is the heavy state participation in the C&S industry
through not only policy guidelines and enforcement but also the
partial ownership of those facilities. Hence, the key analytical
question is whether, ceteris paribus, the C&S entities and their local
supervisors can mend the discussed above “trust linkages” and
serve as a centralized solution, reducing transaction costs in the
sample markets. Does the domestic “gradient,” focusing primarily
on local actors, properly address the local market inefficiencies? If
so, is the “gradient” a friend or foe?
6. ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSPLANT GRADIENT
6.1. Introduction
The sample economies have modified the transplant by
enhancing the role of the state. This Section examines the status of
the state as not only a regulatory authority but also a majority
owner of the C&S facilities.

Private
party

Private
party

C&S
facilities

Private
party

State =
shareholder+
regulator

Private
Party

In order for the C&S transplant to operate efficiently, market
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actors should trust the state in its now dual capacity as an efficient
standard setting and monitoring agent and a major shareholder. If
strong regulators and public ownership are to reduce transaction
costs, an environment conducive to trust must be created. It is
only logical that in order for this to happen, market participants
should believe that the state has the adequate licensing capacity
and that the enforcement agencies can assure orderly C&S.
Simultaneously, market participants must believe the state-related
C&S institutions are both willing to exercise oversight and capable of
properly monitoring their private members.376
6.2. Regulatory “Ability” and “Willingness” and Policy Signaling
6.2.1. Regulators as the Locus of Trust
Let us evaluate the gradient and state’s performance through
the same trust components of Ability and Willingness. Using the
same trust metrics is justified to the extent that, by virtue of the
state ownership, the regulators become somewhat analogous to
other market actors.
Their ability to be a proper “trust-enhancing” locus is a
function of several factors, including, inter alia, the expertise,
understanding of the nature and value of the monitored processes,
and capacity to react fast to stabilize the system and deploy
sophisticated financial analysis to rectify the errors of others.377
The centrality of the Ability and Willingness components hinges
on the actual authority of national regulators. To recap, the law in
the sample makes the regulators the fulcrum of the domestic C&S
systems. At this early stage, the reforms depend on their making a
proper judgment call. By contrast, the functions of the market
actors and courts are somewhat derivative. Specifically, it is not
clear if there is an explicit private right of action in case of, e.g.,
clearinghouses’ failures to enforce their own rules, 378 including
376 See, e.g., Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 37, at 335 (observing that welltransplanted Russian statutes “failed because the institutions purportedly created
were not credible – they did not provide the protection promised by the statute”).
377 The concept of expertise, of course, often serves as a general justification
of the regulatory state. See, e.g., Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries
for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 325–36 (2013) (discussing the
economic analysis in SEC decision-making).
378 That issue is not surprising in itself. Indeed, it is common in jurisdictions-
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both direct and derivative suits by members or shareholders. 379
Instead, most complaints should be reviewed by regulators and
C&S facilities or SROs in the first place, although aggrieved parties

transplant-origins. See, e.g., Kusch v. Mishkin (In re Adler, Coleman Clearing
Corp.), 1998 WL 551972, at 426–29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998).
379 Public enforcement seems to remain the most useful form enforcement of
C&S provisions. See, e.g., the sources listed in supra note 95 (describing class
actions). See also Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan ob Aktsionernykh Obshchestvakh
[ZRK ob AO] [Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Joint-Stock Companies],
VEDEMOSTI PARLAMENTA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [VP RK] [GAZETTE OF THE
PARLIAMENT OF THE RESPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN] 2003, No. 10, Item 55, arts. 58.8,
63.2 (imposing on shareholder derivative actions: 1. a scienter requirement, and 2.
a requirement that the shareholder(s) hold(s) at least five percent of the
outstanding stock); Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Rynke Tsennykh Bumag
[ZRK] [Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Securities Market] VEDEMOSTI
PARLAMENTA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [VP RK] [GAZETTE OF THE PARLIAMENT OF
THE RESPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN] 2003, No. 14, Item 119, arts. 108–11, 113
(establishing the authority of national regulators and liability provisions); KODEKS
RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN OB ADMINISTRATIVNYKH PRAVONARUSHENIIAKH [KOAP RK]
[CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATIONS] VEDEMOSTI PARLAMENTA RESPUBLIKI
KAZAKHSTAN [VP RK] [GAZETTE OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE RESPUBLIC OF
KAZAKHSTAN] 2001, No. 5-6, Item 24, arts. 193–94, 195–96; GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS
RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN (OBSHCHAIA CHAST’) [GK RK] [CIVIL CODE (GENERAL
SECTION)] arts. 292, 378–405 (Kaz.) (containing provisions on securities and civil
liability that appear more suitable for more typical trading in securities than C&S);
Zakon Ukrainy pro Derzhavne Reguliuvannia Rynku Tsіnnykh Paperіv v Ukrainі
[Law of Ukraine on State Regulation of the Securities Market] 1996, No. 51, Item
292, art. 8–11 (authorizing a national commission to regulate the Ukrainian
securities and stock markets); ISPOLNITEL’NYI KOMITET SNG, supra note 96, at 31–32
(providing statistics on regulatory actions of securities trading within the CIS
states); TSYVIL’NYI KODEKS UKRAINY [CIVIL CODE], supra note 16, arts. 194–98 (Ukr.)
(defining and providing general information about securities); Asters, Shareholder
Derivative Action as a Possible Protection Mechanism in the Ukrainian Corporate
Legislation,
US-UKR.
BUS.
COUNCIL
(Oct.
23,
2013),
http://www.usubc.org/site/member-news/shareholder-derivative-action-as-apossible-protection-mechanism-in-the-ukrainian-corporate-legislation;
ASTERS,
supra note 95, at 33–34 (discussing improvements in the legal protection of rights
of minority shareholders to address the abuse of the dominant position by
majority shareholders in Ukraine); Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Zashchite Prav i
Zakonnykh Interesov Investorov na Rynke Tsennykh Bumag, [Federal Law of the
Russian Federation on the Protection of the Rights and Legitimate Interests of
Investors in the Securities Market], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI
FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF LEGISLATION] 1999, No. 10,
Item 1163 (describing the role of Russian regulators and investor associations in
investor protection); Federal’nyi zakon RF ob Aktsionernykh Obshchestvakh
[Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Joint-Stock Companies], SZ RF 1996,
No. 1, Item 1, art. 71 (imposing a one percent ownership threshold on certain
derivative suits in corporate law disputes); APK RF, supra note 16, art. 53 (Russ.)
(expounding on representative actions in Russia); FZ RF on Securities, supra note
15, arts. 42, 44, 51 (on the authority of federal regulators).
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often may appeal their decisions in local courts.380 Appealing first
to the de facto owners, in turn, raises the “willingness” and
conflicts of interest concerns and may delay dispute resolution.
The second germane issue is that it is unclear how courts in the
sample would treat such cases. Even in the transplant-origin
jurisdictions, courts often exhibit deference to the judgment of
expert regulators like the SEC.381 After all, clearing and settlement
industry is very complex. It would not be surprising if Russian,
Ukrainian and Kazakh courts, just like their homologues in the
transplant-origins, followed the same route. The crucial difference
would be, of course, that the sample courts would be deferring to
the opinion of the state-owners-regulators.
6.2.2. Generalist Judiciary and Policy Signaling
Conflicts of interest aside, another problem is that there are no
regulatory decisions to consult and respect. Considering the
generality of statutory law, regulators typically need to set forth
interpretative ex ante guidelines for the courts and the market.382
380
Compare FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, art. 25 (Russ.) (providing the
Central Bank of Russia with regulatory authority and responsibilities), and FZ RF
on Securities, supra note 16, art. 51 (Russ.) (setting forth the liability principles,
describing enforcement actions, and providing for the right to appeal public
enforcement decisions in court), with ZRK RCB, supra note 15, arts. 98–100, 113
(providing that decisions regarding SRO membership are appealable in court but
that a refusal by an SRO to review a complaint against a member should be
reported to the regulators).
381 See, e.g., Pet Quarters, Inc. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 559 F.3d
772, 777–82 (8th Cir. 2009) (dismissing a claim on the basis of federal preemption
that the defendants’ SEC-approved program drove down the market price for
plaintiff’s shares and eventually put it out of business); Capece, Jr. v. Depository
Trust & Clearing Corp., 2005 WL 4050118, at 3–9 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (dismissing
plaintiff’s motion for remand, which alleged that Defendant’s failure to monitor
the Stock Borrow Program (SBP), an SEC-approved program, devalued Plaintiffs’
CYBR holdings); Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer Co., Inc. v. Depository Trust &
Clearing Corp., 485 F. Supp. 2d 387, 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (concluding that
plaintiff’s claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and the equivalent New
Jersey antitrust statute “fail as a matter of law” and “[a]llegations that DTC has
been arbitrary and capricious in excluding Olde Monmouth from the FAST
Program are properly addressed to the SEC, which oversees DTC’s activities as a
registered clearing agency”); Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Depositary Trust &
Clearing Corp., 168 P.3d 73, 76 (Nev. 2007) (affirming the decision that “federal
law in the area of clearing and settling securities transactions preempted
appellants’ claims”).
382
This may be, in part, an extension of the theory of incomplete law

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

GUSEVA (DO NOT DELETE)

634

4/20/2015 12:13 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 36:2

Such policy guidelines are particularly important where the
generalist judiciary may mistakenly apply well-trodden corporate
law concepts or misunderstand the nature of C&S processes.
Consider the following scenario. A court may unwind a
transaction or correct securities records.383 In a centralized C&S
structure, these simple judicial functions may cause a serious
securities market disruption. By way of example, about ten years
after the establishment of national C&S services in the U.S., the
Delaware Court of Chancery, reviewing a routine takeover claim,
encountered the following issue.384 In short, plaintiffs sought to
enjoin trades in the amount of $1.6 billion. If the court granted the
relief sought by the plaintiffs, the participant broker would
be disabled from making payment to the NSCC. The
NSCC’s function is to match, in every stock trade, the
buyer’s payment to the seller’s delivered stock. In order to
assure the liquidity and reliability of the market, the NSCC
in effect becomes both the buyer and the seller in all notyet-consummated trades. It does so by ‘netting’ the amount
owed not only for a particular stock, but also for all stocks
traded on the Exchange. . . . Should all the sellers of
[specific] stock deliver their . . . stock to the NSCC, and
should [the broker] not make payment against those
deliveries, the NSCC would likely be unable to pay the
sellers, thereby defaulting on the trades. As a consequence
of the $1.6 billion shortfall, NSCC would be unable to pay
numerous brokers, including brokers that were not even
involved in the . . . stock trades [at issue].385
This is a typical scenario where a default by a sizeable
positing regulators as better enforcers when the law is incomplete and
externalities substantial. Chenggang Xu & Katharina Pistor, Law Enforcement
Under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation 35 (LSE
STICERD Research Paper No. TE442, 2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract=396141. See
also Glaeser et al. (2001), supra note 38, at 855–57, 863, 897 (suggesting that
regulators are more motivated to properly understand the law even though they
may be more politically biased).
383 It is, of course, a common procedure. See, e.g., ZU DS, supra note 15, arts.
6–7 (listing the various powers of courts over the depository systems records and
functions).
384 Ivanhoe Partners, supra note 60, at 677.
385 Id. at 677–78.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss2/4

GUSEVA (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/20/2015 12:13 PM

KGB’S LEGACY

635

participant can trigger a chain reaction affecting unrelated
parties.386 Specific reasons for the default or unwinding may be
irrelevant from an efficiency perspective, i.e., it is immaterial why
the party-obligor defaults. In other words, the fact that a single
sizeable obligor belongs to the population of Bs, i.e., opportunists,
or Cs, i.e., unfortunate As, is almost irrelevant: a CCP and the
“survivors” may suffer the consequences and risks of the unwound
transaction all the same. If the ultimate default is sizeable enough
to topple the CCP’s risk management and exceed the member’s
contribution to the guarantee funds and margin payments, the
other CCP members will be affected and losses spread around.
Similarly important risks threaten CSDs. It is for the courts,
often deferring to the regulators, to decide, for example, whether
“parties [did or] did not intend that [a CSD] insure” deposits of its
participants, making it responsible for the losses incurred in
voidable transactions.387
It would be only natural if less experienced courts, absent clear
policy guidelines as a reference point, relied on the well-tested
principles of corporate or bankruptcy law and incidentally
disrupted C&S operations. In this sense, the swiftness of the
transplanting reforms leaves something to be desired, as the
regulators have not yet paid much attention to providing policy
guidelines to the judiciary.
6.2.3. Ex Ante Registration Policies and Expertise
The breathtaking speed of the reforms implies another
unfortunate problem. Although all sample regulators seem to
have experienced a very steep learning curve improving their
regulatory capacity,388 the countries might still have overestimated
their assessment ability, rushed into action and registered the C&S
386 On the risks of centralized C&S and CCPs, see supra notes 60–61 and
accompanying text.
387 Barney v. Liechtensteinische Landesbank, 866 F.Supp. 114, 118 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
388
IMF Report No. 04/338, supra note 103, at 39–41 (discussing the
improvements in Kazakhstan between 2000 and 2004); Ahdieh, supra note 86, at
303–13, 326–47 (discussing the limited but growing role of Russian regulators in
promoting market practices). All three sample countries are ordinary members of
IOSCO,
IOSCO.
IOSCO
Membership
and
Committee
Lists,
http://www.iosco.org/lists/.
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facilities too quickly. 389 This precipitousness, even ignoring the
common doubts about the quality of the regulatory expertise and
monitoring in certain transplanting economies,390 may be a serious
lapse in judgment.
By contrast, the SEC started with granting a temporary
registration and only in a little less than a decade did it
permanently register the major entities.391 It also worked slowly
through the maze of vertical silos to make sure the policies of the
new facilities were fair, nondiscriminatory, safe and sound. For
example, PHLX’s SCCP provided some percentage of its clearing
fund to participants – mostly exchange specialists but also
proprietary and customer omnibus margin accounts – for paying
for securities. The SEC carefully evaluated those policies and
mandated SCCP to “collect further assurances” regarding financial
stability of its participants and deliveries to insolvent or defaulting
participants.392 Similarly, after a careful review the Pacific Stock
Exchange’s C&S arms, the SEC emphasized that it was planning to
continue monitoring the agencies, even though it approved the
interim improvements in the fair representation of participants in
the management and financial responsibility standards for
applicants. 393
Even if the less experienced regulators in the sample are
currently conducting similar assessments of their domestic vertical
silos, they are evaluating already fully functioning market
monopolies. Potential mistakes are costly as a more concentrated
C&S marketplace creates new opportunities for fraudulent
practices.
6.2.4. Ex Post Monitoring
The timing problems impact not only the ex ante policy
389 See, e.g., Monetary & Cap. Mkts. Dep’t, Russian Federation: Financial System
Stability Assessment, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 31, 54–76 (Sept. 2011),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11291.pdf (discussing the
need for ex post and ex ante regulatory assessments). Id. at 75.
390 See e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 817 (observing that the culture of an honest
and competent regulatory apparatus is “the hardest to transplant.”).
391 See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 20,221 (Sept. 23, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg.
45167-02 (Oct. 3, 1983) (ordering the registration of nine clearing agencies).
392 Id. at 45176–77.
393 Id. at 46177–78.
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signaling and registration decisions but also the regulatory
monitoring capacity and integrity. Although clearinghouses are
merely conduits, they can be fraudulent ones, favoring selected
preferred constituencies. By way of example, it took years for the
more experienced SEC to detect massive C&S fraud and commence
an action against MCC and MSTC.394 The fraudulent “cash float”
produced by the agencies reached as much as $35 million a day.395
Hence, the two resultant, closely intertwined questions are the
ability and willingness of the sample regulators to uncover and
prosecute similarly profitable fraud schemes. Would the sample
markets reasonably believe that a state-regulator-owner would
forego a direct pecuniary gain to uphold the law and improve
market efficiency? Can potential prosecutorial oversight result not
only from the temporary inexperience leading to the inability to
detect and prosecute violations but also from the permanent
unwillingness to do so? The answer is unclear at this point.
6.2.5. Developing Proper Policy Guidelines:
The Spillover Effect and Uncertainty
The risks of C&S structures are often not self-contained and
may spill over to corporate management and other unrelated areas
of business law. For instance, the sample jurisdictions, as
discussed above, promote certificateless and indirect securities
holding mechanisms and immobilization of securities.396 Indirect
ownership registration and certificateless, “street name” and
“direct registration system” holdings are commonplace efficiencymaximizing cogs of the modern C&S machine. 397 Even though
physical certificates registered in an investor’s name on the issuer’s
books have become a rare animal, indirect holdings, surprisingly,
still stir up corporate governance disputes.
394 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Civil Penalty, SEC v. Midwest
Clearing Corp., No. 92CV07191, 1992 WL 12617990 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (enjoining the
clearing agency’s practices as in violation of several regulations of the Exchange
Act).
395 Id. §§ 11–13 (alleging that MCC and MSTC, subsidiary clearing agencies,
entered false bookkeeping entries).
396 See supra Section 5.
397
Incidentally, they also help to mitigate share certificate fraud and fix
brokerage recordkeeping problems. See, e.g., UNSAFE AND UNSOUND, supra note
195, at 145–50 (describing germane industry problems in the 1960s).
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An example is the exclusion of shareholder proposals from
proxy materials if a shareholder fails to show stock ownership.
The national rules both in the West and in the sample may be clear,
simple and self-explanatory: hold, propose and vote.398 A wrinkle
is the intricacy of the modern multilayered holding system, where
there is often an introducing broker, who “clears its customers’
trades through and establishes accounts on behalf of its customers
at a broker-dealer that is a participant of a registered clearing
agency,”399 a clearing broker-member of a CSD and the CSD itself.
As a result, proving ownership may become problematic if all
shares are registered in the CSD nominee’s name and the
introducing broker, let alone her customers, has nothing to do with
the CSD.400
Unfortunately, if the management has reasons to prevent
shareholders from raising certain issues or voting, such
bureaucratic uncertainties may be a way to go. It is the regulators’
no-action letters that provide the primary point of reference to the
industry and courts and ensure that “petty games-playing” by the
management will not be tolerated.401
Looking back at the sample economies, the obvious question is
what if the enterprise in question belongs to politically connected
individuals or is majority owned by the state? Will the market
perceive that as an additional reason to label the putative
“regulatory owner-intermediary” and its no-action letters as
“untrustworthy”?

398 Compare 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8 (2011) with FZ RF ob AO, supra note 16, arts.
51, 53 (Russ.) (determining shareholders of record and providing that a holder of
at least two percent of shares may submit a proposal); ZRK ob AO, supra note 16,
arts. 14, 39 (Kaz.) (describing general voting rights and limiting the right to make
most proxy proposals to the holders of more than ten percent of voting stock); ZU
pro AT, supra note 16, arts. 25, 34, 38 (specifying basic shareholder rights,
composition of shareholder lists and proposals, which may be submitted by any
shareholder, although only 5% shareholders’ proposals must be included by law).
399 Letter from William A. Hines, Special Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to
Denise Faltischeck, Assoc. Gen. Couns., Hain Celestial Grp. (Oct. 1, 2008); SEC
No-Action Letter, Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 2008 WL 4717434 (Oct. 1, 2008).
400 Id. See also Apache Corp. v. Chevedden, 696 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726–27 (S.D.
Tex. 2010) (discussing how a multiparty C&S system operates).
401 Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 129804, at 3
(Mar. 4, 1999). See also Apache Corp. v. Chevedden, 696 F. Supp. 2d 723, 735–37
(S.D. Tex. 2010) (holding that a corporation may exclude proposals from an entity
that cannot show proof of stock ownership under SEC regulations).
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6.2.6. Sliver of Silver Lining
Self-evidently, there can be cases where it is in the best interest
of the state, whether an owner or not, to protect C&S facilities. A
germane example is the famous Elliott litigation, 402 which
prompted EU countries to shield clearing agencies from similar
disputes in the future.403 Another example is bankruptcy cases.
What happens if, for instance, in contentious bankruptcy
proceedings, a C&S entity distributes the proceeds to stockholders
identified in the instructions provided by another SRO, like an
exchange, and such instructions happen to differ from the list of
shareholders entitled to the distribution as of the effective date of a
reorganization plan?404 Should a clearinghouse be held liable?
Imagine another scenario where a CSD, as a disbursing agent
in reorganization, disburses funds to the subordinated noteholders,
and senior noteholders, obviously, contest the distribution and file
claims for turnover and money damages.405 In which case would a
CSD be liable for performing ministerial conduit functions and
have to unwind transactions?406
These are all possible examples where enhanced pro-state
sentiments may assure the protection and independence of C&S
facilities. The apparent results would be an alignment of the C&S
402
Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, General Docket No.
2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8th Chambers, Sept. 26, 2000) (looking
through the ministerial nature of C&S facilities as third-party payment conduits).
See also Michael Bradley et al., The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their
Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 292–93
(2010) (discussing the Elliott litigation and the success of a hedge fund against
Peru for unpaid debt).
403 An injunction was issued against a settlement agent, Euroclear in that
case, to protect sovereign debt holders. Euroclear, obviously, was not even a
party to the disputed indentures. See, e.g., Jonathan Blackman & Rahul Mukhi,
The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other
Legal Fauna, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 57 (2010) (describing generally a
corporation’s efforts to enforce its judgment against Peru under the pari passu
theory).
404 Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260, 262
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a self-regulatory agency was immune from a suit for
“conduct falling within the scope of the SRO’s regulatory and general oversight
functions”) (quoting D’Alessio v. NYSE, 258 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2001)).
405 In re Onco Inv. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank MN Nat’l Assoc., 222 Fed. Appx.
100, 2007 WL 173779 (3rd Cir. 2007).
406 Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260, 264–65
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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model with state interests.
6.2.7. Public Ownership and Questionable Willingness to Enforce
the Law
Let us now have a closer look at the Willingness component.
Much ink has been spilt on the common buzzwords such as
“corruption” and “political risks” and their behavioral and
economic foundations,407 naturally undermining such willingness.
The two other preeminent issues are: (1) the conflicts of interest
due to the domestic gradient of state stockownership and (2) the
belief that the national governments should support systemically
important institutions when a financial calamity breaks out.
First, in the sample countries, C&S facilities operate in a fairly
monopolistic market. Such structure may be typical elsewhere and
it is not unusual for regulators to support the single-utility
approach. In the Bradford case, for instance, the SEC supported
market concentration and argued that although the regulators
must not impose undue burden on competition, a national clearing
system would be more efficient than its alternatives.408
The primary difference with the sample economies, of course,
is the direct or indirect state ownership of the national C&S
facilities. Even assuming away the negative correlation between
state ownership and efficiency, for the sake of the argument,409 the
most conspicuous danger is the combination of state ownership,
the regulatory authority of the state, and the monopoly power of
the centralized clearinghouses.
Centralized entities even in the West are prone to flex their
muscles, prompting antitrust disputes. The perpetual evolution of
407
For an excellent overview of the behavioral and “rational” aspects of
corruption in Post-communist economies, see generally Stephan (1997), supra note
37; Stephan (1999), supra note 121.
408 The first major decision in this area was, obviously, the Bradford case,
where regional exchanges located outside New York and their clearing agencies
challenged the NSCC registration arguing that it was on the way to becoming a
monopoly. Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp. v. S.E.C, 590 F.2d 1085, 1107–11 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
409 In this respect, the sample countries should not differ from the rest of the
world. See, e.g., Valentin Zelenyuk & Vitaliy Zheka, Corporate Governance and
Firm’s Efficiency: The Case of a Transitional Country, Ukraine, 25 J. PROD. ANALYSIS
143, 144 (2006) (generally confirming previous findings on a negative association
between the share of state ownership in a firm and its efficiency).
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C&S services constantly generates new opportunities and
incentives for a monopoly to push rival entities, like transfer agents
or smaller private inventors of similar software products, out of
business.410 “[A] monopoly over the entire securities depository
[and/or clearing] industry,”411 theoretically, may be in a position to
arbitrarily and capriciously exclude certain undesirable parties or
categories of parties from participation in its programs or retaliate
against members.412
In the sample countries, the danger is palpable. The state
ownership may generate conflicts of interest and reduce the
willingness of the local regulators to promote competition or
investigate member complaints at the expense of partially stateowned entities. The courts in the sample might simply follow the
state policies in such a complicated matter.
The second issue is the financial stability of the clearinghouses
and the willingness of the state to support such systemically
important entities in case of a crisis. It is, of course, selfexplanatory that states prefer to incentivize C&S facilities to be
more self-reliant and prudent by means of better membership
rules, margining policies, and other mechanisms. The underlying
policy objective is minimizing the expectation of possible bailouts
and moral hazard concerns.413 At the same time, it is obvious to
the market and policymakers that in exigent circumstances the key
facilities may rationally expect to be bailed out or, at the very least,
that the state will provide liquidity or support them in other ways
necessary to keep the national C&S system afloat. The major
example would be the actions of the Fed during the 1987 market
crash.414
The policies of our sample economies, by comparison, upend
these hopes. If history and statistics are any guide, market actors
410
See, e.g., Chapdelaine Corp. Securities & Co. v. Depository Trust &
Clearing Corp., 2006 WL 2020950 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying a motion to dismiss
antitrust claims).
411 Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer Co., Inc. v. Depository Trust & Clearing
Corp., 485 F. Supp. 2d 387, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
412 Id. at 389–91.
413 See supra Section 3.
414 See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 6 (concluding that the Federal Reserve was
important in protecting the clearing and settlement systems during the crash);
Carlson, supra note 217, at 17 (“In an effort to restrain the declines in financial
markets and to prevent any spillovers to the real economy, the Federal Reserve
acted to provide liquidity to the financial system and did so in a public manner
that was aimed at supporting market confidence.”).
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may mistrust their governments and question whether they would
provide assistance in time of need. The most illustrative example
is the financial crisis of 1998, caused by defaults on sovereign debt.
The crisis ultimately wiped out the national banking systems.415 A
more recent case is the impromptu February 11 decision of the
Kazakh National Bank to devalue the national currency by 20%.416
Would the state ownership be a sufficient incentive to spend
public resources on monitoring and support of clearing agencies?
Alternatively, would the sample states prefer to manipulate their
scarce resources in favor of certain institutions and then
recapitalize the system once the storm has blown over? The
answers to these questions are again uncertain.
6.3. “Willingness” and “Ability” of C&S Facilities as Standard Setters
6.3.1. Willingness or Lack Thereof
If the trust linkages between the state and the market and
among market participants malfunction, in theory, private parties
may find respite in the ability and willingness of clearinghouses to
act as expert intermediaries among all involved participants. In
this sense, a conduit like a clearinghouse must remain neutral
while maintaining certain standards of membership quality,
determine its exposure, and ostracize defaulting Bs. By doing so, it
is supposed to maintain and raise the level of trust and
transparency as performance proceeds and ultimately reduce
transaction costs for all parties concerned.417 The willingness of a
clearinghouse to perform its obligations impartially is the fulcrum
of an orderly C&S process.
Unfortunately, all clearing agencies are sometimes prone to
favor affiliated parties, members or exchanges and may violate
corporate governance and fund safety rules. In Europe, for
instance, Clearstream was a subject of a protracted moneylaundering investigation, which led to changes within the
415 See supra note 104 and accompanying text (referencing sources on the
1998 market crash).
416 See, e.g., Jack Farchy & Delphine Strauss, Kazakhstan Devalues Tenge by
Almost 20%, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5a30f3e4931a-11e3-b07c-00144feab7de.html#axzz2tDpvACbG.
417 See supra Section 3.
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management, long-term litigation and fines.418 In the U.S., in 1997,
administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings were instituted
against SCCP and Philadep, which covered parent-exchange’s cash
deficits by transferring funds from their operating account.419 In
the end, the agencies exited the C&S industry. 420 Due to the
centrality of only a few clearinghouses to the sample economies,
the consequences of similar favoritism or conscious disregard of
the corporate governance and financial stability rules may be both
serious and unpredictable.
Another host of issues arise when members and investors are
underrepresented in the management of a non-user-owned
structure. For instance, an options clearinghouse may adjust the
unit of trading, the exercise price, or the underlying security in
such cases as, e.g., stock distributions, splits, reorganizations or
mergers. Writers of options are sometimes naturally suspicious of
the adjustments. 421 If they are not fairly represented in the
management, market participants will always be uncertain
whether an adjustment is motivated by valid business reasons.
What if, on the top of it, the dubious adjustment involves a hostile
takeover undertaken by persons affiliated with the clearinghouse,
the state or other “almighty” parties?422 How much should a party
trust the clearinghouse and the regulators approving its rules and
how much should the decision by the house be shielded from
scrutiny by the business judgment rule and the regulatory
approval by the state-owner?
Alas, even if the members are represented in the governance
structure and a C&S facility is a SRO, that does not ensure the
operational fairness and nondiscriminatory decision-making. The
nature of a SRO is such that potentially low quality members may
418 Chris Kentouris, Clearstream Shakeup Tips Balance, 13 SEC. INDUS. NEWS 21
(May 21, 2001); Patricia Hurtado, Clearstream Banking and Iran Central Bank Probed
by
U.S.,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Apr.
01,
2014),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-04-01/clearstream-banking-andiran-s-central-bank-probed-by-u-dot-s.
419 In the Matter of Stock Clearing Corp. of Phila. and Phila. Depository
Trust Co., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-9360, 1997 WL 457495, at 3 (Aug.
11, 1997).
420 Id. at 8.
421 See, e.g., Brawer v. Options Clearing Corp., 633 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (detailing a claim that the clearing agency failed to follow its rules on option
contracts adjustment in response to a plan of recapitalization).
422 Aidis & Adachi, supra note 105, at 398 (noting that in Russia, bankruptcy
serves as a method of hostile takeover).
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unite into low quality SROs. Such a licensed infrastructural
intermediary may be prone to favor certain groups and will be a
fortiori unwilling to screen out market abuses, charge appropriate
risk-based margins and fund contributions or improve the quality
of its members. East European economies are familiar with such
examples only too well.423
Finally, due to the lack of competition in the C&S segment, the
complying As might have to join potentially low-quality
clearinghouses and be outnumbered by Bs. Recall that by law,
C&S entities must be incorporated as domestic entities in all three
jurisdictions.424 If the numbers of local Bs are substantial, so will
their command of the management. The low-quality opportunistic
B-members, all sharing similar low-trust expectations regarding
counterparty’s performance and the state’s ability and willingness to
intervene, may find additional benefits in shirking. 425 This,
theoretically, may convert the moral hazard of centralized C&S
into a more systemic, trust-related issue.
6.3.2. Doubtful Monitoring and Enforcement Ability
Now, let us assume that, theoretically, a clearinghouse is
willing to properly perform its monitoring and risk-mitigating
requirements, meaning that only the ability aspect of the trust
linkage is questionable. In that scenario, an important issue is how
a C&S facility operating in a low-trust jurisdiction but acting in
good faith is supposed to assess the riskiness of the population of
market actors-members, establish efficient risk-management
policies, such as guarantee funds and margining, monitor
compliance as transactions proceed, and introduce other riskmanagement policies.
The first concern, particularly acute in volatile developing
markets, should be the underestimation of the joint and individual
participants’ exposure by the novice-like clearinghouses. Proper
risk management always requires a very broad knowledge of the
creditworthiness of C&S members. Measuring certain risks is
423 See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 789 n.9 (citing sources examining how
powerful members of Czech SROs engaged in tunnelling).
424 See supra Section 5.
425
By shirking here I mean socially wasteful shirking in contrast with
efficient breach. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 128.
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difficult even for a more experienced clearinghouse operating in a
stable market. This concern is exacerbated by the “trust problems”
in the sample.
Large numbers of low-quality members of an honest, A-type,
clearinghouse may intentionally obstruct information exchange.
Even if a clearinghouse can verify certain prudential and capital
requirements at member registration, in the long term, it may not
necessarily be aware of the post hoc instances of shirking as
companies begin to ignore proper risk management and internal
operational requirements. 426 Continuous policing of these rules
and the observability of shirking become the key to efficient C&S.
A range of internal or external causes, obstructing the observability
of the members’ nature and financial soundness, are similar to
those of the private-private scenario. In addition, the increased
complexity of contractual arrangements, particularly in derivatives
markets, may interfere with monitoring and enforcement
efficiency.
Furthermore, a shortage of resources, such as expertise and
capital, and the discussed above market volatility and opacity may
hinder oversight.
A clearinghouse under stress may
simultaneously lose the capacity to process information efficiently
and assess future exposure.427 In the sample jurisdictions, if the
statutory minimum capital requirements are any indication,
clearinghouses, not taking into account member contributions, also
have minimal financial resources. 428 Similarly, SROs in some
sample economies have historically had limited capacity and
resources to effect proper oversight.429

426
Other parties might also be unable to use the existing rules due to
misunderstanding, low awareness of the available mechanisms, etc. See, e.g., IMF
Report No. 04/338, supra note 318, at 45–47 (mentioning that “[w]hile there are
requirements for internal control procedures to assure compliance with the laws
and regulations, as well as requirement of risk management capacity and
procedures aside from the requirement to meet minimum excess capital,
participants do not perceive any significant changes yet. Increasing awareness
and understanding of these procedures through workshops and campaigns is
required.”).
427
See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 6, at 144 (describing the potential
weaknesses leading to the inability of the clearinghouse to function under stress).
428 Taking the Russian market, the largest in the sample, as a benchmark, the
agencies’ capital requirements are clearly minimal. FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15,
art. 8 (Russ.); FZ RF CD, supra note 15, art. 15 (Russ.).
429
IMF Report No. 04/338, supra note 318, at 38 (discussing the limited
capacity of SROs in Kazakhstan).
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A market may become aware of the analytical and financial
limitations of a C&S institution. Self-evidently, it may lead to more
instances of shirking and raise moral hazard concerns. In addition,
a mere apprehension of defaults may shake up the system, just as it
almost happened during the U.S. 1987 market crash.430 The sample
economies have not addressed these issues properly.
The Statutes in some sample economies do attempt to minimize
the need for ex ante assessments by limiting the liability of a
clearinghouse to only its contractual obligations. Clearinghouses
are granted certain discretion in this area.431 The question remains
whether they can exercise that discretion properly.
Often, a party facing the challenges of long-term contracting in
a market laden with uncertainty collaborates with its
counterparties and exchanges more information in order to reduce
its risks and achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. As discussed
earlier in this Article, western C&S entities have long resorted to
such mechanisms through the user-owned structures, market
advisory committees and other channels. The sample economies
may, self-evidently, transplant the same ideas and enhance
collaborative feedback mechanisms.
There is a reason to be cautious however. Assuming many
parties in the sample operate in an endgame scenario with plentiful
exit strategies and there are comparatively fewer reputable longterm players, the value of cooperation becomes questionable. So
does the ability of a clearinghouse to punish the defectors.
Coming back to the A-W-E analysis, it means that as a
corollary, fair-type clearinghouses would have to set up higher
margins and guarantee fund payments that would not be
necessary under normal market circumstances. Higher posttrading costs increase the cost of capital, potentially producing a
negative effect on trading and GDP432 and undermining the value
of the transplanted clearinghouses as efficiency-enhancing
facilities. Moreover, the existing gradient of state ownership is illsuited to the task of alleviating these concerns and improving C&S
efficiency.
430 Many brokers and FCMs were in dire straits and mere rumors regarding
participants’ solvency might prompt return of securities in exchange for collateral.
See generally supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
431 See, e.g., FZ RF Clearing, supra note 15, arts. 3, 13, 14 (Russ.) (evaluating
contractually determined liability limits and avoiding performance).
432 Schulze & Baur, supra note 5, at 17–18.
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7. IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS: POLICY PROPOSALS
To conclude, there is a danger that the discussed above
behavioral and socioeconomic patterns, left unaddressed by the
regulatory reforms and state ownership requirements, may create a
C&S model characterized by the following principal features. First,
future performance assessment and long-term cooperation remain
broken along the following “trust linkages”: (1) between the state
and the market, (2) among private market actors themselves, and
(3) among market groups including clusters of private parties, such
as broker-dealers, the state and intermediaries like self-regulatory
organizations.
Second, in these muddy waters, conversion of private parties
from the reputable to the opportunistic and nonperforming is
unobservable to the market, regulators and SROs. Third, with time,
micro-level transactional opportunism may transform into “thick
market” contractual practices. Consequently, it is conceivable that
the segment of complying parties, A-parties, begins to shrink over
time, according to the described above lemons equilibrium
scenario. Simultaneously, the B-members of C&S facilities, or their
customers, remain continuously incentivized to defect.
In this sense, the domestic “gradient” in the foreign
transplants, viz., a protectionist statutory focus on the national
actors and state ownership of the regulated institutions, creates a
circular self-propagating system that feeds on itself.
By
exacerbating the foregoing dangers, the gradient questions the “fit”
of the transplant. As a result, these deficiencies may produce a
chilling effect on trading and undermine the value of C&S
arrangements as transaction-cost-minimizing transplants.
The purpose of this Article is, of course, to highlight these
concerns. However, I would like to tentatively suggest a few
corrective strategies, which, by themselves, merit further research.
In short, it is probably impossible to change behavioral patterns or
socioeconomic conditions fast and by means of transplanting. A
more successful method, perhaps, is to mend the broken trust
linkages by breaking with the “national law-market paradigm”
and introducing a foreign institutional umpire.
As a potential avenue for reforms, national policymakers might
consider the following options. Certain transactions may be
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cleared abroad. Most importantly, however, to the extent that
transactions should be cleared locally, the rules regarding domestic
ownership, particularly state ownership, of C&S facilities should
be amended.
In this vein, national policymakers should allow the national
C&S entities be acquired by reputable foreign entities, such as
DTCC, Clearnet and others. Alternatively, a joint venture with a
majority participation and control of a reputable foreign
clearinghouse may be formed. Such an entity would have
sufficient expertise to introduce and maintain proper risk
management and margining policies. As a certain form of
guarantee of performance by domestic participants, some margin
payments and guarantee funds might be transferred to the
accounts operated by the foreign majority-owner in a jurisdiction
outside of the sample countries.
To recapitulate, the purpose of this foreign participation is
mending the broken “trust linkages.” First, private parties and the
state per se may be more inclined to trust such international and
highly reputable self-regulatory organization, monitored by expert
foreign supervisors in the countries where the transplants
originated at least half a century ago. Second, transacting private
parties should feel reassured that the entity would act as a reliable
conduit for all trades.
Finally, in order to minimize the risks of the foreign participant
itself, there is a clear need to provide some form of an explicit
government guarantee, both economic and legal, to mend the
public-private trust linkage. This, self-evidently, may take a
variety of forms, including stabilization and anti-expropriation
clauses, sovereign immunity waiver clauses, arbitration
agreements and other mechanisms. Provided that the foreign C&S
participant is capable of designing and maintaining appropriate
risk management systems, waterfall structures, prudent margining
and other safety valves, the state must also reciprocate and
credibly commit to its role as a financial “guarantor.” Such
guarantee should operate as a “lender of last resort” of sorts,
assuring the foreign investor and the local market actors that they
would be made whole in case of an unforeseen severe contingency
like a financial crisis. By doing so, the state would signal to both the national market and the now foreign-owned domestic
clearinghouse – that it would not defect. Instead, it would be ready
to stand by as the “insurer” in case of a serious risk to the financial
stability of a C&S facility.
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To conclude, such a structure would allow the national markets
to capitalize on the positive externalities produced through
extensive reliance on reputable foreign actors. The developing
economies may effectively borrow reputational and trust-related
mechanisms through foreign entities, as opposed to legal
frameworks distorted by unnecessary and inefficient “domestic
gradients.”
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